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Abstract 
 
This introductory chapter identifies the research question that this thesis investigates as: 
what is entailed by a student-centred approach to legal education? The question is 
explicated and an account of its genesis is given. Problems of method and methodology are 
discussed and my own approach, which involves a type of triangulation combined with 
methods derived from academic law, is explained at the beginning of the discussion of the 
first publication. Each of the prior publications that contribute to this thesis is described in a 
thematic summary, and its role in the investigating of the question is explored. The 
reception and significance of each publication is discussed, although this is done only once 
for my monograph from which three chapters are incorporated into this thesis as three 
separate publications. A section on each publication except the first publication discusses its 
connections with the earlier publications that comprise this thesis. A final section reflects on 
the publication’s relationship with the research question, and except for the fifth 
publication, its connections to later publications that comprise this thesis. This chapter ends 
with a concluding section that demonstrates how my earlier publications and this chapter 
cohere to form a single thesis and demonstrating rigour and making a novel contribution to 
human knowledge. It does this by both collecting in one place relevant features of the 
publications already identified in this chapter and by identifying new features of the 
publications including this chapter that can only be identified through a review of the whole 
thesis. The thesis concludes that a student-centred approach to legal education should be 
adopted. 
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What is entailed by a student-centred approach to 
legal education? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This thesis seeks to answer the question:  
What is entailed by a student-centred approach to legal education?  
It consists of this introductory chapter and five of my previous publications:  
(1) ‘What Students Care About and Why We Should Care in Affect: The Impact of 
Emotion on Learning and Teaching the Law (2011) (‘What students care about’),1  
(2) ‘Values ethics and legal ethics: the QLD and LETR Recommendations 6, 7, 10, and 
11’ (2014) (‘Values, ethics and legal ethics’),2  
(3)  (4) and (5) Chapters One, Four and Eight of the book Uses of Values in Legal 
Education (2015) (‘Uses of Values’).3 
The research question contains three significant terms which merit definition as the outset. 
The term “student-centred” is derived from the idea of learner-centred education which 
was given its classic development by John Dewey and is founded upon three insights: 
 
1 Graham Ferris and Rebecca Huxley-Binns, ‘What Students Care About and Why We Should Care in Affect: The 
Impact of Emotion on Learning and Teaching the Law’ in Paul Maharg and Caroline Maugham (eds), Affect and 
Legal Education: Emotion in Learning and Teaching the Law (Ashgate 2011) 195-210. As lead author with 
Rebecca Huxley-Binns. 
2 Graham Ferris, ‘Values ethics and legal ethics: the QLD and LETR Recommendations 6, 7, 10, and 11’ (2014) 
48 The Law Teacher 20-32. 
3 Graham Ferris, Uses of Values in Legal Education (Intersentia 2015). 
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learning is dialectical in its processes; learners have a past that impacts upon learning; 
learners have a future that will be shaped by learning.4  
The term “legal education” encompasses a range of activities and requires some further 
definition to be serviceable. The focus of my research is English and Welsh (UK) legal 
education at undergraduate level,5 and this is the assumed paradigm where not otherwise 
indicated. However, legal education as a field encompasses postgraduate UK legal 
education, and university based common law education elsewhere especially North America 
and Australasia. My research often uses sources derived from or directed at graduate and 
postgraduate legal education across common law jurisdictions, although legal education 
outside of universities or other institutions of higher education is hardly touched upon here.  
Legal education has features of both an education about law and an education for law.6 In 
either aspect the distinctive feature is the existence of the practice of law and its 
importance for legal education. The co-existence of university-based legal education and 
legal practice creates a dichotomous division of power and authority in the epistemological 
 
4 See: Graham Ferris, ‘The Legal Educational Continuum That is Visible Through a Glass Dewey’ (2009) 43 The 
Law Teacher 102; John Dewey, The School and Society & the Child and the Curriculum (first published 1915 & 
1902, Dover 2001), 112: “It will do harm if child-study leave in the popular mind the impression that a child of 
a given age has a positive equipment of purposes and interests to be cultivated just as they stand. Interests in 
reality are but attitudes toward possible experiences; they are not achievements; their worth is in the leverage 
they afford, not in the accomplishment they represent.”; John Dewey, Democracy and Education (first 
published 1916, Simon & Brown 2001), 27: “plasticity … is essentially the ability to learn from experience; the 
power to retain from one experience something which is of avail in coping with the difficulties of a later 
situation”; John Dewey, Experience & Education (first published 1938, Touchstone 1997), 27: “every 
experience lives on in further experiences”, 35: “every experience enacted and undergone modifies the one 
who acts and undergoes, while this modification affects  … the quality of subsequent experiences”, 36: “from 
the standpoint of growth as education … Does this form of growth create conditions for further growth”.  
5 Scottish legal education has distinguishing features, including a significant civil law tradition, that makes it too 
different for inclusion. Smaller jurisdictions, such as Northern Ireland and Jersey, might be considered as 
included but do not generate a lot of legal education research. 
6 This dual aspect of legal education can have a baneful influence on legal education discourse. A binary 
conflict between “vocational” and “liberal” educational missions has often been used to frame discussion, see 
William Twining, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (Sweet & Maxwell 1994), 52 and Fiona Cownie, 
‘Introduction’ in Fiona Cownie (ed), Stakeholders in the Law School (Hart Publishing 2010), 2-4, for an account 
of this persistent pattern in the discourse. Twining, who acknowledged that most law schools were “hybrids”,  
identified two “ideal types” (professional service and academic) and then generated three sub-species of each 
type at 52-55. The issue of the educational mission of the undergraduate law degree in the UK is addressed on 
the first page of Graham Ferris, Uses of Values in Legal Education (Intersentia 2015), 3, which is reproduced 
below as publication 3 of this thesis. A student-centred approach subordinates reproduction of the profession 
to the interests of the student. However, for many students their interests will include facilitating an 
engagement with, and even commitment to, the profession, Therefore, the two “binaries” can inform a single 
congruent educational mission. Refusing the binary framing enables the thesis to uncover potential fruitful 
syntheses whilst keeping the educational (student-centred approach) primary in case of conflict. 
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and socialisation fields of action.7 Professional practice generates novel applications of law, 
novel interpretations of law, and even novel law through litigation and reported judgments. 
Reflection upon experiences in professional practice produces a public meta-discourse 
about law.8  
Professional knowledge is generated through reflection upon situated practice, and 
professional writers and speakers have available formal, informal, and academic sources. 
Legal practice thus produces its own ways of knowing and talking about the law, as well as 
its own idea of legal research. A view of research that is somewhat restrictive in purpose, 
generally in response to client needs; sources, generally restricted to legal and officially 
sanctioned texts; and critical content, generally adopting an assumption of good faith in the 
purposes and intentions of the state. Legal practice also generates its own community of 
those knowledgeable in the law and it is this community that many law students aspire to 
join.  
Finally, the term “entailed” in the research question has multivalence. It looks backward 
towards justification, as well as forward towards both legal and educational practice.9 
Justification of making the student central to the legal educational mission, rather than the 
profession or the academic discipline, or the job market. It has a critical potential both for 
student-centred legal education and for alternative approaches to legal education. It makes 
the consequences of the idea of a student-centred legal education for wider stakeholder 
 
7 Graham Ferris, ’Understanding and teaching Different Types of Legal Research – Differentiation and Balance‘ 
paper delivered at: Connecting Higher Education: International perspectives on research-based education, 
London (UCL) 27-28 June 2017; Harry T Edwards, ‘The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession’ (1992) 91 Michigan Law Review 34;  Richard A. Posner, ‘The Judiciary and the Academy: A 
Fraught Relationship’ (2010) 29 University of Queensland Law Journal 13. 
8 Examples include: Benjamin N Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (first published 1921, Dover 
Publications Inc 2005); Clarence Darrow, The Story of My Life (first published 1932, Aegitas 2015);  Tom 
Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin Books 2011); Geoffrey Robertson, The Justice Game (Vintage 1999); Arthur 
L Lipman and Peter Israel, Lawyer: A life of counsel and controversy (Public Affairs 1998); Stephen Sedley, 
Ashes & Sparks: Essays on law and justice (Cambridge University Press 2011); The Secret Barrister, The Secret 
Barrister: Stories of the law and how it’s broken (Picador 2018). 
9 Although my research is at the level of learning and teaching delivery – the “classroom” level - a student-
centred legal education would also entail a “transformative “ approach to university education as this is 
explicated by Robert Jones and Liz Thomas, ‘The 2003 UK Government Higher Education White Paper: a critical 
assessment of its implications for the access and widening participation agenda’ (2005) 20 Journal of Education 
Policy 615. My aim is to facilitate both the cognitive transformations identified by Kegan in Robert Kegan, The 
Evolving Self: Problem and Process in Human Development (Harvard University Press 2009), loc 314: “Human 
being is the composing of meaning, including of course, the occasional inability to compose meaning”, and the 
more affective or identity based transformations first identified by Mezirow, see: Jack Mezirow, ‘An Overview 
on Transformative Learning’ in Knud Illeris, Contemporary Theories of Learning (Routledge 2008).  
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interests a relevant concern. What is entailed raises questions of whether we want to 
commit to legal education that focuses upon a concern with the student who is learning, 
and if we do commit then how we enact our commitment. 
The two terms that identify the subject matter of the research – student-centred education 
and legal education - have a natural meeting point in the future social roles that some 
students, and educators, envisage for some law students: as professional lawyers (including 
judges) or legal academics.10 Thus, student-centred legal education is deeply concerned with 
the adoption of social roles by law students - such an approach to legal education is not 
merely an individual internal psychological event but an aspect of the reproduction of legal 
practice and legal academia.11 Thus, one aspect of student-centred legal education looks to 
students’ imagined future social roles. However, the other aspect looks back to the 
understandings, practices, and reasoning of the past that constitute the academic discipline 
of law. 
 
 
10 The perception that university education in law is a route for social mobility exists beyond the ranks of law 
students and their families: “For some, HE will be a vocational education into a prestigious profession, such as 
law or medicine, much as it has always been” Liz Thomas and Jocey Quinn, First Generation Entry Into Higher 
Education: an international study (OUP 2007), 2. There are serious tensions over what widening participation 
can and should mean for non-traditional populations: Benjamin J Richardson, ‘Students as Stakeholders in 
Legal Education: Gaining Admission to Law School’ in  Fiona Cownie (ed), Stakeholders in the Law School (Hart 
Publishing 2010); Hilary Sommerlad, ‘“What are you doing here? You should be working in a hair salon or 
something’’: outsider status and professional socialization in the solicitors’ profession’ (2008) 2 Web Journal of 
Current Legal Issues. Legal professional structures are resistant to transformational change as non-traditional 
entrants enter the profession, see: Jennifer Tomlinson, Daniel Muzio, Hilary Sommerlad, Lisa Webley, Liz Duff, 
‘Structure, agency and the career strategies of women and BME individuals in the legal profession’ (2013) 66 
Human Relations 245; Lisa Webley, Jennifer Tomlinson, Daniel Muzio, Hilary Sommerlad, and Liz Duff, ‘Access 
to a career in the legal profession in England and Wales: race, class and the role of educational background’ 
and Hilary Sommerlad, ‘The new “professionalism” in England and Wales: Talent, diversity and a legal 
precariat’ in Spencer Headworth, Robert L Nelson, Ronit Dinovitzer and David B Wilkins (eds), Diversity in 
Practice: Race, Gender, and Class in Legal and Professional Careers (Cambridge University Press 2016), 198 and 
226. Academia can also prove resistant to non-traditional entrants, see: Nicola Rollock, ‘Staying Power: the 
career experiences and strategies of UK Black and female professors’ (University and Colleges Union 2019) 
available at: http://www.ucu.org.uk/media/10075/staying-
power/pdf/ucu_rollock_february_2019.pdf?utm_source=lyr-
campaignupdate&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=members&utm_term=_all-
members&utm_content=The+Friday+email:+08+February+2019 last accessed 20 February 2019. 
11 Graham Ferris, ‘Why commitment and vulnerability are key concepts for understanding the reproduction of 
communities of practice and invisible colleges’ paper delivered at ‘A Workshop on Vulnerability and the Social 
Reproduction of Resilient Societies’, Emory, May 29-31, 2018; Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated 
Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation (Cambridge University Press 1991), chapter 2. 
12 
 
1.1 Genesis of the Research Question 
Early in my engagement with research into legal education I resolved that the structuring of 
the curriculum required a theoretical contribution: a need for articulation and awareness 
and pedagogical recognition of the epistemological and ontological commitments of the 
discipline of law for legal education.12 To be understood and made useful to students legal 
materials, both primary and secondary, had to be organised in a way that illuminated the 
nature and purposes of those materials for those students. Thus, I had an idea of how to 
approach the task of organising the materials I would be teaching about. Identification of 
the necessity of either adopting or imposing some theoretically informed structure on legal 
materials made it obvious that I needed to consider who I was teaching this organised 
material to, and why I was teaching it to them.13 It made little sense to structure the 
teaching without regard to what students could make use of, or without considering what 
they thought the learning was directed towards. 
This process of reflection upon how to organise teaching led me to my research question 
and interest in my students as the learners. My reflections made it painfully obvious that the 
common sense metaphor of teaching and learning as a parcel transfer (note my earlier 
metaphorical use of “material” as if dealing with objects) from teacher to learner was clearly 
inadequate.14 There is no transfer of any object from one body to another when something 
is taught and something is learnt (notice “something” also carries a metaphor of the physical 
object). Indeed, there is not even a transfer of information, as the understanding of the 
teacher is not reproduced in the learner. Rote learning (memorisation of words or numbers 
or figures in an order permitting reproduction of the original symbols, a process analogous 
to transfer of data from one computer to another) was not the aim of the students or 
myself.  
 
12 Graham Ferris, ‘We Should Look to Legal Theory to Inform the Teaching of Substantive Law’ (2009) 3 Web 
Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues; Tony Beecher, Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectual enquiry and 
the cultures of disciplines (SRHE and Open University Press 1993); Lee S Shulman, ‘Knowledge and Teaching: 
Foundations of the new reform’ and ‘Learning to Teach’ and ‘Towards a Pedagogy of Substance’ in Lee S 
Shulman, Teaching as Community Property: Essays on higher education (Jossey-Bass2004), 83 and 115 and 
128. The importance of how legal materials are organised is captured by Watson in Alan Watson, ‘The 
Importance of Nutshells’ (1994) 42 The American Journal of Comparative Law 1. 
13 Knud Illeris, ‘A comprehensive understanding of human learning’ in Knud Illeris (ed), Contemporary Theories 
of Learning (Routledge 2009) 7. 
14 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (University of Chicago Press 2003). 
13 
 
Once one rejects the parcel transfer metaphor it becomes obvious that teaching needs to be 
receptive to the qualities of the learners to be effective. The parcel transfer metaphor hides 
this, as an object that is being moved around from body to body is unaffected by its new 
position in space (the same parcel moved to a different place). Unfortunately for this simple 
concept there is no object and nothing that exists in space. In teaching and learning the 
students and I aimed at some type of understanding arising in the student, the unfamiliar 
material becoming both familiar and meaningful. Together we aimed at the development of 
new capabilities in the students that might equip them for future social roles. Any 
replication of my understanding would pervert the educational endeavour. I was not 
engaged with the materials in the same way I wanted the students to engage with them. It 
was my task to organise the materials in a way that facilitated meaningful learning. I did not 
want them to understand the materials in the way I had grown to understand them. Law 
students need to create their own understanding of the subject matter of legal education.  
Dewey had established this a hundred years before for all learners.15 Thus, the research 
question arose from educational practice which led to theoretical engagement with legal 
materials in order to better support that educational practice. 
 
1.2 Law as an Academic Discipline 
I have sought to answer the research question by pursuing methods that are distinctive to 
the legal discipline and have been so since its modern origins in the twelfth-century 
renaissance.16 Law as a discipline developed in response to the problem of discordant texts, 
specifically canons issued by the church and later between different sources of law, and the 
aim was principled concordance or coherence. Characteristics of doctrinal law in both civil 
and common law traditions are a concern with integrity (coherence or at least congruence) 
 
15 See (n 4). In another typical lawyerly response I went back to the “primary source”, John Dewey, rather than 
to a more modern “progressive” educator. I have not included this as part of my disciplinary methodology in 
the next paragraph but finding an authoritative source (origin) is deeply ingrained in my research and 
scholarship. Apart from any other consideration it formed a starting point and later educationalist sources 
(seminal writers), such as Jerome Bruner or Karl Llewellyn or Robert Coles or Jean Lave, would have very 
significant and independent impacts upon the course of the research. 
16 Harold J Berman, Law and Revolution: The formation of the western legal tradition (Harvard University Press 
1983), Berman’s account identifies Gratian, A Concordance of Discordant Canons as the first modern legal text 
see: 143-151 and 202. 
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of the sources;17 assumption of the adequacy of rationality for resolving conflicts between 
sources;18 hierarchical resolution of conflicts between different sources;19 an impulse 
towards generalisation;20 and the testing of general assertions in specific situations 
(casuistic reasoning).21 This casuistic testing of laws flows from the paradigmatic institution 
of legal process – the trial which expresses a faith that antagonistic rationality is an effective 
procedure for testing arguments.22 All of my research including my educational research is 
informed by my disciplinary background, and specifically by the central characteristics of 
doctrinal law identified above. Thus, I adopt a working assumption that a single rational 
account of a set of texts or practices can be given, providing conflicts are openly recognised 
and a procedure for resolving them is established; but I do not trust any successful 
integration attained without subjecting the appearance of principled coherence to a test 
through application in various situations.23  
Educational research tends towards the methodologically opportunistic,24 and my own 
research has this characteristic. My sources in this research have not been primarily legal 
 
17 For a modern iteration and elaboration of this see Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Fontana Paperbacks 1986) 
chapter 6: ‘Integrity’. 
18 Berman (n 15)at 154-155, 251, and 423-424; common law trials began the shift from proofs to jury 
adjudications in the thirteenth century following the Fourth Lateran Council 1215, Finbarr McAuley, ‘Canon 
Law and the End of the Ordeal’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 473, for a modern proponent of 
conflict resolution through structured rational communicative action see Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and 
Norms (Polity Press 1997). 
19 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 1997), chapter !!!, ‘The Variety of Laws’ and 
chapter VI, ‘The Foundations of a Legal System’, on secondary rules of recognition. 
20 Berman (n 15). This impulse is an important source of distinctive trends in modernity and liberal democracy, 
as universalisation of legal personality to individuals it has led to a historically momentous extension of 
political and social and economic rights to classes of people. It is also a source for equality as an ideal value in 
justice theory, e.g. “No government is legitimate that does not show equal concern for the fate of all those 
citizens over whim it claims dominium and from whom it claims allegiance” Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue 
(Harvard University Press 2002), 1. 
21 This is reflected in educational practice in the centrality of case law. For casuistic reasoning see: Albert R 
Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A history of moral reasoning (University of California 
Press 1989). 
22 Habermas (n 17), the story of the influence of this procedural approach to truth on early modern scientific 
practice and thinking is told by Barbara J Shapiro, Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720 (Cornell University Press 
2000). 
23 I agree with Graff that there is a degree of academic obfuscation around what academics do when they do 
research and that as teachers we need to find means to demonstrate and describe our activity that are 
approachable, see: Gerald Graff, Clueless in Academe: How Schooling Obscures the Life of the Mind (Yale 
University Press 2004), see: ‘Introduction’, 1-14 and Chapter 7 ‘Scholars and Sound Bites: the myth of 
academic difficulty’, 134-154. 
24 As illustrated by the range of approaches showcased in the “World Library of Educationalists” published by 
Routledge, the series can be reviewed at:  https://www.routledge.com/World-Library-of-Educationalists/book-
series/WORLDLIBEDU?page=2&page=1 accessed 11 June 2019. The discipline is better defined by its subject 
15 
 
ones (authoritative legal texts and legal commentary) but the research of other researchers 
across a wide range of disciplines including the sub-discipline of legal education and the 
professional educational practice of myself and others. To avoid confusion, professionalism 
of the teachers is intended here, not of the education (professional education) or practicing 
lawyers (professional legal practice). Using sources from disparate disciplinary sources has 
forced me to try to deploy the types of reasoning and argument prevalent in those 
disciplines where relevant, and to incorporate a reflective attitude towards educational 
practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
matter than its research practices, and it draws upon methods from a wide variety of disciplines in its 
investigations.  
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2. Publication 1: What Students Care About25 
 
My colleagues Rebecca Huxley-Binns, Andrea Nicholson and I were engaged in establishing a 
new jurisprudence module as a final year optional module at Nottingham Law School.26 We 
decided to try to incorporate a student-centred learning approach, specifically to attempt to 
structure the module curriculum, delivery, and assessment with a view to maximise student 
motivation. The hope was that we could enhance motivation thereby facilitating high 
student performance as reflected in academic results, as well as encouraging student 
wellbeing through a student-centred approach to module design.27 ‘What students care 
about’ developed from this educational practice context. It is a chapter, in a book of 
collected essays considering the role of affect in legal education, and it was an early attempt 
of mine (2011) to view legal education from a student-centred perspective.  
However, before giving a thematic account of the chapter, it is necessary to engage with 
some problems of methodology in the conduct of research into legal education by legally 
educated educational professionals. Academic law provided to us an approach to texts and 
practices that could be deployed to non-legal texts. Educational practice provided to us 
untheorized and largely “solitary” understanding and insights.28 What was lacking was a 
means to utilise research outside of the disciplinary boundaries of the legal academy, a 
problem of methods and methodology that faces many legal educationalists. 
 
25 Graham Ferris and Rebecca Huxley-Binns, ‘What Students Care About and Why We Should Care’, in Paul 
Maharg and Caroline Maugham (eds), Affect and Legal Education: Emotion and Teaching the Law (Ashgate 
2011). 
26 It was not an ordinary optional module as it was available as an alternative to an Independent Research 
Project that was otherwise compulsory when the module was first established. 
27 See: Graham Ferris, Rebecca Huxley-Binns, and Andrea Nicholson, ‘A Few Of My Favourite Things: Three 
Rules of Thumb for Module Design Informed by Self-Determination Theory’ (Learning in Law Annual 
Conference, Warwick, January 2011); and Graham Ferris and Rebecca Huxley-Binns, ‘This is why I took a law 
degree in the first place. This is what I thought I would be doing. It is such hard work, but I am loving it’ 
(Association of Law Teachers Annual Conference, Cardiff, April 2011). 
28 Solitary is the term used by Shulman, see: Lee S Shulman, ‘Teaching as Community Property: putting an end 
to pedagogical solitude’ in Lee S Shulman, Teaching as Community Property: essays on higher education 
(Jossey-Bass 2004), 140. Solitude because the knowledge being generated is generally the result of activities 
that are not publicly accessible nor open to critical examination. Hence, one necessary and important type of 
educational scholarly activity is bringing professional experience and practice into the public domain for 
dissemination, and critical review: Shulman, at page 142, calls this: “documentation and transformation” 
through writing up in order to produce an “artefact” that can be peer reviewed. 
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2.1 Problems of Method and Methodology 
My co-author and teaching colleague Rebecca Huxley-Binns and I were developing our own 
reflective educational practice and our starting point was fourfold. First, dissatisfaction with 
aspects of our own legal educational experience. Second, concern at the rising levels of self-
reported distress and alienation of undergraduate law students at our law school. Third, 
dissatisfaction with a punishment and reward framing of the motivations of law students.29 
Fourth, a desire to generalise from and systemise our own successes at encouraging and 
maintaining student engagement in our educational practice. We needed to move beyond 
dissatisfaction, concern, and experiential insight, and to do this we needed some sort of 
theories and methods to enable us to move beyond the anecdotal. The books and articles 
we wished to use to provide our theory and method were multi-disciplinary, and this led to 
problems of synthesis and interpretation of the sources. An inevitable effect of an 
opportunistic methodological approach is a need to “translate” different disciplinary 
materials to enable synthesis to take place.30 
Although the section of the chapter that dealt with these issues, under the sub-heading 
“methodology”, was short, it represented a significant process of reflection on multi-
disciplinary research into student-centred legal education. There are two aspects of this 
which are worth expanding upon here, as they have influenced all of my subsequent 
research in this area.  
First, my starting point was that legal and educational professional practice may each 
generate new knowledge that may be capable of generalisation. The normal assumption in 
 
29 A framing expressed by repeated arguments in respect of student engagement of the type: “we must assess 
x (attendance, engagement, analysis, critical thinking, presentation skills, team working skills, employability 
activities) because if it is not assessed they will not do it”; and “modern students have become instrumental in 
their approach to education”.  
30 A similar problem to the one faced by comparative law see: Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, An Introduction 
to Comparative Law (2nd edn, Tony Weir tr, Oxford University Press 1987), 7, 31-33 and 43-45; and Mathias 
Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2014), and 25-31. Translation is used metaphorically in 
the text, it is not about word substitution but seeking common concepts across disciplines or legal systems. 
There is also a less fundamental problem of linguistic translation (utilisation of word or phrase substitution 
across languages) in comparative law, on which see: Siems 17-18. The two issues interact in the phenomenon 
of the “false friend” where familiar words mask conceptual divergence, see: Jaakko Husa, A New Introduction 
to Comparative Law (Hart Publishing 2015), 119-120. 
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academia is that theory and formally generalised knowledge are applied in practice.31 It is 
also assumed that new knowledge is generated at the academic and theoretical level, and 
practice is creative only to the extent that it can incorporate this new knowledge and 
understanding and put it into practice. It is an essentially deductive and top-down view of 
knowledge production that aligns with a gratifying self-image for the research university. 
Rebecca and I felt this paradigm did not recognise the novel insights and potentially 
generalisable contributions of the experienced and reflective practitioner in law or 
education. We came to believe that there was an inductive and bottom-up source of 
knowledge and understanding arising from our educational practice.32  
The relevant insight in the chapter was drawn from innumerable classroom encounters in 
which the social and emotional atmosphere of the group and its members determined the 
effectiveness of the learning taking place. We described this as the “co-operation of reason 
and emotion”.33 
Second, educational practice could not be fully analysed or understood by using the internal 
understandings and methods of the relevant discipline (for us law). Education is not 
constituted by authoritative texts, lacking authoritative institutions in the legal sense of 
authority, and being a performative activity. Investigation of educational practice required a 
multi-disciplinary range of approaches, as is reflected in the opportunistic leanings of 
educational research and learning theory.34 For us as researchers this raised some problems 
as we were not fully versed in the disciplinary conventions for evaluating work across the 
many potentially relevant disciplines. However, as noted above, the problem of synthesising 
 
31 Stephen E Toulmin, ‘The National Commission on Human Experimentation: procedures and outcomes’ in H 
Tristram Engelhardt Jr and Arthur l Caplan (eds), Scientific Controversies (Cambridge University Press 1987). 
32 See: Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (University of Chicago Press 2009), 16-25 disputing the possibility 
of a fully explicit research process; Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral 
Participation (Cambridge University Press 1991), Chapter 1: ‘Legitimate Peripheral Learning’, 29-44. Lave and 
Wenger view learning as paradigmatically about joining a practice, 29: “A person’s intentions to learn are 
engaged and the meaning of learning is configured through the process of becoming a full participant in a 
sociocultural practice.” The practice is prior to the learning, situates the learning, and is the end of the 
learning. However, this does not entail any explicit body of explicitly stated knowledge, and much knowledge 
may remain tacit without frustrating learning or reproduction of the practice. Research, knowledge and 
learning are not dependant upon explicit statements of what is known. Practice is fundamental and theory is 
dependant upon practice, not the other way around. Obviously with explicit statement and theoretical 
elaboration knowledge can develop and new knowledge can be created, although this in turn requires a social 
practice (scholarship or science). 
33 What Students Care About, 195 
34 See (n 23). 
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discordant texts is a foundational concern of legal science. Therefore, our disciplinary 
background did provide us some relevant tools.   
One means to address the problem that we identified in the chapter, of standards of rigour 
that varied across disciplinary boundaries, was to seek independent evidence for factual 
assertions. If the independent sources were congruent with each other then it suggested 
that they were identifying something real. Even if we could not be sure each source was 
entirely justified according to the conventions of its source discipline the congruence of 
findings across disciplines suggested robustness of the findings. Such an approach is 
sometimes called “triangulation” and this seeking out of independent mutually supporting 
sources for propositions of fact became a feature of my research method.35 
We viewed these two potentially problematic issues as capable of being mutually self-
correcting to some extent. If we discovered in independent sources (say our own practice, 
cognitive psychology, and philosophy of the will) congruent and mutually supportive 
findings or arguments, then it suggested the findings or arguments were robust. Thus, 
insights or ideas derived from our educational practice could be tested through 
triangulation in the same way as disparate disciplinary sources could be tested.  
There is a danger in such a method of triangulation of seeking and finding confirmation for 
hypotheses without awareness of the natural human propensity for confirmation bias – 
selective attention to and recognition of confirming evidence and inattention to and 
unawareness of refuting evidence. Therefore, I have tried to incorporate both reflective 
practice, specifically reflection on practice, 36 and self-conscious openness to work that 
 
35 The concept of triangulation is discussed in Susan Smith, PhD by published work: A practical guide for success 
(Palgrave 2015), 91; Louis Cohen, Lawrence Manion and Keith Morrison, Research Methods in Education (5th 
ed, RoutledgeFalmer 2000), 254. An example of triangulation in my practice would be the recognition of the 
importance of non-principled agreement for the coordination of collective, including principled, action 
identified apparently independently in: Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics (5th ed Bloomsbury Academic 
2013), chapter 1: ‘The Nature of Political Rule’; Stephen E Toulmin, ‘The National Commission on Human 
Experimentation: procedures and outcomes’ in H Tristram Engelhardt Jr and Arthur L Caplan eds, Scientific 
Controversies: case studies in the resolution and closure of disputes in science and technology (Cambridge 
University Press 1987); Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Allen Lane 2009), chapter 4: ‘Voice and Social Choice’. 
The point is counter intuitive and significant.  
36 In the sense used in the expressions “reflection on action” and “reflection in action” and as opposed to 
reflection in practice. 
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might disconfirm or contradict my working hypotheses in my research practice, as well as 
adopting a “critical” approach to sources.37 
This concern with the problems of multi-disciplinary sources in researching legal education 
and self-consciously drawing upon what resources are provided by the legal discipline for 
dealing with these problems was innovative. Researchers with a legal background are prone 
to adopting an uncritical approach to non-legal sources, as is clearly visible in the law and 
economics literature, for example: “Economics provided a scientific theory to predict the effects 
of legal sanctions … This theory surpasses intuition, just as science surpasses common sense … In 
addition to a scientific theory of behaviour…”.38 This may be generated by a tendency to fall 
back on reliance upon authority as a central assumption of analysis and synthesis because 
this is a familiar aspect of legal scholarship’s internal to law approach in doctrinal research. 
For many years comparative lawyers have been alert to the problems of reading across 
discourses,39 and the problem is one recognised in the socio-legal field.40 What was original 
was not wrestling with these problems but the development of a response that brought to 
bear the methods of doctrinal research to the problem.41 The lack of self-consciousness has 
been, no doubt, linked to the paucity of discussions of research methods and methodology 
in the legal discipline.42 
 
37 Graham Ferris, ‘The promise and perils of positive psychology in legal education’ (Society of Legal Scholars 
Annual Conference, Oxford, September 2016), available at: http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/30325/ accessed 10 
June 2019. 
38 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (2nd ed, Addison-Wesley 1997), 3. 
39 Zweigert and Kotz, Siems, and Husa n 29. It was writing a review of Jane Ball, Housing Disadvantaged 
People? Insiders and Outsiders in French Social Housing (Routledge 2012) in (2012) 21 Nottingham Law Journal 
that fully brought the difficulty facing the comparative legal researcher home to me. 
40 The problem is aggravated by the receptiveness of socio-legal researchers to various disciplines celebrated 
in Roger Cotterrell, ‘Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A view of sociolegal studies’ (2002) 29 Journal 
of Law and Society 632.The issue is discussed in the socio-legal literature, an example being Sanne Taekema 
and Wibren van der Burg, ‘Towards a Fruitful Cooperation between Legal Philosophy, Legal Sociology and 
Doctrinal Research: How Legal Interactionism May Bridge Unproductive Oppositions’ in Richard Nobles and 
David Schiff, Law Society and Community: Socio-Legal Essays in Honour of Roger Cotterrall (Ashgate 2014) 129, 
130: “Advocating interdisciplinary research is one thing, actually doing it is another. Interdisciplinary research 
is not easy and there are many stumbling blocks to be found. Different disciplines know different methods, 
different conceptual frameworks, different objects of study, different research goals, different academic 
cultures”. 
41 Note how Taekema and Berg, (n 39) at 129-130 subordinate doctrinal method to legal philosophy suggesting 
it performs the task of testing theoretical concepts and conclusion derived from sociology and legal philosophy 
in practical application (which mirrors the practice theory relationship assumed in academe and noted above). 
42 Recent years show a gathering awareness of the problem and publications directed towards filling the gap.  
See, for example, Mark van Hoecke, ‘Preface’ and Roger Brownsword, ‘Maps, Methodologies and Critiques: 
Confessions of a Contract lawyer’ in Mark van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research: which kind of 
method for what kind of discipline (Hart Publishing 2011); Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and 
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It is still unusual to abstract from the practices of doctrinal law those elements that are 
applicable outside of the discipline, as the actual practice of doctrinal law is often seen not 
as a methodology but as common sense.43 As Hutchinson and Duncan noted: “The doctrinal 
method lies at the basis of the common law and is the core legal research method. Until 
relatively recently there has been no necessity to explain or classify it within any broader 
cross-disciplinary research framework.” 44 Indeed, when I wrote the chapter I reverted to a 
similar stance,45 and it was subsequently that I realised the importance of articulating and 
self-consciously utilising aspects of legal reasoning outside of the legal domain.46 This 
introductory chapter is the first published articulation of my abstraction of aspects of 
doctrinal practice and extension of these aspects to non-legal research activity.47 
Another point of originality, unrelated to the abstraction from doctrinal practice, was the 
development and use of what I have termed “triangulation” above. We did not use the 
term, and indeed our use of the technique was independent of its use in the educational 
literature. We were not seeking confirmation of data, and not engaged with the 
experimental paradigm and problems of generalisation. Our use of “triangulation” was two-
fold. First, as noted above, to compensate for our necessary weaknesses in applying 
standards of rigour derived from other disciplines. Second, to seek a technique to avoid 
getting trapped by the framing of inquiries by other disciplines. Multiplicity of sources leads 
to multiplicity of framing, and a powerful resource is provided by accepting a multi-
 
describing what we do: Doctrinal legal research’ (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83; Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal 
Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law (Routledge 
2013). 
43 Richard A Posner, Reflections on Judging (Harvard University Press 2013), 104. 
44 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and describing what we do: Doctrinal legal research’ (2012) 17 
Deakin Law Review 83, 84. 
45 By adopting the stance of Harry Frankfurt in my work ‘What students care about’ (n1) at 196 and speaking 
from the perspective of philosophy. Philosophy is a discipline that has a similar problem of differentiation of its 
methods from “ordinary” antagonistic academic culture according to Graff: Gerald Graff, Clueless in Academe: 
How Schooling Obscures the Life of the Mind (Yale University Press 2004). Taekema and Berg (n 39) adopt a 
similar stance. 
46 Berman (n 15) was a book that brought the issue into a clear focus for me. 
47 There has been a partial articulation through papers delivered by me: Graham Ferris, ‘The promise and perils 
of positive psychology in legal education’ (Society of Legal Scholars Annual Conference, Oxford, September 
2016) available at http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/30325/ accessed 10 June 2019; and Graham Ferris, 
‘Understanding and teaching Different Types of Legal Research – Differentiation and Balance’ (Connecting 
Higher Education: International perspectives on research-based education, London June 2017). 
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disciplinary research methodology, if one is ready to work upon the problems of comparison 
of findings across different disciplines.  
In order to “triangulate” in this manner one must seek semantic or operational equivalence 
of terms and concepts across disciplines. This seeking of underlying shared concepts or 
principles is a key feature of creative legal reasoning. Hence the importance of recognising 
these mutually re-enforcing aspects of originality in approaching multi-disciplinary sources: 
dis-embedding legal methods from law, and using these methods to facilitate the 
“triangulation” of disparate findings. 
These methodological solutions to the methodological problems of utilising multi-
disciplinary materials are demonstrated in the thematic review which follows. This 
introductory chapter thereby links the theory expounded above to ‘What students care 
about’. 
 
2.2 Thematic Summary 
The chapter started by identifying the authors’ concern with harnessing non-cognitive 
features of the learner’s experience for educational ends. Student-centred educational 
practice seeks to engage learners by structuring educational practice so that it aligns with 
their interests.48 It therefore promises to support student motivation for learning. Although 
undergraduate students at law school in England and Wales have committed to the 
educational process, they do not always manage to maintain preparation, attendance, and 
participation in class.49 What is more worrying is that they can become alienated from their 
studies and distressed, which can impair performance and lead to dropping out.50 These 
 
48 Dewey, (n 4) and John Dewey ‘Interest in Relation to Training of the Will’ in John J McDermott (ed), The 
Philosophy of John Dewey: Two Volumes in One 1 the Structure of Experience 2 The Lived Experience (University 
of Chicago Press 1981). 
49 Not only in the UK: Liesel Spencer and Elen Seymour, ‘Reading Law: motivating Digital Natives to ‘Do the 
Reading’’ (2013) 23 Legal Education Review 177. 
50 My first realisation of the extent of the problems came from discussions with student support services at my 
law school, specifically Julie Higginbottom who provides student support as a pastoral advisor working within 
the law school with whom I have collaborated on several occasions (Graham Ferris, Andrew Elliott and Julie 
Higginbottom, ‘The law student experience of anxiety’ Lawyer 2B, May 12 2017; Graham Ferris, Rebecca 
Huxley-Binns and Julie Higginbottom, ‘What Should We Care About When Teaching Law?’ (poster) (Association 
of Law Teachers Annual Conference, Amsterdam, April 2009). For an overview of retention and differences 
between disciplines (including law) see: Ruth Woodfield, Undergraduate Retention and Engagement Across the 
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problems are common to all categories of students but tend to be most problematic with 
first generation university students.51  
Motivation is not primarily a cognitive state, it is more a state of being or feeling with a 
strong emotional or affective component. Therefore, given my interest in motivation I 
responded to an invitation to collaborate on a book proposal coordinated by Paul Maharg 
and Caroline Maugham on affect in legal education.52 I invited Rebecca, to join me in 
researching and writing a chapter which became: ‘What students care about’. I was lead 
author of the chapter, and trail blazed the research, but Rebecca and I discussed the 
research as it developed and were able to do so within the context of designing, delivering, 
assessing, and trying to understand the success of our jurisprudence module (called “Critical 
Legal Thinking”). This chapter was one of three jointly authored publications concerned with 
modules designed to incorporate a conscious concern with motivation in teaching and 
learning.53 
After briefly touching on methodological issues that have been discussed in depth above, 
the chapter introduced and explicated Frankfurt’s work on the importance of what people 
 
Disciplines (HEA 2014), ‘Key Findings’ 8-11. In the legal academy Bradney has recognised the importance of 
non-academic support staff for the modern university in Anthony Bradney, Conversations, Choices and 
Chances: The Liberal Law School in the Twenty-First Century (Bloomsbury Publishing 2003), 60 n105, although 
he did not explore the issue in his exploration of the collegiate nature of liberal governance in chapter 6. 
51 Liz Thomas and Jocey Quinn First Generation Entry Into Higher Education: an international study (OUP 2007), 
4: “When first generation entry is used as a lens it disrupts the taken for granted categories of all the target 
groups used in widening participation and helps produce much more effective approaches to targeting access 
and supporting student success.” The authors accept that first generation status and social class are strongly 
linked (at 10) but argue where both cannot be taken into account parental educational attainment is the most 
useful variable for identifying problems and generating effective policy and institutional responses to problems 
of recruitment, retention, and achievement. Lorenza Antonucci, Student Lives in Crisis: deepening inequality in 
times of austerity (Policy Press 2016), Antonucci stresses welfare resources (or material rather than cultural 
triggers of inequality n 21 loc 3405), see chapter 6: ‘Explaining inequality: the role of social origins and welfare 
sources’ loc 2317: “Wellbeing outcomes in the present are linked to the presence of stretched or abundant 
welfare sources: young people who face problems of stretched welfare sources, which do not cover their 
present needs, face major issues of stress and anxiety. Conversely, more advantaged young people have a 
positive material experience with no forms of psychological distress. Future wellbeing seems to be influenced 
by future expectations about welfare sources and considerations regarding the perceived employability of 
students’ degrees.” 
52 Paul Maharg and Caroline Maughan (eds.) Affect and Legal Education: emotion in learning and teaching the 
law. (Ashgate 2011). 
53 Graham Ferris and Rebecca Huxley-Binns, ‘Escaping the Wasteland: The Multiple Needs for an Explicit 
Incorporation of Values into the Core Curriculum of Contemporary Legal Education’ (2009) 3(1) Journal of the 
World Universities Forum 63; Rebecca Huxley-Binns and Graham Ferris, ‘Putting Theory into Practice: 
Designing a Curriculum According to Self-Determination Theory’ (2013) 19(3) The International Journal of 
Pedagogy and Curriculum 1. 
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care about.54 His disciplinary background is philosophy (analytical philosophy). This reflects 
both the generality of his approach and the centrality of the links between what one cares 
about, who one is, and how one learns. Frankfurt developed an analysis of first order and 
second order desires, and he stressed the importance of second order desires – desires to 
desire certain things (e.g. the wellbeing of a loved one, or lots of money, or sex with men). 
Although not articulated in terms of student-centred learning, Frankfurt’s concern with 
what one wants to want, what things one cares about, identified the importance of 
anyone’s including a student’s value system. Concern with how the individual student was 
able to find significance in the subject matter being studied was thus highlighted by use of 
Frankfurt.  
The exposition of Frankfurt’s theory combined knowledge drawn from my professional 
educational practice with Frankfurt’s explanatory theory. However, Of greater importance 
for my own research was the way that Frankfurt’s concern with people’s volitional choice 
leads to a concern with the identity of the individual (“student’s sense of self … people have 
to become”).55 This connection between student-centred learning and the importance of 
the dynamic identity of the student became more important as the research progressed, 
and I will return to these issues in my consideration of the second publication that makes up 
this thesis. 
The second source reviewed was Damasio’s work which provided a remarkable confirmation 
of the importance of caring about something, a central aspect of Frankfurt’s work - and is a 
good example of “triangulation”.56 Essentially Damasio identifies an organic base for the 
capacity to care (i.e. to regard it as serious and worth effort to pursue something). He also 
confirms our assertion that learning is not merely cognitive but also “emotional” or 
“affective”, as his case studies involved people who had full cognitive functioning yet were 
incapable of living a purposeful life as they were unconcerned about the consequences of 
their actions upon themselves. 
Frankfurt and Damasio were both expressed at a high level of generality, and neither had 
any obvious concern with education, and certainly no concern with legal education. Thus, it 
 
54 Ferris and Huxley-Binns (n 1), 196-199. 
55 Ferris and Huxley-Binns (n 1), 198. 
56 Ferris and Huxley-Binns (n 1), 199-200. 
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was necessary for the chapter to bring their abstract concerns to bear on teaching and 
learning. We did this by focussing on evidence of affective dysfunction in law students and 
those causes of this dysfunction that lay in incongruence between what students cared 
about and their experience of legal education.57 
Law student distress and poor wellbeing had been reported from research in the USA over 
decades.58 Raising awareness of this in non-USA discourse was itself a useful thing for the 
chapter to do. Of course the US data comes from a country with a different culture, where 
legal qualification requires a three year post-graduate degree, and where fees for students 
have been long established and high.59 However, the main purposes of the account were 
two-fold. First, it provided another source of independent confirmation of the importance of 
what people care about, and second, it confirmed the importance of emotional or affective 
states to educative practice. It argued that in the context of legal education a “do no harm” 
principle may be both relevant and breached by our collective practice as shown by the 
 
57 Ferris and Huxley-Binns (n 1), 200-204. 
58 Studies began to notice a problem in the US in the late 70s and early 80s and the problems seem to 
continue: James M Hedegard, ‘The Impact of Legal Education: An in-depth analysis of career relevant interests, 
attitudes and personality traits among first year law students’ (1979) American Bar Foundation Research 
Journal 791; Marilyn Heins, Shirley Nickols Fahey and Roger C Henderson, ‘Law Students and Medical Students: 
A Comparison of Perceived Stress’ (1983) 33 Journal of Legal Education 511; Stephen B Shanfield and G 
Andrew H Benjamin, ‘Psychiatric Distress in Law Students’ (1985) 35 Journal of Legal Education 65; G Andrew H 
Benjamin, Alfred Kaszniak, Bruce Sales and Stephen B Shanfield, ‘The Role of Legal Education in Producing 
Psychological Distress among Law Students and Lawyers’ (1986) American Bar Foundation Research Journal 
225; Patrick J Schiltz, ‘On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and 
Unethical Profession’ (1999) 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 871; Lawrence S Krieger, ‘Institutional Denial About the 
Dark Side of Law School, and Fresh Empirical guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence’ (2002) 52 
Journal of Legal Education 112; Susan Swaim Daicoff, Lawyer Know Thyself – A Psychological Analysis of 
Personality Strengths and Weaknesses (American Psychological Association 2004); Susan Swaim Daicoff, 
‘Lawyer be yourself: an empirical investigation of the relationship between the ethic of care, the feeling 
decision making preference, and lawyer wellbeing’ (2008) 16 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and Law 8; Susan 
Swaim Daicoff, ‘Methods of Teaching and Forming Professional identity: Lawyer Form Thyself: Professional 
identity formation strategies in legal education through ‘soft skills’ training, ethics, and experiential courses’ 
(2014) 27(2) Regent University Law Review 205; Lawrence Krieger and Kennon M Sheldon, ‘What Makes 
Lawyers Happy?:A data-driven prescription to define professional success’ (2015) 83 George Washington Law 
Review 554. 
Australian law schools have also become concerned following the death of Tristan Jepson: Norm Kelk, 
Georgina Luscomb, Sharon Medlow and Ian Hickie, Courting the Blues- Attitudes Towards Depression in 
Australian Law Students and Lawyers (Brain and Mind Research Institute, University of Sydney 2009); Molly 
Townes O’Brien, Stephen Tang and Kath Hall, ‘Changing Our Thinking: empirical research on law student 
wellbeing, thinking styles and the law curriculum’ (2011) 21 Legal Education Review 149. The problem seems 
wider than just law students: Wendy Larcombe, Sue Finch and Rachel Sore, ‘Who’s Distressed? Not Only Law 
Students: Psychological distress levels in university students across diverse fields of study’ (2015) 37 Sydney 
Law Review 243. 
59 A critical account of the state of US law schools is given in Brian Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools (University of 
Chicago Pres 2012), the preface gives an overview of his concerns, and chapter two ‘Why is law school three 
years’ is highly critical of the time and expense imposed by accreditation requirements for legal qualification. 
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research into law student wellbeing. This emphasised the importance of taking a student-
centred approach. Mere attention to the intention (benign or neutral) of the teacher did not 
predict the effects (malign) upon many students in legal education. It was essential to 
attend to the student learners if one was to understand what was happening in educational 
processes. 
The first purpose was the more significant one for this thesis. In order to make the link it 
was necessary to find studies concerned with student values (things students care about) 
and student wellbeing.60 Such studies were identified, supporting our intuition that a sense 
of value disorientation was a factor in student distress, and confirming Frankfurt’s emphasis 
on the importance of this issue. Studies based upon the theory of self-determination were 
the crucial sources of the “triangulation” with Frankfurt’s theory.61 This is explored below.62 
Research into law student wellbeing and distress established the relevance and salience of 
previous research informed by self-determination theory to the chapter’s concerns with 
emotion, learning, and concern with student values (and thereby student-centred 
education). However, it was necessary to examine this theory at greater length to establish 
the independence and robustness of any “triangulation” with Frankfurt’s work. Therefore, a 
brief account of self-determination theory and its development was given. 
On the foundation of the exposition of self-determination theory it was possible to link 
some of the concepts used in self-determination theory with concepts developed by 
 
60 G Andrew H Benjamin, Alfred Kaszniak, Bruce Sales and Stephen B Shanfield, ‘The Role of Legal Education in 
Producing Psychological Distress among Law Students and Lawyers’ (1986) American Bar Foundation Research 
Journal 225; Patrick J Schiltz, ‘On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and 
Unethical Profession’ (1999) 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 871; Kennon M Sheldon and Lawrence Krieger, ‘Does 
Legal Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Student? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values and 
Well-Being’ (2004) 22 Behavioural Sciences and the Law 261; Kennon M Sheldon and Lawrence Krieger, 
‘Understanding the Negative Effects of Legal Education on Law Students: A Longitudinal Test of Self-
Determination Theory’ (2007) 33 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 883. 
61 Ferris and Huxley-Binns (n 1), 204-207. Self-determination theory has been assembled over a period of 
decades by psychologists. It posits three human needs (to be able to exercise competence, to feel self-
directed, and to feel part of a group or related) that when met lead to intrinsically motivated behaviour. 
Intrinsic motivation being both more pleasant for an actor and more effective than extrinsic motivation fuelled 
by rewards or punishments originating from outside of the actor. 
62 The investigation of student wellbeing would become significant in my later research concerns but is not 
central to this thesis - the issue is further explored in Uses of Values (n 3), 56-65, which forms part of chapter 2 
which is not part of this thesis. 
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Frankfurt: autonomy with the adoption of a second order desire;63 identified motivation 
with a successfully adopted second order desire (and possibly introjected motivation with 
an unsuccessfully adopted second order desire);64 and wholeheartedness with self-
concordance.65 Once again we were engaged in “triangulation” and once again in self-
determination theory we uncovered an independent source of support for the work of 
Frankfurt. 
Finally, in keeping with the overall structure of the argument, the chapter returned to an 
example drawn from the authors’ practice, and explicable in terms of the research we had 
explored in the chapter, specifically Frankfurt and self-determination theory. The entire 
chapter is an exercise in multi-disciplinary “triangulation”, drawing from law (our practice), 
philosophy (Frankfurt), neuroscience (Damasio), cognitive psychology (self-determination 
theory), and educational research (student wellbeing and the student-centred focus). The 
core argument was that it is important to take into account the concerns of law students in 
the practice of legal education. This is for both positive and negative reasons. Positive as it 
can lead to engagement and student motivation. Negative because failure to take student 
concerns into account may alienate and lead to low wellbeing and distress among students. 
 
 
2.3 Reception and Significance of ‘What students care about’ 
2.3.A. Metrics and Impact 
Law is not yet a bibliometric discipline, and citation and review information is not very 
informative when trying to assess the reception of academic work. WorldCat lists 504 
libraries holding Affect and Legal Education.66 These libraries are situated in 66 independent 
 
63 Graham Ferris and Rebecca Huxley-Binns, ‘What Students Care About and Why We Should Care in Affect: 
The Impact of Emotion on Learning and Teaching the Law’, in Paul Maharg and Caroline Maugham (eds), Affect 
and Legal Education: Emotion in Learning and Teaching the Law (Ashgate 2011) 195, 204. 
64 Ibid 205. 
65 Ibid 207. 
66 https://www.worldcat.org/title/affect-and-legal-education-emotion-in-learning-and-teaching-the-
law/oclc/719673475&referer=brief_results last accessed 22 February 2019. 
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countries spread across all the inhabited continents in the world.67 The book is held by 
libraries in civil law jurisdictions as well as common law ones. The book is more widely held 
in the United States and Australia than it is in the UK and it, therefore, has a truly global 
reach. 
A search of Scopus database revealed four citations for the chapter and five citations for the 
book as well as one book review.68 A search of HeinOnline data bases revealed one book 
review and 25 citations for the book, and three citations for the chapter.69 It seems likely 
that the record of citations is incomplete, as many law journals are not on the Scopus 
database, but the source of citations captured again reflects the global reach of the book.70 
The Field-Weighted Citation Impact in Scopus of 2.27 is over twice the normalised average. 
The chapter was foundational for this thesis, as it established a methodology for handling 
multi-disciplinary sources, identified important sources, and important issues. It also has 
informed my professional educational practice. 
The chapter and subsequent publications and dissemination activities, such as attendance 
and delivery of papers at conferences, both established an awareness of student wellbeing 
as an area for research investigation in the UK, 71  and of the possible uses of self-
 
67 66 independent countries and Hong Kong and the British Virgin Islands. The 66 countries are: Australia; 
Austria; Bahrain; Barbados; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Canada; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; 
Greece; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hungary; India; Israel; Ireland; Italy; Jamaica; Jordan; Kenya; Kuwait; 
Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lebanon; Lithuania; Malaysia; Mexico; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Nigeria; Norway; Philippines; Poland; Republic of Korea; Romania; Russian Federation; Saudi Arabia; 
Serbia; South Africa; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Turkey; United Arab 
Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America. 
68 E-mail from Sharon Potter 8/12/2017 
69 Book review: Lawrence Donnelly (2012) 11 Hibernian Law Journal 207.  
70 Citations of the book from publications based in USA, Canada, Australia, Singapore, UK and Ireland. Citations 
to the chapter from the UK and Singapore. 
71 My own activity in this area has been extensive, including four publications: Rebecca Huxley-Binns and 
Graham Ferris, ‘Putting Theory into Practice: Designing a Curriculum According to Self-Determination Theory’ 
(2013) 19 The International Journal of Pedagogy and Curriculum; Graham Ferris, ‘Values ethics and legal ethics: 
the QLD and LETR Recommendations 6, 7, 10, and 11’ (2014) 48 The Law Teacher 20; Uses of Values in Legal 
Education (Intersentia 2015); Graham Ferris, Andrew Elliott and Julie Higginbottom ‘The law student 
experience of anxiety’ Lawyer 2B, May 12 2017. 
Nine conference papers or contributions to panels: (1) Graham Ferris, Rebecca Huxley-Binns and Andrea 
Nicholson, ‘A Few Of My Favourite Things: Three Rules of Thumb For Module Design Informed By Self-
Determination Theory’ (Learning in Law Annual Conference, Warwick, January 2011): (2) Graham Ferris and 
Nick Johnson, ‘Why Our Approach to Student Engagement Might Be Determined by Our Answer to the 
Question: Is Law Merely a Business?’ (Association of Law Teachers Annual Conference, Cardiff, April 2011); (3) 
Graham Ferris and Rebecca Huxley-Binns, ‘This is why I took a law degree in the first place. This is what I 
thought I would be doing. It is such hard work, but I am loving it’ (Association of Law Teachers Annual 
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determination theory in course design.72 Law student wellbeing is now an active subject of 
research in the UK.73  
 
2.3.B. Significance  
‘What students care about’ had significance both for the development of my research and it 
added significantly to the literatures on Frankfurt, Dewey, and on legal education. It is worth 
capturing these aspects of the chapter here. 
Once one asks: “What is entailed by a student-centred approach to legal education?” one 
has to think about what students as learners might hope for from legal education. Issues 
commonly assumed to be at the forefront of student concerns, such as economic benefits 
 
Conference, Oxford, April 2012); (4) Graham Ferris and Rebecca Huxley-Binns, ‘For Learning's Sake’ (Society of 
Legal Scholars Annual Conference, Bristol, September 2012); (5) Graham Ferris, ‘The integration of ethics into 
legal education’ (International Legal Ethics Conference VI, London, July 2014); (6) Graham Ferris (panellist), 
‘Responding to the Ethics and Values Recommendations of the Legal Education and Training Review: What and 
Why?’ (Association of Law Teachers Annual Conference, Cardiff, March 2015): (7) Graham Ferris, ‘Memory and 
Forgetting: What should legal education take from the past and into the future?’ (Association of Law Teachers  
Annual Conference, Cardiff, March 2015); (8) Graham Ferris, ‘The promise and perils of positive psychology in 
legal education’ (Society of Legal Scholars Annual Conference, London, September 2016) 
http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/30325/ accessed 10 June 2019; (9) Graham Ferris, ‘Law students, lawyers, 
wellbeing, and vulnerability Society of Legal Scholars Annual Conference, London, September 2018). 
Four other dissemination or networking events: (1) Graham Ferris, ‘Increasing student engagement in law 
tutorials’ (Anglia Ruskin Law School Away Days, Chelmsford, June 2013); (2) Graham Ferris, ‘On the how and 
why of value informed legal education’ (Teaching Legal Ethics Workshop UK, London, March 2016); (3) Graham 
Ferris, ‘T’ain’t what you do it’s the way that you do it – That’s what gets results’ (Ella Fitzgerald) (Re-Imagining 
Land Law, Birmingham, September 2017)); (4) Graham Ferris, ‘Investigations into Law Student and Lawyer 
Wellbeing’ (Nottingham, June 2018 I organised and hosted a joint Centre for Legal Education and Legal 
Education Research Network (CLE and LERN) event funded by the Health and Wellbeing research initiative at 
Nottingham Trent University. 
Three dissemination events internal to NTU: (1) Workshop of Legal Education Group, 22 February 2012 
Workshop Session: ‘Values in Legal Education’; (2) Centre for Legal Education Retreat, 9-11 December 2013 
Session: ‘Teaching law, values, and ethics; student identity and miscellaneous’; (3) Legal Education Group 
Seminar, 4th February 2015 Session: ‘Ethics and Identity’. 
72 For example: Caroline Strevens and Clare Wilson, ‘Law student wellbeing in the UK: a call for curriculum 
intervention’ (2016) 11 Journal of Commonwealth Law and Legal Education 44. 
73 See: Strevens and Wilson (n70); Emma Jones, ‘Transforming legal education through emotions’ (2018) 38 
Legal Studies 450; Emma Jones, Rajvinder Samra, and Mathijs Lucassen, ‘The world at their fingertips? The 
mental wellbeing of online distance-based law students’ (2019) 53 The Law Teacher 49. Two National events 
have been held to link researchers interested in law student (and academic and legal professional) wellbeing: 
‘Investigations into Law Student and Lawyer Wellbeing’ Nottingham, 15 June 2018; ‘Intentional Education 
Design for well-being’ London, 2May 2019; and a third is planned: ‘Intentional Education Design for Well-being 
– Transition Pedagogies’ London, 5 July 2019 – all three events supported by the Legal Education Research 
Network. 
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through a professional career, were not focussed upon.74 Rather we attempted to take a 
holistic approach to the student as learner, one that could encompass economic ambitions 
but was not to be limited a priori to any sub-set of interests. This task was attempted by 
making student concern – what students cared about – the central theme of the chapter.  
We kept the frame as wide as seemed feasible and asked about the human (modern human 
by implication) who might care about something, we made caring about something (or 
someone) the framing device. This led us to Frankfurt whose career has been largely 
devoted to the question of how people care about things and people.75  
This framing device (making the question of what students cared about central) emphasised 
not the aims of the teacher or the needs of the discipline or the profession or the economy 
but the connection with the affective state of the students. The question was not what was 
in the best interests of the students as ascertained by experts but what the students cared 
about. To care is to be attached to, and concerned about the state of, the object of care, it is 
not merely a cognitive state. Much of the chapter was devoted to a deep justification of this 
unusual emphasis for research on legal education. Making the student central to the 
educational mission of the law school destabilised that educational mission by removing the 
focus away from subject matter or learning outcomes. 
In pursuing these ends the chapter did make several original contributions to human 
knowledge. The use of Frankfurt’s work in connection with the problems of legal education 
specifically and in conjunction with Damasio, research into student wellbeing, and self-
determination theory were novel. 
 
74 For discussion of “education as human capital” in higher education generally see: Stefan Collini, What are 
Universities For (Penguin 2012), chapter 3: ‘The Useful and the Useless’ and chapter 5: The Highest Aspirations 
and ideals: Universities as a Public Good; Speaking of Universities (Verso 2018), chapter 6: ‘Higher Purchase: 
The Student as Consumer’. I first contributed to a related discourse publicly when I reviewed Anthony 
Bradney, Conversations, Choices and Chances: The Liberal Law School in the Twenty-First Century (Hart 
Publishing 2003) in Graham Ferris, ‘An Account of the Twentieth Century in Legal Academe: Or Two Nations 
Divided by a Common Language’ (2006) 15 Nottingham Law Journal 38. The two discourses – around higher 
education and legal education have many connections. 
75 Frankfurt has also published on Descartes’s philosophy in Harry G Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers, & Madmen: 
the defense of reason in Descartes’s Meditations (Princeton University Press 2008), and famously on public 
discourse in Harry G Frankfurt, On Bullshit (Princeton University Press 2005) collected in Harry G Frankfurt, The 
Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge University Press 1998). 
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Frankfurt had been used as a theorist in legal discourse, but not in connection with legal 
education.76 Indeed, his relevance is not obvious unless one takes a student-centred 
approach. However, if one does then he throws light upon one of the more obscure aspects 
of Dewey’s theory of educational practice. Dewey argued that the educator must design the 
curriculum in a manner that touches upon the “interest” of the child.77 However, his 
attempts to flesh out the content of this idea of interest were not transparent: sometimes it 
seemed to be a primordial need to persist, sometimes to lie in internal developmental 
processes, sometimes to be derived from a child’s life situation, sometimes from the 
anticipated future economic role of the child, sometimes from the future wellbeing of the 
child.78 Frankfurt’s concern with second order desires, as explicated in the chapter, gave 
traction to the idea of a student’s “interest”, at least for the young or emerging adult 
student,79 by identifying the centrality of what the student cares about.  
The reflexive nature of the process explored by Frankfurt in his work - the consideration of 
second order desires in the light of what one knows about oneself and one’s situation – 
helps explain the problems that Dewey had in ascertaining the nature of the student’s 
interest. Thus, application of Frankfurt to student-centred learning generated novel insights 
into his work and into the work of Dewey. 
In his published works Frankfurt has shown little interest in the empirical basis for his 
theory. His work remains predominantly conceptual in the tradition of philosophy. When I 
linked his work with the work of Damasio I introduced the possibility of empirical 
confirmation not of the processes Frankfurt describes but of the importance of caring about 
things for human functioning. This in turn offered novel support for some of the assertions 
of theorists of care ethics, whose work can be overly reliant upon assertions supported by 
self-reflection.80 This linking of Frankfurt and Damasio was novel. 
 
76 Meir Dan-Cohen, ‘Socializing Harry’ in Harry G Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right 
(Stanford University Press 2006).  
77 Dewey, (n 4) and John Dewey ‘Interest in Relation to Training of the Will’ in John J McDermott (ed), The 
Philosophy of John Dewey: Two Volumes in One 1 the Structure of Experience 2 The Lived Experience (University 
of Chicago Press 1981). 
78 Ibid. 
79 On the “emerging adult” as a life stage of late modernity see: Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: 
The Winding Road from the Late Teens Through the Twenties (2nd edn, OUP 2014). 
80 See: Martin Buber, I and Thou (Simon & Schuster 2008); Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to 
Ethics and Moral Education (2nd edn, University of California Press 2003). Of course the main focus of ethics of 
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A further novel synthesis was the application of Frankfurt’s theory to problems of student 
distress and self-determination theory. The self in self-determination theory is dynamically 
involved with the world and this involvement shapes development.81 However, there is no 
emphasis on the self being reflexively responsive to beliefs about the self.82 Frankfurt 
identifies a source of “intrinsic” motivations in the second order desires one commits to. It 
has been suggested that attacks upon the student’s self-identity may explain low law 
student wellbeing.83 The attempt to use Frankfurt’s concept of the second order desire as a 
bridging concept emphasised the importance of beliefs about the self, commitments, and 
self-identity when thinking about law student motivation and wellbeing. These links were 
explored in later publications that form part of this thesis.84 
Finally, we also explored congruence between the theoretical insights of self-determination 
theory and our practice experience. Given the earlier triangulating with Frankfurt it provided 
two conciliant theoretical ways to understand and generalise our insights derived from our 
teaching practice. This was an original articulation and development from practice to 
theory, or the generation of novel practice informed theory. 
 
2.4 Reflections and Connections 
The importance to the research reported in ‘What students care about’ of a student-centred 
approach to educational practice is never very clearly articulated in the chapter. This was 
 
care is relational caring about other people, not ideas or projects, and Damasio does not endorse this aspect of 
their work. 
81 Todd D Little, Patricia H Hawley, Christopher C Heinrich and Katherine W Marsland, ‘Three Views of the 
Agentic Self: A Developmental Synthesis’ in Edward L Deci and Richard M Ryan (eds), Handbook of Self-
Determination Research (University of Rochester Press 2002), 389, 390: “An organismic approach to 
understanding the behaviour of individuals also involves an explicit focus on the interface between self and 
context … As part of their integrated functioning, individuals engage in a self-evaluative feedback process, 
continuously interpreting and evaluating actions and their consequences … the individual continually discovers 
and refines who she or he is and what she or he is capable of”. 
82 For a psychological exploration of the impact of theories about the self that affect self-image (i.e. reflexive 
self-narratives) see: Carol S Dweck, Self-Theories: Their Role in Motivation, Personality, and Development 
(Psychology Press 2000), chapter 7: ‘Implicit Theories and Goals Predict Self-Esteem Loss and Depressive 
Reactions to Negative Events’.  
83 Patrick J Schiltz, ‘On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical 
Profession’ (1999) 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 871. 
84 ‘Values ethics and legal ethics: the QLD and LETR recommendations 6, 7, 10, and 11’ and chapter 8 of Uses of 
Values in Legal Education in particular. 
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partly because it was a shared perspective of the authors and informed our practice: it was 
too obvious to us. It was also because we did not directly address our educational 
assumptions, given the context of the book. Finally, it was due to our being concerned in 
writing the chapter to engage with what we viewed as negative assumptions held by legal 
educators towards any engagement with the emotions or values of law students, preferring 
the illusory security provided by an exclusive focus upon the cognitive. 
The remaining publications covered by this introductory chapter did make the centrality of 
the student’s developing self-identity clearer. In subsequent work I also accepted that it was 
necessary to challenge some of the assumptions around what the limits of the academic 
teaching role is.85 
The chapter is too crowded with content. This is a problem with our attempt to deal with 
the problems of multi-disciplinary research by seeking out independent sources to support 
research findings of importance. Given the audience is unlikely to be familiar with the 
sources, as they do not form part of a shared disciplinary corpus, the technique requires a 
lot of exposition.  
This problem forced some potentially valuable material out of the chapter,86 and 
necessitated a rather summary approach to the exposition of the material included. 
However, the only solution to the problem of word limits is to engage in further 
publications, and this thesis represents the most recent addition to the exploration of the 
area. 
The chapter attempted to engage with values without engaging with substantive values 
through the adoption of Frankfurt’s position that anything a person cares about is adequate 
and it is not necessary to evaluate the values of people in order to analyse the process of 
valuing (caring about) things. Such a value-neutral posture is not supportable in legal 
 
85 In addition to the publications presented as part of this thesis: Graham Ferris, ‘The integration of ethics into 
legal education’ (Society of Legal Scholars Annual Conference, Bristol, September 2012);  Graham Ferris and 
Nigel Duncan,  ‘Fishing For Values in Legal Education’ (Association of Law Teachers Annual Conference, 
Nottingham, March 2013); Graham Ferris, ‘Memory and Forgetting: What should legal education take from the 
past and into the future?’ (Association of Law Teachers Annual Conference, Cardiff, March 2015); Graham 
Ferris and Jane Jarman, ‘What makes a person morally courageous?’ (Teaching Legal Ethics Workshop UK, 
London, July 2013); Graham Ferris and Nick Johnson ‘Save the World on Your Own Time: Is the attack on 
professionalism an assertion of a normative imperative to maximise profits’ (Workshop on Professionalism and 
Vulnerability, Leeds, October 2017). 
86 Such as Viktor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning: The classic tribute to hope from the Holocaust (Rider 2004). 
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education.87 This issue became apparent in writing ‘Values ethics and legal ethics’ and was 
substantively addressed in chapter one of Uses of Values as discussed below.88 
Although ‘What students care about’ identified the dynamics of value adoption and tied it to 
self-development it did not articulate the importance of this dynamic to the developmental 
process young people are going through in legal education. Although the importance of the 
value commitments of students was recognised there was still a reluctance to see legal 
education as just one aspect of the student’s life. This issue of the importance of the 
developing student identity for legal education was taken up in my next publication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 For an attempt to defend such a position see: Stanley Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time (Oxford 
University Press 2012) at 19: “But neither the university as a collective nor its faculty should advocate 
personal, political, moral, or any other kind of views except academic views”; and at 21: “I Ignore these 
[professional and vocational education, residential life, and extracurricular activity] activities”. The book is an 
elaboration of Fish’s argument in his earlier piece ‘Aim Low’ in the Chronical of Higher Education 16 May 2003: 
“The authors [of Educating Citizens: Preparing America's Undergraduates For Lives Of Moral And Civic 
Responsibility] complain that students' "impatience to complete their professional or vocational training ... can 
make it difficult to interest them in broader goals of intellectual and personal development." Mine is the 
opposite fear, that the emphasis on broader goals and especially on the therapeutic goal of "personal 
development" can make it difficult to interest students in the disciplinary training it is our job to provide.” 
Available at: https://www.chronicle.com/article/Aim-Low/45210 accessed 13 December 2019.  
Fish took issue with Bok in ‘Aim Low’ and Bok was strongly critical of the argument in ‘Aim Low’ in Derek Bok, 
Our Underachieving Colleges: A candid look at how much students learn and why they should be learning more 
(Princeton university Press 2009), 59-60.  
88 The topic is also addressed by chapter three of Uses of Values, but chapter three is not incorporated into this 
thesis. 
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3. Publication 2: ‘Values Ethics and Legal Ethics’89 
 
3.1 Thematic Summary  
In this article I started to address the issue of what the student learners’ “interest” might be 
in the context of legal education. The argument was that as educators we should align our 
practice with the best interests of our students and not attempt to turn education into a 
panacea for social or regulatory ills. I did this by articulating the importance of the individual 
learner’s self-identity, drawing upon Anthony Gidden’s work on the reflexive project of the 
self and the concept of the third apprenticeship in the Carnegie Report Educating Lawyers, 
to elaborate on my understanding of legal education.90 
Educating Lawyers sets out three apprenticeships.91 First, the intellectual or cognitive 
apprenticeship, which is an apprenticeship in legal analysis which is devoted to developing 
analytical thinking and formal knowledge – or thinking like a lawyer. Second, is an 
apprenticeship in forms of expert practice, and is concerned with practical skills, best taught 
through experiential learning. Third is an apprenticeship of identity, concerned with the 
purpose and attitudes of the lawyer. It is the third apprenticeship with its concern with the 
learner’s self-identity and values that was of most importance for the article.  
The idea of the third apprenticeship is valuable as it avoids framing legal education as an 
antagonistic combat between different educational aims, cognitive (academic), skills 
(professional), and socialisation (identity). Rather it frames the three apprenticeships as 
necessary and complementary, and gives an unusually central place to the third 
apprenticeship as the one that integrates and makes sense of the other two. This thus both 
 
89 Graham Ferris, ‘Values ethics and legal ethics’ (n2). 
90 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Polity 1991), 5-6, 32-
34, and 214-217 provide relevant summaries; William M Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch Wegner, Lloyd 
Bond and Lee S Shulman, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law (Jossey-Bass 2007). 
91 William M Sullivan et al, Educating Lawyers: ‘The Three Apprenticeships of Professional Education’, loc 414-
449. 
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articulates the third or identity apprenticeship and emphasises its structural importance to 
the legal education project. 
Gidden’s articulation of the self-reflexive identity projects of people, including students, is 
important as a way of generalising beyond legal education as a preparation for professional 
practice, and beyond legal education to undergraduate education. Personal identity is 
constructed, and constructed within a social context by individuals, according to Giddens.92 
This is not something that should be done to students, but something students should be 
helped to do for themselves. Especially in an undergraduate context a legal professional 
identity should be offered as one possible model but not imposed upon students. Student 
interest is not something known a priori by the teacher, but something identified by the 
student learner with the help of the teacher. 
As Giddens’ analysis is highly abstract, the chapter referenced the social and organisational 
mediation of university learning project (SOMUL project) which generated a highly similar 
concept to the self-reflexive self-identity project in the “identity-projects” of students.93 
SOMUL presented the findings of qualitative research into what university students valued 
in their experience of university education and found personally significant relationships and 
formative experiences of independence were emphasised by students over knowledge or 
disciplinary characteristic ways of reasoning. These prosaic findings served to illustrate the 
ordinary and familiar contents of the self-identity project. 
Finally, ‘Values ethics and legal ethics’ was concerned with the specifically ethical aspects of 
student identity, and the chapter introduced an influential analysis of the factors that lead 
to ethical action. The model was created by Rest and Narvaez and is known as the “four 
component model”.94 The four components are sensitivity, reasoning, motivation and 
efficacy. The model was used to highlight the personal and contentious nature of 
 
92 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Polity 1991), (n 90). 
93 John Brennan, Robert Edwards, Muir Houston, David Jary, Yann Lebeau, Michael Osborne and John T E 
Richardson, Improving What is Learned in University: An Exploration of the Social and Organisational Diversity 
of University Education (Routledge 2010), Chapter 7, 138 and 156. Other terms are used such as: “academic 
identity”, “subject identity”, “graduate identity”, “personal/self-identity/self-concept”, “group identity/social 
identity”, and “identity”. 
94 James R Rest, ‘Chapter 1 Background: Theory and Research’ in James R Rest and Darcia Narvaez (eds), Moral 
Development in the Professions: Psychology and Applied Ethics (Erlbaum Associates Inc 1994), 23-25. 
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components two and three – moral reasoning and moral motivation - which are central to 
ethical self-identity of an individual. 
Thus, my article provided a clearer articulation of what adult-student-centred (or emerging 
adult-student-centred) education might be about.95 Ethical values which are a sub-set of 
what people care about were the thematic focus of my research, reflecting both my interest 
in ethical values and the importance they had been assigned in the Legal Education and 
Training Review (LETR).96 
The article noted two aspects of the LETR. First, that the LETR brief reflected the perspective 
of regulators rather than educators, and second, the importance given in the LETR to ethics 
and values and professionalism (three linked terms) by stakeholders.97 The article used 
these facts to inform an evaluative position, which led to a cautioning against the setting of 
unrealistic, or even inappropriate, objectives for legal education in a highly unstable legal 
services market context.98 
LETR used the terminology and conceptual apparatus of learning outcomes.99 Learning 
outcomes are congruent with the metaphor of education as transfer of a parcel or object 
(information or knowledge or skills),100 but less compatible with the idea of education as 
learner transformation. In the transfer model what is transferred is controllable, and indeed 
can be described before any education takes place in terms of outcomes, and successful 
transfer can be assessed. The parcel transferred starts in the teacher and teaching materials, 
is moved into the learner, and the learner can produce it for inspection in assessment. It is 
not interestingly dynamic; the parcel should be consistent and stable. Transformation of the 
parcel through interaction with the learner is learner error. In a learner transformation 
 
95 Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: The Winding Road from the Late Teens Through the Twenties 
(2nd edn, OUP 2014). 
96 Julian Webb, Jane Ching, Paul Maharg and Avrom Sherr, Setting Standards: The Future of Legal Services 
Education and Training Regulation in England and Wales (Legal Education and Training Review 2013). 
97 Fiona Cownie ed, Stakeholders in the Law School (Hart Publishing 2010). 
98 It should be noted that the LETR was not directed to undergraduate legal education primarily, but had a 
broader remit. 
99 Webb et al LETR (n 94) ix: “enhance consistency of education and training through a more robust system of 
learning outcomes and standards, and increased standardisation of assessment”; and paras 4.106, 4.122, and 
recommendations 1-5. The most pertinent discourse is the one on outcome based regulation rather than 
learning outcomes, see: Solicitors Regulation Authority, ‘Outcomes-focused regulation - transforming the 
SRA's regulation of legal services’ available at: https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/consultations/OFR-
consultation.page accessed 11 June 2019. 
100 Discussed above at text at notes 13-14. 
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model the process and the final outcomes are not controllable, being inherently dialectical 
and unpredictable. The most important process is the development of the learner, which 
may be away from the law, or in a strongly critical direction within the law, or towards one 
of many very different models of legal professional practice.101 
When outcomes are tied to assessment this produces the risk of reification as that 
assessment becomes the product of the educational process. A transfer model of learning, 
teaching pre-established outcomes, and demanding that assessment of those outcomes 
alone is permissible can support a reified and technocratic frame for analysing education. 
Such a vision of education is one in which students are coached in order to demonstrate 
that they have achieved the pre-set outcomes through successful assessment 
performance.102 There is little room in this for the individual learner to develop an identity 
project as a lawyer or a non-lawyer, and one concern behind my research was that many 
law undergraduates do not work in the legal services market after graduation, and many of 
those who do work in that market do so as paralegals not as legal professionals.103 Neither 
those students who will work outside the legal services market or those who will work 
outside the legal professions are well served by an education structured around these 
outcomes. There is little room here for the recognition of value differences as the outcomes 
are presumptively outside of critical examination, if they are not demonstrated then the 
learner has failed. There is no room for the learner to challenge successfully the outcomes 
within the educational process. This placing of the educational product outside of the 
educational discourse is why such a technocratic approach is sometimes identified as 
training rather than education.104   
 
101 For an interesting investigation of what attorney career choices in the US generated wellbeing see: 
Lawrence S Krieger and Kennon M Sheldon, 'What Makes Lawyers Happy?: A Data-Driven Prescription to 
Redefine Professional Success' (2015) 83 George Washington Law Review 554. 
102 For a critical account of just such an aberration in US school education see: Diane Ravitch, The Death and 
Life of the Great American School System: How testing and choice are undermining education (revised ed, Basic 
Books 2016), Chapter 2: ‘Hijacked! How the Standards Movement Turned Into the Testing Movement’.  
103 Hilary Sommerlad, The new ‘professionalism’ in England and Wales: talent, diversity, and a legal precariat in 
Spencer Headworth, Robert l Nelson, Ronit Dinovitzer and David B Wilkins (eds) Diversity in Practice: Race, 
Gender, and Class in Legal and Professional Careers (Cambridge University Press 2016), 226. 
104 The existence of two knowledge producing sectors, the academy and the professions, has caused a tension 
in legal education since the common law became a university taught subject. Sometimes the tension is argued 
out in a contrast between liberal arts and training; sometimes as a conflict between a theoretical or practical 
approach; sometimes as black letter versus contextual legal education. The substitution of the regulator for 
the profession in the conflict makes the centrality of power in these debates more obvious – in part it is about 
who gets to define and control and evaluate legal education. 
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Thus, the conceptual frame used in the LETR reflects a common sense approach to 
education expressed through the knowledge transfer metaphor of teaching and learning. 
The LETR was informed by the regulatory mission of the commissioning bodies. Obviously, 
the approach has a product (outcomes) not process focus. It naturally generates an 
evaluative criterion of efficiency: one should generate the outcomes at the least cost in time 
and resources.105  
The article focussed on one problematic aspect of an outcomes-based approach to legal 
education: the risk of the marginalisation or even exclusion of non-assessable but important 
educational objectives from legal education, specifically from the undergraduate law 
degree. The idea was thereby to identify the need to counterbalance the regulatory frame 
with appreciation of student-centred concerns, specifically the formation of a student 
ethical identity. If personal ethical identity is not suitable for, or capable of, reliable 
assessment, then an aspect of legal education highly valued by stakeholders was at risk from 
the structural concepts relied upon in the report. Two specific problems posed by the 
conceptual frame of the LETR were examined in the article. 
First, as assessment is a proxy for any learning outcome that is not a rote reproduction of 
material the emphasis on assessment was distortive of educational values. This problem is 
exacerbated when the desired outcome is a change in behaviour over time, as it is for ethics 
and values education. This threatened a second order problem. Responding to an 
assessment about values in a way that misrepresents one’s true values might be 
instrumentally rational (obtain good assessment marks) but would certainly be hypocritical. 
In other words: attempts to assess might inculcate dishonesty and betrayal of personal 
integrity in the context of legal education.106 This would be facilitating the internalisation of 
an undesirable value. This is one important reason for education to recognise the 
 
105 Such an approach to learning is of course familiar from the bureaucratic management of teaching and 
learning in the modern UK university and has developed in part as an attempt to undermine teaching and 
assessment that was based upon unarticulated aspects of cultural capital. For a classic account of the role of 
cultural capital in higher education assessments in twentieth century France see: Pierre Bourdieu, The State 
Nobility (Polity Press 1996).  
106 Ruth W Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics (University of 
Chicago Press 1997), 62-75 where she distinguishes three types of hypocrite: cynical, complacent and 
righteous antihypocrite. Either the cynical or the complacent seem to be potentially in issue in ethics testing. 
See also: Angela Duckworth, ‘Don’t Grade Schools on Grit’ New York Times (New York 26 March 2016) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/opinion/sunday/dont-grade-schools-on-grit.html accessed 17 March 
2019. 
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educational value of learners’ critical engagement with learning outcomes. Such critical 
engagement with the learning outcomes can, and where appropriate should, be rewarded in 
assessment or academic feedback. Strong and deep ethical beliefs can be forged through 
critical reflection upon socially endorsed values and practices. 
Second, ethical and value positions are contentious. Contentious substantive ethical or 
value positions challenge the appropriateness of setting substantive learning outcomes in 
this domain. The technocratic aspect of the frame obscures the salience of this issue. Such a 
frame obscures valid value pluralism and makes it difficult not to confound propaganda aims 
with educational aims. When one sees the consideration of values, and their rejection or 
adoption as part of a learner’s identity project this issue becomes very sensitive indeed. The 
dogmatic assertion, teaching, and assessment of “acceptable” value positions, whether 
explicitly or implicitly embedded in learning outcomes, runs directly counter to the proudest 
rhetoric and tradition of the liberal undergraduate degree.107 What is needed is defence of 
any values necessary to legal education, and recognition of the educational validity of those 
values within the realm of legitimate pluralistic dispute.108 
The proposed resolution to these problems in this article was to drop any rigid adherence to 
the learning outcomes and constructive alignment model of legal education in this domain 
and to substitute one concerned with the learner’s identity project at least in the 
undergraduate degree. Professionalism is an aspect of identity, and professional ethics 
inform a professional identity. However, mere recitation and application of ethical codes to 
hypothetical scenarios is a weak and limited approach to values and ethics in legal 
education.109 The article sketched an influential analysis of the factors required for effective 
 
107 Anthony Bradney, Conversation, Choices and Chances: The Liberal Law School in the Twenty-First Century 
(Hart Publishing 2003), chapter 2. 
108 An idea analogous to the idea of reasonable pluralism developed by John Rawls, Political Liberalism 
(Columbia University Press 2005), 36-38. 
109 William H Simon, ‘The trouble with legal ethics’ (1991) 41 Journal of Legal Education 65; Julian Webb, 
‘Conduct, Ethics and Experience in Vocational Education: Opportunities Missed’ in Kim Economides (ed), 
Ethical Challenges to Legal Education & Conduct (Hart Publishing 1998), 271; Andrew Boon, The Ethics and 
Conduct of Lawyers in England and Wales (Hart Publishing 2014) chapter 6 ‘Education’. See also: Anthony T 
Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Harvard University Press 1993), Introduction; 
William H Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers’ Ethics (Harvard University Pres 
1998)’Introduction’; Stuart A Scheingold and Austin Sarat, Something to Believe In: Politics, Professionalism, 
and Cause Lawyering (Stanford University Press 2004), chapter 3: ‘Beating the Odds: cause lawyering and legal 
education’; David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (Cambridge University Press 2007), Part I: ‘The Ethics 
in Legal Ethics’. 
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ethical action. 110 Some (ethical reasoning and practical reasoning for efficacy) had 
important problem-solving cognitive elements. However, others (sensitivity and motivation) 
had important identity aspects and were less cognitive in nature. A strongly ethical or value 
led educational process would be concerned not with passing an assessment in ethics but in 
engaging with ethics as part of the learner’s identity project. This would no doubt generate 
knowledge and understanding of ethical discourse and be a site for critical thinking. 
However, facilitating the development of self-identity is an important educational objective 
and is not assessable as a learning outcome. 
This is connected to the final element in the article – that in the domain of values, ethics and 
identity a technocratic (or positivistic) approach to legal education is untenable. Values and 
ethics are not merely cognitive, indeed their importance to the professions and potential 
role in the integration of legal education depend upon this. It is possible to claim academic 
practice should be concerned only with argumentative form and not truth.111 It is possible to 
treat legal professional ethics as mere rules that must be known and followed. However, the 
article argued these positions would be failures of educational duty. It argued that there is 
an imperative to support the learner in her identity project. Furthermore, that the fulfilling 
of this duty strengthens legal education, and benefits the regulation of the profession when 
professional ethics are internalised by neophyte legal professionals. 
 
3.2 Relation to ‘What Students Care About’ 
The article was part of a special issue of The Law Teacher responding to the LETR. However, 
the idea of the student identity project (or third apprenticeship) was a direct development 
of the concerns of ‘What students care about’. The idea of second order desires (desires to 
desire) aligns with ethical motivation in Rest’s four component model of ethical action.112 
 
110 James R Rest, ‘Background Theory and Research’ in James Rest and Darcia Narvaez, Moral Development in 
the Profession: Psychology and Applied Ethics (Laurence Erlbaum Associates 1994). 
111 Stanley Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time (Oxford University Press 2012), 22-37. Although Fish argues 
in effect that the learning outcomes must always be capable of being the subject matter of educational 
discourse – what he calls “academicizing”. Therefore, the approach of the LETR may go further than Fish in 
some respects in its rejection of concern with the identity (character) of the learner. 
112 James R Rest, ‘Background Theory and Research’ in James R Rest and Darcia Narvaez (eds), Moral 
Development in the Professions: Psychology and Applied Ethics (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 1994). 
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The rather acontextual account given by Frankfurt in his published words is placed within a 
developmental and educational context. The basic methodological approach is continued, 
and the article uses ethical, sociological and educational concepts to give some content to 
“the interest of the learner” as that phrase is used in student-centred approaches to 
education.113 
Thus, in ‘Values, ethics and legal ethics’ the student who is to be at the centre of legal 
education in the question: “What is entailed by a student-centred approach to legal 
education?” is placed within a social context and so is legal education. ‘What students care 
about’ discussed a very decontextualized individual and legal education and how it should 
be understood never came into analytical focus. 
The article also attends to the institutional context of the discussion itself. The regulatory 
perspective of the LETR was not an arbitrary or chance one, it was a function of the identity 
of the research funders. The tendency of constructive alignment to become assessment 
driven education is tied to the bureaucratic rolling out of the idea,114 and its congruity with 
an international regulatory model of “accountability” and “transparency” in modern 
governance.115  
 
113 See: Dewey, (n 4) and John Dewey ‘Interest in Relation to Training of the Will’ in John J McDermott (ed), The 
Philosophy of John Dewey: Two Volumes in One 1 the Structure of Experience 2 The Lived Experience (University 
of Chicago Press 1981). 
114 John Biggs, ‘Constructive alignment in university teaching’ (2014) 1 HERDSA Review of Higher Education 5; 
John Biggs and Catherine Tang, Teaching For Quality Learning At University (4th edn, Open University Press 
2011). 
115 Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (Oxford University Press 1997), chapter 1: ‘The 
Audit Explosion’; Marilyn Strathern, ‘New Accountabilities: Anthropological studies in audit, ethics and the 
academy’ in Marilyn Strathern (ed), Audit Cultures: Anthropological studies in accountability, ethics and the 
academy (Routledge 200);  Jamil Salmi, ‘The growing accountability agenda in tertiary education: progress or 
mixed blessing’ (2008) OECD Programme on Institutional Management in Higher Education available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/site/eduimhe08/41218034.pdf and Jamil Salmi, The growing accountability agenda in 
tertiary education: progress or mixed blessing (2009) Education working paper series no 16 available at:  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1099079877269/547664-
1099079956815/EWPS16_Accountability_Tertiary_Educ.pdf last accessed 2 July 2018  
Salmi identifies faculty as the problem constituency (educational professionals) at p vii 2009 and p 6 2008: “… 
institutional leaders often face difficulties in convincing their constituencies, especially faculty.”  
Jo Johnson, ‘Embracing accountability and promoting value for money in Higher Education’ (2017) Speech to 
Universities UK Annual Conference 7 September 2017 available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/jo-johnson-speech-to-uuk-annual-conference last accessed 2 July 
2018. Ellen Hazelkorn, ‘Reshaping the world order of higher education: the role and impact of rankings on 
national and global systems’ (2017) 2 Policy Reviews in higher Education 4 sees the growing regulatory 
apparatus as a response to universities becoming civilly disengaged and, at 20 : “creating a vacuum, pushing 
the state, often controversially, to step back in, to (re)sume a strong(er) co-ordinating role to oversee and 
reaffirm the public good by way of new regulations, national strategies, frameworks and funding mechanisms. 
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Thus, the two pieces are tied together by the concern with the student’s experience of 
educational processes. The book chapter articulated issues of importance at an individual 
level of analysis, and the article identified ways that an awareness of the importance of the 
learner’s development illuminated problems inherent in analyses that neglected the issue. 
However, it also illustrated how important it is to consider both aspects of education, the 
teaching (outcomes and constructive alignment) as well as the learning (self-identity). This 
in turn highlighted how important it is to have a developed discourse on values, and 
specially some approach to identifying those thought necessary to the discipline and those 
that exist in a realm of reasonable pluralism. Finally, the importance of viewing education as 
a process, rather than a product, was brought home by the analysis of the inherent 
difficulties around assessment of certain valid educational aims. These issues were 
developed further in the book chapters from Uses of Values in Legal Education that form the 
final part of this thesis.  
 
3.3 Reception and Significance of the Article 
 
3.3.A. Metrics and Impact 
The article has been cited four times according to Scopus.116 It has a Field-Weighted Citation 
Impact of 1.11 which is just over the average which is normalised to 1.0. PlumXMetrics 
shows 101 views of the abstract, 16 full text views, 11 link-outs and 9 captures.117  In 
addition I have sent one copy to an academic by personal request.  
The Law Teacher is probably the most influential journal in the legal education field in the 
UK. Certainly, the critical stance taken of the LETR has become far more prevalent than 
when the article was published.118 The article stands as a contribution to the debate over 
undergraduate legal education in the UK.  
 
116 Also, once according to Google Scholar – unfortunately, it is not possible to know if this is one of the 
citations picked up by Scopus or not.  
117 https://www.scopus.com/record/pubmetrics.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84893502816&origin=recordpage accessed 25 
February 2019. 
118 See the special edition of The Law Teacher: ‘From LETR to SQE’ (2018) 53(4) The Law Teacher 379. 
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3.3.B. Significance 
As noted above, the article contextualised the student and legal education and thereby the 
research question, but context is not obvious or given. Context has to be provided by 
credible evidence backed sources. This involved bringing several extant sources together 
and making connection across discourses. Thus, the article continued in the multi-
disciplinary spirit of ‘What students care about’. Literature from sociology, ethics, and 
education (legal and ethical) was reviewed.119 An effort was made to identify common 
concepts that may have been hidden behind disparate terms across the disciplines. This 
effort facilitated a significant and novel syntheses of the sources. 
This situating of Frankfurt’s work in a sociologically informed context produced new 
understanding of Frankfurt’s work. It linked Frankfurt’s concern with second order desires to 
questions of identity. What one cares about is important in narratives of the self that 
constitute the reflexive project of the self that informs self-identity as these terms are used 
by Giddens.120 Two things can be taken from this. First, Frankfurt illuminates an aspect of 
the student’s emerging adult identity that looks both backward and forwards in time and is 
impacted by developing ideas about the student’s self. Second, Frankfurt can be seen as a 
theorist and expositor of the reflexive project of the self that is characteristic of late 
modernity. 
Giddens’ concept of the reflexive identity project was presented as a feature of late 
modernity. It was not limited to ethical identity, nor work identity, but encompassed all 
potential social roles. Ethical motivation is part of a model for successful ethical action that 
is intended to be universal. Thus, if we restrict our concern to contemporary ethical 
character and ethical action, then, conscious ethical motivation must be developed through 
the self-reflexive personal narrative. Ethical action is salient across all social roles. Thus, 
concern with one’s ethical identity is an aspect of the broader self-identity project 
 
119 ‘Values, ethics and legal ethics’ (n2), 24-30.  
120 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Polity 1991), 242-
244. 
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generated by the loss of inherited traditional social roles and associated lifeworld.121 
Aspects of the modern lifeworld are always at risk of a reflexive examination and removal to 
the realm of conscious knowledge.122 Ethics can no longer be merely accepted but require 
consideration and incorporation into the self-narrative. 
Thus, I suggested a synthesis of the self-narrative (Giddens) with the conscious formation of 
ethical motivation (Rest and Narvaez).123 This enables the placing of ethical identity within a 
broader context of self-identity and to bring the ethical consequences of the modern self-
identity project into sharper focus.  
The third apprenticeship of Educating Lawyers is situated in the US law school in the report. 
Given the structure of US legal education that means it is situated in an education designed 
to socialise and prepare students for legal professional practice. As such it is intended to 
inculcate a set of professional ethical attitudes, a process that is in part conducted through 
express teaching of legal ethics. Educating Lawyers identified this aspect of both 
unconscious (socialised) and conscious (self-narrative) identity formation as the third 
apprenticeship. I argued this third apprenticeship is the ethical aspect of the self-identity 
project that leads to moral motivation. 
To conclude this account of the synthesis in this article: the third apprenticeship is not 
peculiar to professional or legal education but is part of a universal identity project in the 
developed world, an identity project that will influence and may determine the presence or 
absence of moral motivation. Thus, the third apprenticeship and a concern with ethical 
 
121 Lifeworld is used here in the sense it is used by Habermas: “lifeworld contexts … provide the backing of a 
massive background consensus … shared, unproblematic beliefs … nourished by these resources of the always 
already familiar” and The lifeworld, of which institutions are a part, comes into view as a complex of 
interpenetrating cultural traditions, social orders, and personal identities” Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts 
and Norms (Polity Press 1997), 22 and 23. The phrases “life world” and “life-world” as used by Peter Jarvis 
seem to have a similar meaning: “our own life world upon which we can presume in an almost unthinking 
manner”, “every implication within the life-world goes on within the milieu of affairs which have already been 
explicated, within a reality that is fundamentally and typically familiar.” Peter Jarvis, Teaching, Learning and 
Education in Late Modernity (Routledge 2012), loc 1232 and loc 1902. The key reason to prefer the formulation 
by Habermas is that his lifeworld is a social shared phenomenon rather than an internal phenomenon of an 
individual as the terms seems to be when used by Jarvis. However, it may simply be that Jarvis is explicating 
the individual learner’s experience, and he would agree that the lifeworld is shared. The concept is important 
for Jarvis as it is changes to the taken for granted life world that constitute learning.  
122 To thematise lifeworld belief is to disintegrate or decompose it, Ibid 22-23. 
123 Of course not all ethical motivation is created consciously, much of it might be the product of socialisation – 
an aspect of the lifeworld. Thus, the two concepts overlap rather than collapse into each other. 
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identity is not tied to professional education per se and can be used to inform the 
curriculum and educational practice of undergraduate education. 
This synthesis was developed and applied in the context of the LETR which used quite 
different framing concepts, as noted above. LETR was not focused on the practice of legal 
education, nor upon the extra-regulatory objectives of legal education. However, it did 
share a concern with ethical character formation congruent with my concerns with the 
learner’s self-identity project, and specifically its ethical component. Bringing these two 
disparate approaches together permitted a critique of the conceptual approach of the LETR 
in the ethical realm. This critique was novel and undermined the subsequent use made of 
the LETR by the Solicitors Regulation Authority.124  
The article also permitted an exploration of the purpose of undergraduate legal education. 
The conceptual framing had the benefit of avoiding an account based upon a contradiction 
between liberal or educational purposes and professional or training purposes. Clearly, 
professional character (suited to a legal professional) is one possible ideal outcome of an 
ethical self-narrative, and not a necessary one. By placing the third apprenticeship into a 
broader context its specificity is lost, it becomes one identity a student can endorse and 
adopt, not a requirement of the degree course. It also becomes an exemplar of an ethical 
self-identity project as part of the broader self-identity project. This frees up the possibility 
for critical examination of current professional ethics, as well as the exploration of 
alternative ethical identities. It also makes the professional identity one that is useful to 
offer, explicate, and explore as part of law students’ education. 
A student-centred approach to education makes the development of the learner the key 
criterion for evaluation of the educational endeavour. This focus can draw criticism as it 
seems to be in tension with the reproduction of the discipline and in law of the legal 
professions.125 However, the application of the synthesised sources to undergraduate legal 
education demonstrated that any tension can be overcome. Law students choose to study 
law, and it is perfectly reasonable to introduce them to the demands and ethical constraints 
of a legal professional identity. At the same time there is no warrant, given student 
 
124 See: The Law Teacher (2018) 52(4), ‘From LETR to SQE’ a special issue devoted to the dubious development 
of the Solicitors Qualifying Examination (SQE) from the LETR. 
125 I explored one aspect of this tension in chapter one of Uses of Values (n 3), 3-4.  
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destinations, to insist students adopt this identity or pretend to adopt this ethical identity in 
assessments. An undergraduate curriculum that manages to engage with ethical identity is 
valuable as such,126 and it offers support in the difficult self-identity project forced upon 
students by late modernity. Legal professional identity can be a vehicle for such ethical 
reflection. 
Thus, the article shows how legal ethics and professional identity are not intrinsically 
aspects of a training model of undergraduate education. Rather they can be a way to 
explore issues of self-identity and personal growth and development, tasks characteristic of 
the ideal accounts of the liberal undergraduate degree. The article made this possibility 
apparent through its engagements with, synthesis and application of, a range of multi-
disciplinary sources which were subjected to exploration using interpretative techniques 
drawn from academic law. This generated a novel insight and made an original contribution 
to the ongoing discourse on the purpose of the undergraduate law degree. 
 
3.4 Reflections and Connections 
The article left several issues under-explored.  
There was no engagement with substantive values in legal education. It was established that 
the undergraduate degree should aim to assist law students with their personal identity 
projects, but beyond exploring the professional identity there was little consideration of the 
proper limits of such assistance. Specifically, the tension between the third apprenticeship 
in US legal education and its possible value in legal education in England and Wales was not 
considered. 
Rest’s four components of ethical action model was introduced, and used, but, 
considerations of space left the exposition thin. This was of particular importance in 
 
126 As argued by: Martha C Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education 
(Harvard University Press 1998), Introduction; Antony T Kronman, Education's End: Why Our Colleges and 
Universities Have Given Up on the Meaning of Life (Yale University Press 2007), Introduction; Derek Bok, Our 
Underachieving Collages: A candid look at how much students learn and why they should be learning more 
(Princeton University Press 2009), 58-66; Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity (Princeton University 
Press 2010), chapter 4: ‘The Trouble with Culture’. 
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connection with moral motivation. An exploration would have permitted links to be made to 
‘What students care about’.  
Happily, these issues could be and were further explored in Uses of Values which is the 
source of the final three publications that make up this thesis. 
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4. Publication 3: Uses of Values Chapter one127 
 
4.1 Thematic Summary 
Both ‘What students care about’ and ‘Values ethics and legal ethics’ identified the 
importance of reflection upon values taught and values adopted by students for legal 
education. ‘Values ethics and legal ethics’ also identified the importance of a willingness to 
critically examine values embedded in the curriculum for a legal education in order to avoid 
degeneration into dogmatic training. Hence the importance of articulating and defending 
the values that I proposed in my research should inform the educator and curriculum of 
legal education. Articulation and justification of a set of values is the subject of chapter one 
of Uses of Values. The subject overlaps naturally with discourses about the values that 
should inform legal education in particular and higher education in general. 
To be credible, higher education must address plurality of values.128 It would be possible to 
argue that there is some identifiable set of correct (true) values that should be taught, and 
indeed the European university had its origins in a conception of value discourse that was 
relatively closed (divine revelation and the church were not to be challenged).129 However, 
the diversity of modern society, the loss of plausible naivety in the face of cultural 
difference, and sceptical challenges to certainty of values make this approach impossible to 
justify. Consequently, the chapter sought to justify a “starting value”, followed by identifying 
a set of “justifiable values” for legal education. Thus, it established purposes or aims for 
legal education that could be broadly accepted by legal educators.130  
The idea of a “starting value” was an attempt to recognise the need for an organising 
principle. An organising principle is not necessarily recognised as having hierarchical priority, 
 
127 Graham Ferris, Uses of Values in Legal Education (Intersentia 2015), 3. 
128 Pluralism as described in Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, in Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study of 
Mankind: An anthology of essays (Pimlico 1998). 
129 Harold J Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Harvard University 
Press 1983), Introduction.  
130 Values for legal education not values for a legal curriculum – which was considered in chapter 3 of Uses of 
Values in Legal Education. 
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but it serves to organise and even integrate potentially conflicting values (or aims). 
Identification and use of such a principle are characteristics of doctrinal academic legal 
scholarship that is usually directed at the corpus of legal materials.131 The point is most 
easily expressed by way of an example. In teaching the law of contract a starting value 
(principle) for organising an exposition of contract law would be the enforcement of 
voluntary agreements. In other words, contracts are enforced because they represent the 
agreement of the parties. This principle does not close down disagreement over why the 
agreement is enforceable (e.g. reciprocal reliance or the force of promises or economic 
efficiency), nor does it mean all agreements will be enforced (public policy).132 Finally, when 
the agreement comes into existence, what the terms of the agreement are, and what 
circumstances render it unenforceable are all open questions that appeal to values of 
certainty, freedom of action, and fairness.133 The value recognised in enforcing agreements 
because they are agreements – giving effect to agreements entered into voluntarily despite 
later regret by one party – is a good starting point as it enables one to make sense of the 
other values recognised by contract law. Choice of a starting value (principle) is significant 
because the use of a different starting principle can lead to different substantive results.134 
The starting value put forward for legal education was to pay regard to the effects of legal 
education upon the learner: to act in the interests of the students. The contrast was made 
between postgraduate legal education in the US and undergraduate legal education in the 
UK, as the US emphasis on preparation for the profession used in the Carnegie report 
Educating Lawyers made more sense in a US context. However, it was also argued that 
education should focus upon the learners and not upon social ends (e.g. social mobility, 
economic rejuvenation, acceptance of existing authority structures, professional standards 
in legal practice) because such aims were often outside of the effective influence of an 
educational institution. The problem posed by my suggested aim was of course the one 
 
131 See: Alan Watson, ‘The Importance of Nutshells’ (1994) 42 American Journal of Comparative Law 1. 
132 PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (OUP 1985); Robert B Cooter Jr and Thomas Ulen, Law 
and Economics (6th ed, Pearson 2013). 
133 Following typical teaching text order of treatment (e.g. Roger Brownsword, Smith & Thomas: A Casebook on 
Contract (13 ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) – offer and acceptance, construction of express terms and default 
terms, and frustration. 
134 This can be seen in cases like Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102 in which two potential organising 
principles were in contestation: unjust enrichment and property. 
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identified above with learner-centred educational theory – how does one identify what is in 
the interests of the student learners? 
Ascertaining what values best serve the interests of the students is not straightforward. 
Academic paternalism was considered as a means of doing so, relying upon professional 
practice as an educator as a source of knowledge. However, low wellbeing of law students 
suggested this source had not aligned legal education with student interest in the past.135 
Consideration and rejection of the market as a source of information on student interests 
was postponed to a later chapter (as being too large a subject for chapter one). The only 
principles of selection identified were avoidance of avoidable harm, respect for learner 
autonomy, and regard for value pluralism – principles that operate to demand justification 
of teaching any value and militate against dogmatism and proselytising by educators.  
Several values were enumerated, which could be pursued through educational practices as 
educational aims that were in the interests of the students. First, respect for and facilitation 
of reflection upon personal and social values, in effect valuing the academic project.136 The 
chapter identified Frankfurt, Giddens, and Williams as important theorists who gave content 
to the idea of reflection on who the self might be and become.137 Fundamentally, once 
student autonomy was given value, the question of how academics might support the 
students in exercising that autonomy well became salient. 
Second, building capabilities of students, in particular the abilities to reason soundly and 
express oneself well, and to pursue truth – which linked back to reflection upon values. The 
concept of capabilities was taken from the work of Sen and Nussbaum,138 with some 
emphasis on Nussbaum reflecting her engagement with the use of capability theory in an 
educational context.139 
 
135 As discussed in ‘What students care about’ (n1) above, and in Uses of Values (n 3) at 56-64. 
136 This value of “academicizing” issues would be viewed as legitimate even by Fish, see Stanley Fish, Save the 
World on Your Own Time (Oxford University Press 2008). 
137 Williams’ concept of the ground project was an important addition to the theoretical understanding, see: 
Bernard Williams, ‘Persons, character and morality’ in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 
1973-1980 (Cambridge University Press 1981), 18. 
138 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford University Press 1999); Martha C Nussbaum, Creating 
Capabilities – The human development approach (Belknap Press of Harvard University 2011). 
139 Martha C Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity – Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education (Harvard 
University Press 1997); Martha C Nussbaum, Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (Princeton 
University Press 2010). 
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Third, encouragement of a scholarly community of academics and students. This was 
justified in three ways: reproduction of the discipline, inculcation of subject identity in the 
students, and support for the autonomy of the students as learners. It was noted that only 
the third reason was truly student-centred.  
In arguing that these aims were both in the interests of students and appropriate values to 
inform legal education it was necessary to notice discourses about the aim (what should be 
valued and pursued) of higher education. Legal education is, in this context, a sub-set of 
higher education. 
The independence, role, and purposes of universities are contentious subjects in the 
twenty-first century developed world.140 Discourse tends to assume a necessary tension 
between disinterested education and research (liberal) and education and research serving 
social or economic ends: employability and impact (instrumental). If the purpose of legal 
education, and especially undergraduate legal education, is to serve the interests of 
students then this offers a means to escape the liberal versus instrumental dichotomy which 
frames and directs the prevalent discourse. Students have personal and social interests – 
they are developing their self-identity and then hope to occupy postgraduate social roles. 
These roles will include economic ones such as jobs or careers, and caring ones such as 
parenthood or care of parents. Adoption of such roles is often taken to be adoption of adult 
roles and modern delay in taking them up has been the “objective” aspect of emerging 
adulthood as a life stage.141   
 
4.2 Relationship to publications 1 and 2.  
Chapter one of Uses of Values addressed the destabilizing effect of a student-centred 
approach to legal education upon legal education that was revealed by ‘What students care 
 
140 Stefan Collini, What are Universities For? (Penguin 2012); Stefan Collini, Speaking of Universities (Verso 
2017); Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity – Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education (Harvard 
University Press 1997); Stanley Fish, Save the World in Your Own Time (Oxford University Press 2012); Anthony 
T Kronman, Education's End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on the Meaning of Life (Yale 
University Press 2007); Derek Bok, Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization of Higher Education 
(Princeton University Press 2009). 
141 Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: The Winding Road from the Late Teens Through the Twenties 
(2nd edn, OUP 2014). 
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about’ and ‘Values, ethics, and legal ethics’. Thus, it was concerned with: What is entailed by 
a student-centred approach to legal education?  
The progress across the publications discussed so far in this introductory chapter can 
therefore be schematised as: publication 1 was acontextual; publication 2 positioned the 
question within a macro context; publication 3 placed the question in a meso context. Of 
course this schematic carries some distortion: ‘What students care about’ had some implicit 
context within a discourse on legal education; ‘Values ethics and legal ethics’ engaged with 
different models of legal education – unsurprisingly legal education discourse has an implicit 
institutional meso level that frames the work. However, the institutional frame itself was 
not a focus of analysis in the earlier publications.142 
In developing an analysis of this institutional or meso level, chapter one engaged with values 
at a substantive level. This was required by the link between values and non-legal norms. 
Norms are Janus faced: they are generated and sustained by practices; they are generated 
and sustained by underlying values.143 Non-legal norms inform, guide, and give meaning to 
educational practice. They are why we should practise as we do from a viewpoint that is 
within the practice community. Taking a student-centred approach will impact upon what 
educational values are justifiable – on the nature of what education is about and therefore 
what is good educational practice.  
This institutional level of analysis situates legal education within higher education. The 
discussion of what higher education is about is most familiarly discussed in terms of what 
universities are for. Thus, the purpose of legal education (what is the law school for) is a 
sub-set of the purpose of higher education (what is the university for) which is a subset of 
 
142 Institutional is used here in the way North uses “institutions” – not a focus on “organisations” (e.g. 
universities, legal firms, public corporations) but upon institutional structures (e.g. laws, property regimes, 
non-legal norms, practices of regulatory bodies or enforcement mechanisms), Douglass C North, Institutions, 
Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press 1991). Institutions frame the 
game and organisations play the game. Therefore, the words do not describe essences but the role of the 
factor in an analysis – so a state agency may play the role of institution or organisation depending on the 
analysis. 
143 The first aspect is captured by HLA Hart’s idea of the external aspect of law; and the second part is captured 
by John Finnis’ development of natural law from human goods (which are things of value), HLA Hart, The 
Concept of Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2012), 55-58; John Finnis, Natural Law & Natural Rights (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2011), chapters 1 and 4. A very illuminating discussion of norms is: Amitai Etzioni, 
Social Norms: The Rubicon of Social Science in Amitai Etzioni, The Monochrome Society (Princeton University 
Press 2001), 163. In Etzioni’s discussion the first wing is “environmental” and the second is “intrinsic”. 
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the purpose of education (philosophy of education). Chapter one directly addressed these 
questions, which are unavoidable ones that involve substantive values, in a way that ‘What 
students care about’ and ‘Values, ethics and legal ethics’ had avoided. 
 
4.3 Reception and Significance 
 
4.3.A. Metrics and Impact 
As publications 3, 4 and 5 are chapters one, four and eight of my book Uses of Values I shall 
deal with the reception of the book once here, and not repeat the material again below. 
A search of WorldCat shows 97 libraries hold Uses of Values.144 The libraries are situated in 
11 different countries.145 The United States and Australia account for the majority of 
holdings indicating interest in the common law world primarily, although libraries in five civil 
law jurisdictions hold the book.146 
The book has been reviewed by Rebecca Huxley-Binns.147 Googlescholar notes four citations 
of the book. The Cambridge Core website records 541 full text views.148 The book is not on 
the Scopus data base, so it is not possible to ascertain its Field Weighted Citation Impact. 
 
 
 
 
144 https://www.worldcat.org/title/uses-of-values-in-legal-education/oclc/935611723&referer=brief_results 
last accessed 22 February 2019. 
145 Australia; Belgium; Canada; Germany; Ireland; Netherlands; Switzerland; South Africa; Thailand; United 
Kingdom; United States of America. 
146 Belgium; Germany; Netherlands; Switzerland; Thailand. South Africa is a mixed system. 
147 Rebecca Huxley-Binns (2015) 49 The Law Teacher 411. 
148 https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/uses-of-values-in-legal-
education/BC60CC3771A04F413B8440BFB6931471#fndtn-metrics accessed 1 May 2019. By way of 
comparison, another book about a segment of higher educational provision: Howard Thomas, Peter Lorange 
and Jagdish Sheth, The Business School in the Twenty-First Century: Emergent Challenges and New Business 
Models (Cambridge University Press 2013) shows 404 full text views over the same period (September 2016 to 
1 May 2019). See:https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/business-school-in-the-twentyfirst-
century/B69AE064BCE7A4DB643045377F22B1EA#fndtn-metrics accessed 1 May 2019. 
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4.3.B. Significance 
Chapter one widened out the subject matter of legal education in the question: “What is 
entailed by a student-centred approach to legal education?” It did this by developing the 
idea of education (including legal education) with a specific concern with undergraduate 
higher education in the UK. 
Chapter one set out a robust foundation for a sharable vision of legal educational practice 
that took seriously the need to adopt a student-centred approach. This required four tasks 
be carried out. First, it was necessary to destabilise the assumption that common sense and 
widespread practice proved there was no problem, that what universities were doing was 
unproblematically justified by the fact they were economically successful.149 Second, it was 
necessary to make the case for a student-centred approach to the task. Third, it was 
necessary to establish a basis for a student-centred practice that dealt with the problem of 
diversity in the learning community. Finally, it was necessary to deal with concerns around 
value inculcation based on undeveloped assumptions around value relativism which 
otherwise make all value convergence seem arbitrary or genuflection before power. 
The first task required engagement with economic justifications of the status quo and of 
educational reform. The book postponed the bulk of this discussion to chapter two, which 
does not form part of this thesis. 
The second task required development of an idea of the abstract law student: identification 
of common relevant features of law students as learners. This was informed by the 
synthesis established in ‘What students care about’. As noted above, Dewey struggled to 
articulate a stable account of what was in the interests of learners, and Frankfurt’s analysis 
provided a high level abstract account that was supported (through triangulation) by 
Damasio and self-determination theory. This was pursued through exposition of the idea of 
the interests of law students: shared interests of the learners engaged in undergraduate 
legal education. Chapter one placed this abstract analysis within the social context of late 
 
149 Ferris, Uses of Values (n 3) chapter 2 deals with the economic common sense argument based upon an 
ideology of market rationality – anything people pay or must be worth what it costs (or people would not pay 
that price) and the market ensures it is provided as cheaply as it can be provided (or competition would lead to 
undercutting in the market that would reduce prices). I have dealt above with the common sense metaphor of 
knowledge transfer and why it is inadequate when viewed from a student-centred perspective. 
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modernity following the path laid down in ‘Values ethics, and legal ethics’. The relevant 
features identified in the chapter were a reflexive self-identity project and an ambition to 
graduate and enter into other social roles. Thus, learners have two (not necessarily 
compatible) interests: in self-development and in preparation for post-education (adult) 
roles. Therefore, student-centred education should seek to further these ends.  
The chapter placed these arguments in a new context – the aims of legal education. Here it 
explored one dimension of what “entailed” meant in the research question. The position 
argued for was differentiated clearly from an influential account of legal education that 
emphasised the needs of the profession by insisting upon the primacy of the student. 150 
Thus, the chapter broadened the issue from one concerning undergraduate law students to 
one concerning undergraduate students including law students. This positioned the 
research question within discourses about university education, generalising the importance 
of the research whilst maintaining the focus upon law students. 
It is obvious that the two types of interest identified: self-development and post-educational 
roles are easily assimilated to the two prevalent models of undergraduate education. Self-
development with the liberal degree and post-educational roles with the instrumental or 
training degree. Therefore, the learner centred approach demands some attempt to 
synthesise or accommodate both models and must be informed by concepts capable of 
supporting this synthesis. This again reflected a development of the analysis developed in 
‘Values ethics and legal ethics’. The use of Giddens’ sociologically based analysis in this 
chapter naturally permits social roles to be viewed as features of agency (the self-reflexive 
identity project), and structure (social roles) or as being concerned with both self-
development and post educational roles. It is an analysis that makes the two aims the two 
sides of a single coin. 
Less obvious advancing of these two interests involves a decentring of information 
transmission in thinking about educational practice (the parcel transfer metaphor discussed 
above). Any educational process (including knowledge acquisition) is justified by its service 
 
150 Ferris, Uses of Values (n3), 3. The influential account was William M Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch 
Wenger, Lloyd Bond and Lee S Shulman, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law (Jossey-Bass 
2007). 
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to the learner’s life projects. It is another way of describing a student-centred approach to 
education. 
Given the abstract aim is to serve the students’ life projects then there must be 
accommodation for the concrete and particular student’s life projects. Hence the centrality 
of the third task identified above – the problem posed to a student-centred approach by 
diversity in the student cohort. A recurring problem of trying to design education that serves 
learners’ interests is that learners have disparate interests. This problem, of diversity of 
learners’ initial self-identity, capability, expectations, and aspirations makes pluralism an 
essential ingredient in curriculum design.  
Pluralism raises the problem of relativism. Once one rejects the existence of a single 
identifiable solution to any value conflict, then it raises the possibility that all and any 
proposed solutions are of equal value or worth. Thus, the need for chapter one to engage 
with relativism and reject it. 
Chapter one adds to the existing literature on the purpose of legal education.151 It attacked 
the question of what is entitled by a student-centred legal education directly, although not 
in those precise terms. It is a sophisticated and innovative attempt to articulate a vision of 
legal education as a type of higher education in the modern world.  
The attempt to place legal education within several overlapping but distinct discourses 
generated new understanding of the problematic nature of legal education. Thus, it placed 
the legal education binary division between liberal and professional ends into contact with 
the broader discourses about whether higher education should be “useless” or “useful”;152 
it disentangled educational aims from non-educational aims; it suggested a plausible 
contemporary theory of human flourishing as the purpose of education in the capability 
 
151 Examples from the UK: Peter Birks (ed), What Are Law Schools For? (Oxford University Press 1996); Bob 
Hepple, ‘The Renewal of the Liberal Law Degree’ (1996) 55 Cambridge Law Review 470; Anthony Bradney, 
Conversations, Choices and Chances: The Liberal Law School in the Twenty-First Century (Hart Publishing 2003); 
(2014) 48 The Law Teacher 1-135 and (2018) 52 The Law Teacher 379-534 - special editions of The Law 
Teacher.  
152 Stefan Collini, What Are Universities For? (Penguin 2012), chapter 3 ‘The Useful and the Useless: Newman 
Revisited’. 
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literature.153 In developing this contextualised view the chapter asserted, and returned to 
the central importance of legal education serving the interest of the students.   
The chapter moved beyond earlier accounts of the interest of the learner by the reflexive 
self-identity project typical of late modernity, and the difficulties pluralism caused for 
people engaged in the self-narratives and life-planning that make up the self-identity 
project.154 Thus, it brought into focus difficulties posed to legal education by the culture of 
late modernity. Throughout the chapter the student whose interest is in question is a 
member of the modern diverse student population, the institutional context is one of mass 
higher education. Diverse students bring diverse and potentially conflicting values and tacit 
understandings informed by their pre-university lifeworlds.  
Chapter one rejected any idea that legal education should seek to inculcate some universally 
valid and integrated set of values to address discordance of student values. Pluralism is the 
theoretical acceptance of the validity of diverse values. Self-identity is reflexive and 
pluralism, or its more destabilising cousin relativism, informs and can undermine the 
project. Therefore, the chapter engaged with pluralism, and its relationship to truth, 
establishing that legal education should seek truth within a pluralist setting. Thus, a further 
original synthesis was generated by taking seriously the interests of a diverse student body 
embarked upon reflexive self-identity projects. 
The identification of student interest with student self-identity enabled the third 
apprenticeship of Educating Lawyers to be seen for what it is in a English and Welsh context 
– one possible model for a life-plan.155 The Carnegie report has been massively influential in 
the United States, and elsewhere, and I was anxious to both preserve the progress in 
envisaging legal education as a student-centred enterprise made in the report and to 
carefully highlight those areas where it differed from my synthesis that focussed upon the 
undergraduate law degree in England and Wales. 
 
153 Alejandra Boni and Melanie Walker (eds), Human Development and Capabilities: Re-imagining the 
university of the twenty-first century (Routledge 2013) shows a similar inspiration and articulates congruent 
vision of higher education. 
154 Using self-narrative, life planning and self-identity as the terms are used by Giddens in Anthony Giddens, 
Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Polity 1991), 242-244. 
155 Educating Lawyers (n 88). 
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Finally, chapter one set out an original analysis that identified some previously unperceived 
tensions between legal education and education. The tensions are identified as lying not in 
the difference between liberal education and professional training but between the ethic 
and openness of the educator and the ethic and openness of the lawyer. Lawyers in legal 
practice need to be more self-protective than lawyers in educational practice, and this 
difference between the two professional practices (legal and legal educational) were 
identified as a source of confusion for legal education. 
Thus, chapter one is an original work of synthesis that advances the work of Dewey on the 
student interest and modifies his theory making it applicable to higher education in late 
modernity. Modernity is characterised, in the UK at least, by student diversity, value 
pluralism, and mass legal education. Politically and institutionally the dominant discourse on 
the purpose of universities is economic, reflecting the ideological attraction of the market. 
The vision set out in the chapter rejected economic reductionism and through commitment 
to a student-centred legal education generated a vision of an education devoted to 
supporting the self-identity project of the student and the development of student 
capabilities. 
 
4.4 Reflections and Connections 
There is some ambiguity about chapter one’s purpose. That is, it is not clear whether it is 
concerned with the values that should guide educators or about the values educators 
should adopt and encourage in their students. The organising starting value, to align 
teaching practice with the interests of students, is clearly addressed to educators. There is 
no attempt to inculcate the value of putting their own interests first in the students. 
However, such values as sound reasoning and the promotion of truth are values that, it is 
argued, should be internalised by educators and students. The value of student inclusion 
within a scholarly community is put forward as a mutual value, as it is only when shared by 
teachers and learners that it can be fully effective. The discussion that marks transition 
within the chapter is the advocation of the capabilities approach, and this also is the 
discussion that attempts to synthesise the valuable contributions of the existing discourses 
around liberal (educational, self-development, cultural capital, theoretical or useless, life-
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long learning) and professional (training, economic advancement, human capital, practical 
or useful, entry to middle class labour market). Essentially the chapter could have gained in 
clarity if it had been divided into two chapters with some overlapping material. 
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5. Publication 4: Uses of Values Chapter 4 
 
5.1 Thematic Summary 
Chapter four developed the work on student motivation that was started in ‘What students 
care about’. It focussed on application of motivational theory through teaching practice and 
curriculum design. It also identified possible interference problems that can arise from 
incoherent design of a learning environment. Finally, it presented a case for preferring a 
student-centred approach because it is an ethically superior approach to either coercive or 
manipulative approaches to student motivation and engagement. 
The chapter provided an exposition of the genesis, the main features of, and some detail on 
relevant aspects of self-determination theory.156 The genesis was necessary to support the 
later explanation of inconsistency between self-determination theory and behaviourist 
approaches to motivation. The detailed account of types of regulation was necessary to 
show how self-determination theory can guide the design of teaching materials and the 
learning environment. Types of regulation is the term used by self-determination theorists 
when describing the types of motivation being experienced by an individual. The exposition 
developed examples based in legal educational practice to help the reader to follow the 
distinctions between types of motivational regulation. 
Having explained how self-determination theory approaches motivation, the chapter 
explained how behaviourist informed learning theory approached the same subject. This 
was necessary because behaviourist theories inform many people’s common sense 
approach to motivational problems. If someone is not doing something that a person with 
power wants them to do then the person with power can motivate them by offering a 
reward or threatening a punishment.157 Such motivation is external as it originates outside 
of the agent. In higher education this understanding of motivation can lead to trying to use 
assessment to control the activity of students.158 It is important to realise that this common 
 
156 See: ‘What students care about’ (n 1), 205-207; and the text above between nn 59-63.  
157 Money is a form of power, as is institutional office, or physical strength. 
158 Marks for attendance or seminar contribution – this is a feature of much learning outcome/constructive 
alignment work. The problem arises when educational practice becomes assessment driven. For a critical 
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sense approach is based upon one or more theory of learning, and that those theories that 
it is based upon are deficient.159 Furthermore, as the chapter went on to explain, the 
common sense approach can have strongly negative effects on learning because the efforts 
to manipulate or coerce interfere with learner motivation. 
Given the chapter argued that common sense approaches were problematic, a message that 
will always run into resistance, an element of triangulation was used. Although the 
explanation for the genesis of self-determination theory gave a persuasive reason to reject 
fundamental elements of the behaviourist approach to motivation, it is relatively technical 
and may not be seen as having general application. It is possible to see self-determination 
theory as concerned with peripheral rather than paradigmatic motivational situations.160 
Therefore, the chapter gave an account of other research which has identified the 
interference effects, in educational theory,161 economic theory,162 and political theory.163 
These brief accounts focused upon the interference effect that can be caused by attempting 
to introduce an external motivation through reward or punishment in a situation where 
internal motivation exists, the effect is to reduce motivation - the relationship is 
antagonistic not aggregative.164 This in turn opened up the three types of motivational 
intervention one might attempt, coercive, manipulative, or collaborative. These would 
 
account see: Kohn A, Punished by Rewards: The Trouble with Gold Stars, Incentive Plans, A's, Praise and Other 
Bribes (Houghton Mifflin 1999). 
159 Two theories of learning. One is behaviourism, classical and operative conditioning. The other is in 
economics which has two traditions, one looking at the system features that encourage or lead to learning 
(with a preference for good learning – productive learning that leads to greater productivity) and one based on 
a mixture of axioms and utilitarian theory dealing with motivation of individual actors. 
160 This is a fallacy, as contemplation of informal learning in children makes obvious. A human baby does not 
learn to interact with its carers due to rewards it has received or punishments it fears, and does not learn to 
speak in response to external demands. See: Jerome Bruner, Child’s Talk: Learning to Use Language (W W 
Norton & Co 1983); Margaret Donaldson, Children’s Minds (Harper Perennial 2006); John Bowlby, The Making 
and Breaking of Affectional Bonds (Routledge 2005). The human baby’s predilection for interaction is probably 
linked to evolutionary pressures that meant that such predispositions enhanced its chances of survival, but 
they operate on organisms over time not as motivations of individuals, see: Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Mothers and 
Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding (Harvard University Press 2011). Infancy and 
childhood are not peripheral to human development, and language acquisition is one of the most impressive 
feats of learning people accomplish. External motivation is peripheral here and intrinsic motivation is central. 
The primacy often given to external motivation is not warranted by the behaviours that call for explanation. 
161 Alfie Kohn, Punished by Rewards: The Trouble with Gold Stars, Incentive Plans, A's, Praise and Other Bribes 
(Houghton Mifflin 1999). 
162 Bruno S Frey, Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation (Edward Elgar 1997). 
163 Ruth W Grant, Strings Attached: Untangling the ethics of incentives (Princeton University Press 2012). 
164. Roland G Fryer Jr, ‘Financial Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from Randomized Trials’ (2011) 
126 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1755 gives clear evidence of the lack of efficacy of attempts to use 
economic behavioural motivational tools in an educational setting. 
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operate through threat, reward, or persuasion respectively. It was argued that persuasion, 
joining in a common endeavour, was not only most efficacious but also ethically superior.165 
 
5.2 Relation to earlier publications 
What leads to learners learning and what impedes them is clearly a subject of inquiry for 
any approach to education that is student-centred. Once one takes the role of the learner in 
education seriously the question of what they are motivated to do (what they are trying to 
do) is of obvious importance. Thus, chapter four took an interest in student motivation as 
entailed by a student-centred approach to legal education. 
As noted above chapter four developed and elaborated upon theories and problems of 
motivation first explored in ‘What students care about’. Between the two publications were 
several other publications and oral presentations concerned with the issues of student 
motivation and curriculum design.166 The chapter was the fullest account of the theory and 
its use in legal education that I have published and was an elaboration of this earlier work in 
this regard. The only novelty in this respect was the use of the examples drawn from my 
experience as a law student and articled clerk. 
In the contrasting of self-determination theory with behaviourist approaches to motivation 
the chapter breaks new ground in my work. There are two important insights. First, that 
motivational theories are components of learning theories. Second, that the motivational 
theories used (including common sense) are not simply a matter of preference because in 
practice manipulative theories interfere with the learner’s educational experience and 
specifically the relationship of teacher and learner. This in turn links to chapter one and the 
values that should inform educational practice. 
 
165 In this the chapter followed Ruth W Grant, Strings Attached: Untangling the ethics of incentives (Princeton 
University Press 2012), chapter 4: ‘Ethical and not So Ethical Incentives’. 
166 Rebecca Huxley-Binns and Graham Ferris, ‘Putting Theory into Practice: Designing a Curriculum According 
to Self-Determination Theory’ (2013) 19(3) The International Journal of Pedagogy and Curriculum. Graham 
Ferris and Rebecca Huxley-Binns, ‘This is why I took a law degree in the first place. This is what I thought I 
would be doing. It is such hard work, but I am loving it’ (Association of Law Teachers Annual Conference, 
Cardiff, April 2011); Graham Ferris and Rebecca Huxley-Binns, ‘For Learning's Sake’ (Association of Law 
Teachers Annual Conference, Oxford, April 2012). 
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Chapter four less obviously also develops the concern of ‘Values ethics and legal ethics’ with 
the student identity project. This is because the intrinsic of intrinsic motivation is built into 
the self-awareness and self-concept of the student. The intrinsically motivated student 
shares clear links to the wholehearted person in Frankfurt’s work.167 Identified regulation, as 
the term is used by self-determination theorists, on its face has a relation to the student’s 
identity project.168 Integrated regulation is in the fortunate position of not having (or not 
being aware of) any conflicting desires.169  
This deep linkage is perhaps most easily noticed in the ethical conclusion of chapter four: 
that efforts to persuade a student to engage in a common endeavour are the ethically 
superior way to approach motivation. The challenge should not be for the student to get 
through the learning experience (pass and be accredited) but for the student to be 
strengthened or enriched in a way that student values. The educative process should be 
viewed by the student as serving the ends of the student. This may leave the student with a 
relatively external motivation, as the importance of the activity may lie in ends external to 
the sense of self. However, the more aligned with the self-concept of the student the 
activity is, then the stronger the motivation. For identified regulation the student has to 
value the learning experience as an opportunity of building up the self they desire. The 
teacher seeks to persuade the student that the purpose of the process is not to show 
competence in assessment but to build the capabilities of the student. The collaborative 
enterprise is the enrichment of the student through the acquisition of knowledge, skills, 
understanding, and self-knowledge in ways valued by the student whether for their own 
sake or instrumentally. 
The links with chapter one are multiple. If the teaching is in the interests of the student then 
it should be possible to persuade the student of their value to herself without any sophistry. 
 
167 Harry G Frankfurt, ‘Identification and Wholeheartedness’ in Harry G Frankfurt, The Importance of What We 
Care About (Cambridge University Press 1998). 
168 It also seems to share characteristics with a person who is resolved in their second order desire in 
Frankfurt’s terms, see: Harry G Frankfurt, ‘The Importance of What We Care About’ in Harry G Frankfurt, The 
Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge University Press 1998). 
169 Pluralism tells us this is a fortunate and not necessarily possible state, see: Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the 
Ideal’ in Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays (Pimlico 1998), 10. As Sandel notes 
it can be the internal clashes of values that are most difficult to deal with under condition of modernity, see: 
Michael J Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in search of a public philosophy (Harvard University Press  
1996), 350. 
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The attempt to find ways each student can gain from the process recognises value pluralism. 
The gaining of valued characteristics is the building of capabilities. Strengthening powers of 
reason and expression are aims that find ready endorsement amongst students. Inviting law 
students into the scholarly community is one powerful way to provide both relatedness and 
a new potential self-identity. The overarching idea of chapter one that education should be 
an ethically informed practice is naturally aligned with the emphasis on persuasion and 
collaboration in preference to coercion or manipulation. 
 
5.3 Significance  
Chapter four made new links between learning theory, psychological theory of motivation, 
economic theory and political theory that are original and valuable in themselves.  
The chapter also generated new insight into how self-determination theory might be useful 
in reflection upon and delivery of legal education. It used both examples from the author’s 
experience as a learner and as a teacher in designing Critical Legal Thinking to illustrate how 
the theory can be used in analysis and application. Of itself this has novelty and contributes 
to our understanding of the theory in practice. 
The chapter also engaged in an analysis of problems with common sense behaviourism and 
its theoretical justifications that put together a new synthesis of congruent work from 
several discourses. At one level this was another example of my use of triangulation. 
However, viewed from the perspective of educational practice it constituted a strong 
argument for a major reconsideration of many of the under-theorised assumptions that 
inform teaching and curriculum in legal education.  
The chapter thereby confirmed the importance in educational practice of taking a student-
centred approach to legal education. This led to the identification of problems that are 
obscured if we restrict our view to the intentions of the educator. It also made power 
relations problematic in a healthy manner, as much educational discourse assumes power is 
unproblematic and benign.170  
 
170 Not all educational literature by any means for example: Ivor F Goodson, Learning, Curriculum and Life 
Politics (Routledge 2005); David F Labaree, Education, Markets, and the Public Good (Routledge 2007); Ted 
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The chapter is important in the response to the research question because it manages to 
make concrete an inquiry that can easily become very abstract. Chapter four is an 
elucidation of what concern with student life projects might mean in terms of teaching 
practice. The benefits sought are very practical and mainstream – strengthening student 
engagement is a well-recognised objective for modern mass higher education.171 An 
understanding of how unarticulated and erroneous theories of learning can lead to self-
defeating practice is important new knowledge. Knowledge and error are embedded in 
social and professional practices and chapter four is an example of how research can 
facilitate a renewal of practice informed by theoretical understanding of education from the 
perspective of the learner. 
 
5.4 Reflections and Connections 
Chapter four did not fully develop the ethical case against coercive or manipulative attempts 
to influence behaviour. The focus on the power of applied theory for educational practice 
marginalises the ethical issues. The topic was introduced but not explored. Presumably 
there are legitimate reasons to resort to coercion or manipulation in educational practice, 
and there is no examination in the chapter of when this might be the case – an issue of 
potentially great practical importance. This suggests that the topic deserves a more 
thorough treatment elsewhere. It would naturally fall into a treatment of the ethics of 
educational practice, a subject I have not researched at length. 
Chapter four did not fully articulate the links between the psychological theory deployed, 
learning theory, Frankfurt’s work, and the identity project of the learner. It suggested a 
valuable synthesis might exist but did not engage in the conceptual analysis that would be 
necessary to decide if the links were robust, whether it is possible to identify one or a few 
 
Wragg, The Art and Science of Teaching and Learning (Routledge 2005). However particularly the more applied 
literature tends to adopt a technocratic pose that leaves issues of power unarticulated, for example: Stanley 
Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time (Oxford University Press 2012); Heather Fry, Steve Ketteridge and 
Stephanie Marshall (eds), A Handbook of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education: Enhancing Academic 
Practice (3rd edn, Routledge 2009); Ernest T Pascarella and Patrick T Terenzini, How College Affects Students: A 
Third Decade of Research (Jossey-Bass 2009). 
171 For example, there is a scholarly network: RAISE: Researching, Advancing & Inspiring Student Engagement 
that has its own journal: Student Engagement in Higher Education Journal. 
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underlying principles or concepts that could unify the convergent research conclusions it 
identified. To some extent this inquiry is taken forward by chapter eight. 
Finally, chapter four did not lead the reader to a new professional praxis informed by the 
insights and arguments it contained. If inherited practices and conceptions of the learner 
and learning are inadequate then where might a reader concerned with her own 
professional practice go for help in re-imagining and re-enacting her practice? The works 
referred to in the chapter can be used, but they are directed more towards critique and 
establishing the need for a new approach than supporting development of new approaches 
to teaching.  
At the most general level building into the curriculum and classroom or clinic interactions 
autonomy (permitting students to choose, within constraints), competence (setting tasks 
within the competence of students and developing from that starting point), and 
relatedness (establishing a sense of community in the student group and with wider 
communities such as academics or legal academics or lawyers or advisors) should enhance 
self-determination and support intrinsic motivation. But how to do this whilst continuing to 
support valid educational aims embedded in earlier teaching practice is not obvious. 
Several literatures might be resorted to in order to support the legal educator. The self-
determination literature furnishes a wealth of material rooted in the psychological and 
social-psychological approaches to motivation.172 The literature is particularly rich in 
material focussed on the classroom interaction level of teaching and learning,173 although it 
is predominantly concerned with the education of children in school not emerging adults in 
universities. A leading thinker who did try to apply his theories of education and student 
learning to legal education in the United States was Jerome Bruner.174 Bruner’s work started 
 
172 A recent authoritative book that would provide an excellent jumping -off point is Richard M Ryan and 
Edward L Deci, Self-Determination Theory: Basic Psychological Needs in Motivation, Development, and 
Wellness (Guilford Pres 2017). The application of SDT to education (with a focus on schools) is at Chapter 14, 
and the use of SDT in encouraging successful self-identity projects (with a focus on adolescents) is at Chapter 
15. 
173 A useful review of the state of knowledge on the impact of different teaching styles in the early twenty-first 
century  is given in Johnmarshall Reeve, ‘Self-Determination Theory Applied to Educational Settings’ in Edward 
L Deci and Richard M Ryan (eds) Handbook of Self-Determination Research (University of Rochester Press 
(2002). 
174 Anthony G Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law: How court rely upon storytelling, and how 
their stories change the ways we understand the law – and ourselves (Harvard University Press 2000). 
68 
 
in cognitive psychology but took a distinctively cultural turn and may be more congenial to 
legal scholars who are uneasy in the literatures of experimental and theoretical 
psychology.175 Literature on professional education can be helpful and in this connection it 
is worth mentioning Educating Lawyers – Preparation for the Profession of Law and 
Teaching as Community Property each of which make the identity projects of students a 
central concern, and the second also engages with the identity project of the teacher as 
well.176 Finally, the work of theorists of learning may be helpful to those still working out 
their understanding of the learning process in legal education and what they hope to 
achieve.177 Both Peter Jarvis and Knud Illeris provide helpful accounts of learning that 
encompass adult learning.178  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175 Jerome Bruner, The Culture of Education (Harvard University Press 1996) might be a good point of 
departure. 
176 William M Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch Wegner, Lloyd Bond and Lee S Shulman, Educating Lawyers: 
Preparation for the Profession of Law (Jossey-Bass 2007); Lee S Shulman, Teaching as Community Property: 
Essays on higher education (Jossey-Bass 2004) 
177 A good introduction to the field is either edition of Knud Illeris, Contemporary Theories of Learning: 
Learning Theorists … In Their Own Words (Routledge 2018) (Routledge 2009). 
178 Peter Jarvis, Teaching, Learning and Education in Late Modernity: The Selected Works of Peter Jarvis 
(Routledge 2012); Knud Illeris, How We Learn: Learning and non-learning in school and beyond (Routledge 
2016). 
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6. Publication 5: Uses of Values Chapter 8 
 
6.1 Thematic Summary 
The chapter has two parts. The first part explored the relationship between moral 
motivation and identity, the second part was a series of illustrative examples of how one 
might teach to strengthen moral motivation. The first part recalled the specific issue that 
started this series of publications, an interest in what students care about. Thus, the chapter 
is concerned with the role of students’ commitments as they inform student identity and 
influence the taking of ethical action. Thus, the chapter assumed identity is not fixed or 
given and argued that ethical action is linked to self-identity.179 In the second part of the 
chapter the focus was upon the role of education in influencing what students care about. 
The extensive examples were useful because this is a subject that needs to be approached 
obliquely, because of concerns about the propriety of value indoctrination, respect for 
student autonomy, and recognition of pluralism of values. 
Chapter eight picked up the unfinished task of chapter four of setting out a robust and 
articulated synthesis of Frankfurt and the student learner’s identity project within a frame 
that emphasised the moral identity of the student. It was therefore creative of new insights 
and generated new knowledge so far as it was successful in its synthesis. 
The chapter framed the discussion in terms of “moral motivation”. This was because the 
chapter formed part of a series of four chapters (6, 7, 8, and 9) devoted to analysis, and 
elaboration and explication of how to teach in order to inculcate the four components of 
ethical action identified by Rest and Narvaez.180 The four components are described by Rest 
and Narvaez as moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation and moral character 
and the language of chapter eight reflected this terminology. For successful moral action 
 
179 Personal moral development is a feature of many otherwise disparate approaches to ethical development 
and ethical education among the pioneers were: Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment Of The Child (Routledge 
2001); Erik H Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle (WW Norton & Co 1994); Lawrence Kohlberg, Child psychology 
and childhood education: a cognitive-developmental view (Longman 1987). 
180 James R Rest, ‘Chapter 1 Background: Theory and Research’ in James R Rest, James R Rest and Darcia 
Narvaez (eds), Moral Development in the Profession: Psychology and Applied Ethics (Erlbaum Associates Inc 
1994); Uses of Values, 157-8.  
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each of the four components must be present: the actor must realise there is an issue, 
understand what the right thing to do is, care about doing the right thing, and be able to act 
effectively. 
Chapter eight is titled ‘Ethical Identity’ and it argued that moral motivation is another way 
to think about ethical identity, and that ethical identity is a part of a student’s identity 
project. The problem was approached through an exposition of the research of the Oliners 
into those who did and those who did not assist Jewish people during the Nazi genocide.181 
This approach grounded the discussion in consideration of effective action, and posed the 
question in the first instance as an explanatory inquiry into what features of a person are 
associated with effective dangerous and altruistic ethical action.  
The chapter explained that the four components are not an abstract schema of ethical 
action, and that moral motivation in particular needs to be in place prior to any event that 
requires ethical action. The chapter developed a metaphor of a spring-loaded trap: the 
motivational urge to act ethically must be a pre-disposition that will take effect when the 
agent is presented with some circumstance that is recognised as calling for ethical action - it 
has been perceived as such and is obviously, or is upon reflection, such a circumstance.  
The chapter combined elements from the Oliners’ work, Frankurt’s work and Williams’ 
work. Anthony Giddens’ concept of the identity project in late modernity was used to 
situate the discussion in an account of the individual response to the social conditions of 
late modernity. However, Giddens did not populate his concept at the level of specificity 
needed for the analysis, so apart from situating the issues and supplying the idea of the 
identity project it played little further role in the discussion. The relevant parts of Frankfurt’s 
work have been explained above when discussing ‘What students care about’.  
Williams emphasised four aspects of ethical conduct: the ethical demands of 
relationships,182 the real risk of ethically motivated action misfiring,183 the existence of 
 
181 Samuel P Oliner and Pearl M Oliner, Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe (Free Press 1988). 
182 Bernard Williams, ‘Persons, character and morality’ in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 
1973-1980 (Cambridge University Press 1981), 18.  
183 Bernard Williams, ‘Moral Luck’ in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge 
University Press 1981); see also Martha C Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek 
Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge University Press 2001). 
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ethical conflicts (ethical pluralism),184 and the importance of people’s life projects (whether 
ethical in focus or not) upon their ethical life.185 Hence it may be seen he was opposed to 
the placing of ethics outside of the lived experience of people (i.e. against the Kantian 
noumenal self and area of activity outside the phenomenal world in ethical thought). 
Clearly, for Williams ethics were a part of life. 
The chapter argued that the idea of the reflexive identity project, a feature of modernity 
driven by the loss of inter-generational social stability (sons not adopting the same roles as 
their fathers, daughters not adopting the same roles as their mothers), has an aspect 
concerned with commitment (what people care about). This way of presenting the issue 
best allowed me to synthesise the second order desire of Frankfurt, the ground projects of 
Williams,186 and the “fundamental ethical principles” identified by the Oliners that had been 
internalised and acted upon by rescuers. Commitment does not need to be a self-conscious 
volitional act,187 nor does it need to be ethical, although commitment that leads to ethical 
action will have at least an ethical component. Modernity has made conscious commitment 
more important but has not displaced socialisation as a source of ethical commitment. 
Thus, Giddens’ narrative of the self, Frankfurt’s second order desire, Williams’ ground 
projects and the Oliners’ character or fundamental moral principle share a subject matter – 
the ethical identity of the agent (whether modern reflective agent, rescuer of Jewish people, 
or law student). The concepts are not identical, but they are all concerned with an aspect of 
the life project – the creation of a narrative of identity – under modern conditions. 
Therefore, the law students will also be engaged with a life politics and life planning that can 
and is likely to include ethical commitments that will inform their sense of self and guide 
their future actions.188  
 
184 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Fontana 2006), 174-196. 
185 Bernard Williams, ‘Persons, character and morality’ in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 
1973-1980 (Cambridge University Press 1981). 
186 Bernard Williams, ‘Persons, character and morality’ in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 
1973-1980 (Cambridge University Press 1981) 12-14. Ground projects are long term and important projects 
that give an individual’s life purpose across time. 
187 In this respect the treatment is different from that associated with existentialism with its emphasis on 
personal conscious commitment. 
188 For narrative of the self, life politics and life planning see: Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: 
Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Polity 1991) nn 120 and 154. 
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This final example of triangulation is strongly suggestive of something else. The convergence 
of the thinkers, whose starting points differ quite markedly,189 suggests the ethical identity 
project is a feature of modernity for young people at least in the developed world. That the 
educational importance of the issue has increased over the last one hundred years or so. 
The two world wars, the collapse of the colonial project, genocide, and the crimes of 
communism have all made ethical complacency about modern society difficult to justify. 
The rise of new socially created risks has made ethics relevant to wider spheres of 
concern.190 Economic change has undermined traditional understanding of work roles 
across the world. The identity project of late modernity is a product of modern liberties but 
also of modern insecurities. 
Having made these links and argued that this area of the student’s development was 
educationally appropriate, the chapter noted real problems in how an education effective 
for facilitating desirable moral motivation can be approached. Identity is a uniquely private 
matter and ground projects (or suitability of second order desires) are not subject to any 
disciplinary superior expertise in law (or elsewhere in the academy).191 Here one must be 
wary of transgressing the proper boundaries of the teacher and student relationship.192 
Ethical identity should not be assessed, and in teaching terms is best approached obliquely. 
The rest of the chapter gave a series of examples of how law teachers might approach such 
issues. This was primarily by making the issues of identity (ascribed and avowed)193 salient 
 
189 The thinkers are drawn from philosophical and sociological backgrounds. The classic modern attempt to 
synthesise the insights of these disciplines is that of Jurgen Habermas. My work is not so ambitious, and 
Habermas has not engaged with the issues I am concerned with. 
190 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (SAGE Publications Ltd 1992); Charles Perrow, Normal 
Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies (Princeton University Press 1999). 
191 Contra: Anthony T Kronman, Education's End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on the 
Meaning of Life (Yale University Press 2007) who argues that the humanities do have useful knowledge and 
ways of framing the issues that are found in the traditions of the discipline and that can and should be taught. 
192 Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Lies That Bind: Rethinking Identity (Profile Books 2018), loc 76, makes the 
point well for the cognitive sphere: “not by telling you what to think but by providing an assortment of 
concepts and theories you can use to decide what to think for yourself.” Here we are concerned with what 
people care about – what to feel - and should abjure the temptation of imposition of our beliefs even more 
seriously. 
193 The contrast between how one is seen or classified by others (ascribed identity) and how one’s own 
commitments and self-identity (avowed) is familiar see e.g. The World Bank Group, Inter Cultural 
Communication. https://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVACC/Resources/InterculturalCommweb.pdf last 
accessed 11 January 2019. Sen makes a similar distinction in Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of 
Destiny (Penguin 2007) when he contrasts ascribed with self-perceived identity. The important point is of 
course that the learner commitment is an aspect of avowed identity or self-perceived identity or the narrative 
of the self per Giddens. 
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and providing social space and conceptual language suitable to the project.194 The examples 
were diverse and fairly well developed, because it is not easy to teach in the absence of 
relevant disciplinary knowledge. Asking people to use abstract and unapplied extra-
disciplinary theory in their educational practice can undermine the feelings of competency 
of the teacher. When competency is threatened people often become defensive, which can 
undermine the educative project. Therefore, the chapter recognised the need for guidance 
and emphasised how difficult the task is, whilst providing methods for attempting it. 
 
6.2 Relation to Earlier Publications 
As noted above, chapter eight took up once again the question of what students care about. 
It also used Frankfurt’s work as a key for understanding the nature of what people care 
about – the idea of the second order desire to distinguish the problem from other types of 
choice, and his elaboration of limits upon any such choice. The most distinctive 
development was that this choice was now situated within concerns with the learner’s 
identity and moral action. The link with identity was made in ‘Values ethics and legal ethics’ 
which deployed the conceptual apparatus devised by Giddens to the learner and the 
interests of the learner. However, this article had little focus upon ethical efficacy (ethical 
action), an aspect that was to the fore of chapter eight. Thus, across the publications the 
task of synthesis was developed and became more ambitious. 
Chapter four was concerned with the ethical quality of the learning environment and 
student motivation for learning. However, it accepted that greater student engagement was 
an appropriate evaluative measure in itself. The interest in student self-identity projects was 
therefore a rather instrumental approach to the issues of student values and student 
identities - justifying respectful persuasion over manipulation or coercion on efficiency 
grounds. The alignment with student interests was made in pursuance of the educative 
project. 
In chapter eight this was no longer the case. The chapter showed concern with facilitating 
ethical action. It accepted that the values of students should be self-determined. Therefore, 
 
194 Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity (Princeton University Press 2005), loc 1067. 
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it accepted that the nature of ethical action should not be determined by the teacher. The 
self-identity project of the student had become the focus of the educative process which 
should support and align itself with the self-identity project, which would thereby align with 
student interests. Thus, chapter eight made it clear that student interests are dynamic, not 
static, (as they shift with student commitments) and that education should serve the self-
narrative identity process as a primary aim. In one sense this was a fancy way to express the 
well-recognised educational aspiration for self-development. It recognised the ambition of 
the liberal degree, which is concerned with the improvement of the student. In another 
sense it was rather more impressive as it re-vivified an area of discourse by placing it upon 
modern, secular and pluralist foundations. It thereby provided a conceptual language that 
can facilitate the planning and implementation of a legal education that takes seriously the 
self-development of the law student through legal education.   
 
6.3 Significance 
Chapter eight drew together several bodies of work and provides a synthesis of them that is 
persuasive and useful. A major problem of modern scholarship and research is the failure to 
recognise the significance of work done in one area of a discipline for work done in other 
areas of the same discipline and work done in different disciplines.195 Educational research, 
as noted above, has tended to borrow methods of investigation from other disciplines. As 
such it has served as a potential site of inter-disciplinary synthesis. My practice of 
triangulation also generates an interdisciplinary dynamic. These two features of my work 
generate a pressure in my research for the identification of common concepts, or principles. 
Seeking underlying principles that explain disparate decisions is, as noted above, a feature 
of legal scholarship from its modern foundation in the twelfth century.196 Thus, my research 
 
195 Joel Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena: historical origins of the knowledge economy (Princeton University Press 
2002), chapter 2 ‘The Industrial Enlightenment’; Joel Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy: Britain and the 
Industrial Revolution, 1700-1850 (Penguin 2011). Mokyr explores both relationships between propositional 
and prescriptive knowledge 9theoretical and applied) and social and economic receptiveness of new 
knowledge. 
196 Perhaps the most famous use of this lawyerly principle in the natural sciences was by Sir Charles Lyell, 
Principles of Geology (first published 1830-1833, Abridged edn, Penguin Classics 1997) and his principle of 
“uniformitarianism”. 
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naturally brings together a problem of synthesis with a technique for synthesis. Chapter 
eight is an example of this process in powerful and effective motion. 
In the first part of chapter eight a concern with the learner’s experience of education 
generated a new understanding of the human experience of life under modern conditions. 
The problem of choice in the value sphere has generated much of post reformation 
philosophy. It lies behind the search for certainty not rooted in revelation that inspired 
Descartes, as well as the struggle with volition of the existentialists, and the post-modern 
attack upon grand narratives that require universal value validity. Giddens has examined 
how the ordinary individual responds to the problem in his work. Frankfurt has explored the 
nature of value choice in the life of an individual. Williams has wrestled with ethics in a 
world where there is no indisputable and clear difference between ethical and non-ethical 
values. The Oliners have tried to understand how and when ethical behaviour could and did 
survive the Nazi upsetting of values through its ideology of force, leadership and race. 
Chapter eight was able to synthesis these bodies of work because they are all concerned 
with the modern problem of pluralism of values, the lack of secure absolute knowledge of 
right and wrong or good and bad. 
Chapter eight elaborated and developed understanding of the Rest and Narvaez four 
components model of ethical action. Specifically, it focused on moral motivation which has 
not received substantial attention. It dispelled a possible misconception about the model 
(that it is a schematic account of how ethical action arises) and brought into sharp focus the 
necessity for commitment prior to the events that require ethical action. Thus, it highlighted 
the importance of educational effort in the area of moral motivation.  
The chapter utilised Frankfurt’s work in its exploration of moral motivation, self-identity, 
and beliefs that are constitutive of the self. This was an extension of insights identified by 
Frankfurt in his own writings. Moral motivation is present when someone cares enough 
about something to act upon this concern. A second order desire is the desire to care about 
something, and it becomes constitutive of the volitional self. If one cares about something 
and one acts to further the interests of what one cares about then one is wholehearted in 
the action. One not only cares enough to act but acting in this manner is self-affirming. 
Having a second order desire to act ethically is to be motivated to act ethically. In these 
circumstances acting will affirm one’s volitional identity, failure to so act will damage it. 
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Thus, I used Frankfurt to analyse moral motivation, extending his work to a new purpose 
and forging a new understanding of the nature of moral motivation. 
Chapter eight identified common concerns amongst the authors it considered. It identified 
analogous categories and showed how each body of work can be used to inform and 
elaborate upon the others. By using different approaches to problems of individual 
commitments with ethical consequences it created a multi-faceted perspective on the 
issues it discussed. The resulting synthesis provided new understanding of the work 
synthesised and of the subject matter under investigation. 
Finally, the chapter considered possible applications of the theoretical insights it provided. 
This concern with theory grounded in the demands of professional teaching practice 
produced valuable new knowledge at the applied level. In chapter eight it both illuminated 
the possible teaching value of the examples it explored and added to the professional 
knowledge of its academic readership. 
 
6.4 Reflections and Connections 
Chapter eight was effective in synthesising some of the major authors that have been used 
in my research. However, it did not enter into an account of the nature of identity and its 
possible influence, positive and negative, in legal education. If, as it is argued, the student 
identity project is a vital concept for student-centred education then it is a concept that 
should be explicated and explored. A similar point might be made about the concept of 
moral development. Whilst the idea of moral change over time is a common understanding, 
the constraints over that change and its possible termini are not a matter of consensus. 
Specifically, there is contention in the chapter over whether development is hierarchical and 
if so whether there is a single developmental apex.  
Also, the chapter did not consider the interactions between extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivational factors. The chapter assumed it was intrinsic motivation that was of interest. 
The Oliners were concerned with a scenario in which power, the source of positive and 
negative sanctions, was opposed to moral action. In the context of legal professional ethics 
negative sanctions attach to breach of the ethical code – so external motivation is clearly 
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relevant. Motivation derived from moral feelings, motivation to act ethically because one 
feels it is the right thing to do, was effectively the subject matter of the chapter. However, 
motivation to act ethically may be non-ethical, or in the case of deceitful actions even 
unethical. This aspect of moral motivation derived from non-moral purposes was not clearly 
identified or explored in the chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
7.1 Development and Coherence of the Thesis  
This thesis has been the first articulation of the research question: What is entailed by a 
student-centred approach to legal education?  The writing of the PhD allowed me to identify 
the significance of the publications to this question and thereby develop new understanding 
of them. The opportunity to re-visit the original publications facilitated an exceptionally 
rigorous reflection upon the development of themes and integration of sources. 
The “student” of student-centred was subjected to analytical division, in the search for that 
“student interest” that student-centred education demanded. Students became people 
divided between their past and future selves, and the significant linkage between these 
selves was not the body but the self-reflexive identity project, the attempts by the students 
through narratives of the self to find or impose meaning in their lives. ‘What students care 
about’ had left the students the subjects of an ahistorical and acontextual analysis. ‘Values 
ethics and legal ethics’ situated them in late modernity embarked upon a project of 
personal and professional identity. 
Given reflexivity, the developing student understanding of what people (including 
themselves) are like and what is important to people that they obtain through their 
educational experience has an important impact upon their self-identity project. The values 
that inform educational practice impact upon the student through their motivating effects 
in the present and their influence upon character formation in the future.197 Thus, it was 
necessary to try and move beyond concern with student values, whatever they may be – 
which was where ‘What students care about’ and ‘Values, ethics and legal ethics’ had left 
the issue - and consider what values it was in the interests of students as a body to be 
encouraged to adopt, and in Uses of Values chapters 1, 4 and 8 I set sail in these dangerous 
 
197 Character has been referred to above as “ethical character”, “moral character”, “professional character”, 
and “Oliners’ character or fundamental moral principle”. It is of course another way of describing the purpose 
of the third apprenticeship in Educating Lawyers and is constituted in part by the ground projects of Williams. 
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waters.198 The student is essentially dynamic, and developmental and social processes 
complicate the abstract simplicities of value choice. Legal education starts influencing what 
the student is, and therefore what is in her interest and this makes it imperative to 
articulate the duty of the legal educator, as attempted in chapter 1 of Uses of Values. 
Thus, the nature of the student was elaborated upon across all of the publications. The 
understanding of the nature of the student informed how to identify the interest of the 
student that should lead educational practice. The application of this developing 
understanding of the student and student interest in pursuing an understanding of what 
was entailed by student-centred education upon the understanding of legal education was 
destabilising. As students, especially young or emerging adults, but all students are engaged 
in a vital ongoing project of self-identity construction and maintenance. Student-centred 
legal education should facilitate and support this process. The self-identity project can go 
well or badly, and it is in the students’ interest that it goes well. What values a student 
commits to will influence whether the project goes well, and therefore, legal educators 
should concern themselves with the values offered to students in legal education for 
adoption. 
In ‘What students care about’ the argument was that real educational benefits - in 
wellbeing, motivation and performance – could be derived by being attentive to what 
students cared about and how educational practices could engage with those concerns. 
Essentially, we assumed the practice could be value neutral, and did not impact on 
educational aims – it was concerned with how legal education was done not with what legal 
education should try to do. ‘Values ethics and legal ethics’ attacked this very assumption. I 
argued that a technocratic account of education obscured power relations and risked either 
marginalising the students’ self-identity projects or even affecting them negatively. A 
student-centred account challenged assumptions about the limits of educational ambition 
to assessable outcomes. Education needed to respond to the whole person, because the 
whole person was learning, making sense of what was learned, and incorporating it into 
their self-narratives.  
 
198 The voyage was continued in chapter 3 but that falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
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In Uses of Values the instrumental use of values remained (as indicated by the title of the 
book) but engagement with value discourse had become an academic duty in chapter 1, and 
the vital role of ethical education in character formation was the focus on chapter 8. The 
aim of legal education had been transformed by the need to take seriously the interests of 
the student. 
Thus, over the period of the research the central concepts under investigation developed, 
becoming more elaborate, and their interaction became a concern of the research. At the 
same time to support and articulate this elaboration new concepts were introduced and 
incorporated into the research synthesis. Some thinkers and theories were present from the 
start until the end: Frankfurt and self-determination theory. Others were introduced later as 
the research developed: Giddens and Rest and Narvaez in ‘Values, ethics and legal ethics’; 
Williams, Nussbaum and the Oliners in Uses of Values.199  
Therefore, one can clearly identify a process of conceptual development and elaboration 
over time and the publications evidence a coherent body of research over time (2011-2015). 
 
7.2 The Research was Rigorous  
It has been noted above that the research posed problems because of the need to draw 
upon resources from several disciplines in order to answer the research question. Law as an 
academic discipline does not so much generate data as try to harmonise and rationalise 
data in order to make the data coherent and useable.200 Empirical educational research 
tends to adopt methods of investigation used in other disciplines, such as anthropology, 
history, politics, psychology, and sociology.201 Legal and educational theory tend to use 
 
199 Frankfurt, Giddens, Williams and Rest and Narvaez are adequately referenced above. See for examples: 
Martha C Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity – Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education (Harvard 
University Press 1997); Samuel P Oliner and Pearl M Oliner, Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi 
Europe (Free Press 1988). 
200 In the words of van Hoecke: “Legal scholars collect empirical data (statues, cases, etc) word hypotheses on 
their meaning and scope, which they test, using the classic canons of interpretation. In a next stage, they build 
theories (…) which they test and from which they derive new hypotheses (…).” Mark van Hoecke, ‘Legal 
doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’ in Mark van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal 
Research: which kind of method for what kind of discipline (Hart Publishing 2011), 11. 
201 See n 24. Psychological researchers have authored much educational theory (e.g. Edward L Thorndyke, BF 
Skinner, Jerome Bruner, Howard Gardner), and the knowledge base they relied upon was derived from the 
discipline of psychology. Sociologists have been influential in research into the structural forces that have 
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methods informed by history, philosophy and social science including economics. Both legal 
practice and educational practice are sources of knowledge and understanding. In short, 
rigour becomes a contestable concept across disciplines and across disciplinary and 
practice-based inquiry.  
At a methodological level I was aware, at times painfully aware, of the problem of rigour 
and the danger of confirmation bias. In the past I have taken an interest in the discourses 
about scientific method and I have read some of the methodological materials generated by 
social science as a result of my activities in the Graduate school (as it then was) at 
Nottingham Trent University.202 I have also supervised research students who have used 
qualitative research methods which has required awareness of some of the problems of 
empirical research.203 Finally, it is impossible to research across disciplines without 
becoming aware of concerns within disciplines around rigour, reliability, researcher bias, 
and value assumptions that may distort research questions. Ultimately there can be no 
universal response to these problems, but I did address the issues in four specific ways. 
First, the practices and assumptions of doctrinal academic law were used. In effect legal 
techniques informed a meta-analysis. Legal reasoning interrogates texts and practices 
seeking generalisable principles, identifying contradictions, and rejecting logical or practical 
 
impacted upon education (e.g. Emile Durkheim, Pierre Bordieu, AH Halsey, Martin Trow, Michael W Apple), 
and their knowledge base was taken from the discipline of sociology and its means of inquiry, reasoning and 
theory building. Anthropologists (e.g. Jean Lave) and Historians (e.g. Richard Aldrich) and political scientists 
(Robert D Putnam) have also had a significant impact on our understanding of education. Methods of inquiry 
have naturally been adopted from these and other sources into educational research, and methodological 
concerns have followed.  
202 Three presentations I gave between 2008-2010 were specifically concerned with these issues: Graham 
Ferris, ‘The use of discipline specific theoretical materials and materials derived from educational theories in 
structuring curricula in law’ (Research-informed Teaching Symposium, November 2008): the presentation was 
to a non-legal, mostly social science audience; Graham Ferris, ‘How do judges and legal scholars make 
inferences about what parliament intended, about criminal intent and the intent of contracting parties?’ 
(Graduate School NTU, Research Seminar on Researching Beliefs and Intentions, May 2010) presentation to a 
non-legal, mostly social science audience; Graham Ferris, ‘How do judges and legal scholars make inferences 
about what parliament intended, about criminal intent and the intent of contracting parties?’ (NTU Law School 
Research Away Day, May 2010) presentation to a legal audience. The events were interactive, and the 
discussions and other papers were as valuable as formulating my own ideas. 
203 Mohd Hwaidi, ‘The Impact of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 600 on Parties under 
Common Law and Jordanian Law’ ((DPhil thesis Nottingham Trent University 2016); Sairah Al-Qasim, ‘Legal 
Education In ‘Islamic Law’ For Legal Practice In England And Wales: An ‘Islamic Law’ Framework For Legal 
Professionals’ (ProfDoc Legal Practice Nottingham Trent University thesis submitted 2019); Gabor Andrasi, ‘An 
Overview of the Theoretical Background of Ethics Education in Central and Eastern European Countries’ (DPhil 
Registered Nottingham Trent University 2016). 
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absurdities.204 This deployment of practices honed in law provided two benefits. It enabled 
many sources weak in internal coherence or reasoning to be rejected – thus it gave a critical 
edge to the research process. It informed a search for underlying substantial similarities – 
thus it powered the process of synthesis that was a significant feature of the research. 
Second, I used a triangulation technique. As detailed above I sought confirmation or 
disconfirmation from disparate sources. This naturally aligned with and informed the 
synthesis the research pursued. At a self-conscious level I tried to avoid confirmation bias in 
my use of triangulation, and I did seek to establish independence of the sources from each 
other. 
Third, I applied in my teaching practice the findings of my research in design and delivery of 
my teaching especially in Critical Legal Thinking. This provided a practical testing of the 
theoretically informed features of the curriculum and delivery of the module – and the 
module was successful and exceptionally engaging for many students. Thus, my educational 
practice was not only a source of knowledge but enabled the testing of ideas generated 
from my research in practice. 
Fourth, I read the disparate materials, including, where relevant, disputes around method 
and methodology. Hence, I spent considerable time engaged in investigating disputes 
around whether someone is able to cheat the Defining Issues Test,205 and whether the 
construct of “intrinsic motivation” reflects a phenomenon in the world that is reduced 
 
204 Harold J Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Harvard University 
Press 1983), 8-9 and at 253: “The analytical integration of canon law, that is its explicit logical systematization, 
proceeded from the belief that underlying multiplicity of legal rules and procedures was a set of basic legal 
principles, and that it was the task of jurists to identify those principles and to help shape the law so that it 
would inform them.” Berman argues this impulse informs the Western legal tradition. In the common law 
tradition it is called” the declaratory theory of law”. Mark van Hoecke, ‘Legal doctrine: Which Method(s) for 
What Kind of Discipline?’ in Mark van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research: which kind of method for 
what kind of discipline (Hart Publishing 2011), 14: “Explicit interpretation questions are not a marginal 
phenomenon in law. They arise when texts are unclear, but also when the result of a literal interpretation 
leads to unreasonable, inequitable or even absurd results. The confrontation of this result with the meaning 
given to the text, in a way, ‘falsifies’ the implicit, prima facie meaning of the text.” Essentially the same point is 
made prescriptively by Dworkin: “The adjudicative principle of integrity instructs judges to identify legal rights 
and duties, so far as possible, on the assumption that they were all created by a single author – the community 
personified – expressing a coherent conception of law, of justice and fairness.” Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
(Hart Publishing 2000), 225.  
205 The Defining Interests Test (DIT), was developed by Rest who developed the four component model of 
ethical action with Narvaez, and is a measure of ethical reasoning. 
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through the proffer of extrinsic rewards.206 Obviously, my ability to judge these issues was 
relatively modest, but those critical reading skills developed in law were of real value for this 
enterprise. 
Finally, all my research has been presented in public fora and published to enable people to 
comment and correct. This includes my educational practice which I have endeavoured to 
make common property. Ultimately public dissemination and critical review are the 
operational check on rigour in all disciplines. 
 
7.3 Answering the research question – the contribution to human 
knowledge 
The research produced novel understanding in four distinct ways: contributed to the 
literature on Frankfurt; added to the literature on legal education; it produced novel and 
valuable synthesis; and through use of the research it informed my educational practice and 
it generated new knowledge and tested theoretical insights through application. The short 
answer to the research question was that a student-centred approach to legal education 
entailed investigation of the individual student’s situation in late modern society, a 
fundamental review of the purposes of legal education, and a novel approach to curriculum 
design and delivery. However, in arriving at this answer the work made several identifiable 
contributions to human knowledge.  
 
206 Re DIT: Colin McGeorge, ‘Susceptibility to Faking the Defining Issues Test of Moral Development (1975) 11 
Developmental Psychology 18; Nicholas Elmer, Stanley Renwick and Bernadette Malone, ‘The Relationship 
between  Moral Reasoning and Political Orientation’ (1983) 45 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
1073; Robert Barnett, Jean Evans and James Rest, ‘Faking Moral Judgment on the Defining Issues Test’ (1995) 
34 British Journal of Social Psychology 267; Nicholas Elmer and E Palmer-Canton, ‘Politics, Moral Reasoning 
and the Defining Issues Test: A reply to Barnett et al (1995)’ (1998) 37 British Journal of Social Psychology.  
Re intrinsic motivation: Edward L Deci, Richard Koestner and Richard M Ryan, A Meta-Analytic Review of 
Experiments Examining the effects of Extrinsic rewards on Intrinsic Motivation’ (1999) 125 Psychological 
Bulletin 627; Robert Eisenberger, W David Pierce and Judy Cameron, ‘Effects of reward on intrinsic motivation-
-negative, neutral and positive: comment on Deci, Koestner, and Ryan’ (1999) 125 Psychological  Bulletin 677; 
Mark Lepper, Jennifer Henderlong and Isabelle Gingras, ‘Understanding the effects of Extrinsic Rewards on 
Intrinsic Motivation – Uses and Abuses of meta-Analysis; Comment on Deci, Koestner , and Ryan (1999)’ (1999) 
125 Psychological  Bulletin 669; Edward L Deci, Richard Koestner and Richard M Ryan, ‘The Undermining Effect 
is a Reality After All – Extrinsic Rewards, Task Interest and Self-Determination: Reply to Eisenberger, Pierce and 
Cameron (1999) and Lepper, Henderlong, and Gingras’ (1999) 125 Psychological  Bulletin 692. 
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7.3.A. Contribution to understanding of Frankfurt 
From the first publication ‘What students care about’ it was clear that Frankfurt’s 
theoretical account of second order desires was being used in my research in ways that both 
illuminated and supported his work and applied it in novel ways. The version of 
triangulation I developed was first used in connection with Frankfurt’s theory. As noted 
above, empirical support was found for aspects of his exploration of volition in Damasio, 
work on law student wellbeing, and self-determination theory. The application of 
Frankfurt’s theory to legal education was a novel application that demonstrated the 
usefulness of his theoretical work in a practical educational context.207 
‘Values ethics and legal ethics’ took this contribution to our understanding of Frankfurt one 
step further. Frankfurt has never shown much interest in the social context of his theory in 
print. I placed his theory into a sociologically informed account of the individual in late 
modernity. This produced two new insights. First, Frankfurt’s work became explicable in 
historical terms – he has been explicating the nature of the modern individual’s reflexive 
self-identity project in his work. Second, this means we can use Frankfurt to illuminate the 
nature of this project, another application of his theory to a novel subject matter.208 
Finally, chapter eight of Uses of Values applied Frankfurt’s theory to the under-theorised 
nature of moral motivation in the four component model of ethical action. Frankfurt writes 
about “volitional continuity” as the necessary to our taking part in our own agency. This 
volitional agency is provided by our commitment to our second order desires. Thus, I 
argued, our second order desires are constitutive of who we are – they are an important 
part of our self-identity and are likely to inform our self-narratives. In chapter eight I 
extended this insight of Frankfurt to moral motivation – a restricted class of things we care 
about. I thereby made Frankfurt important for understanding the necessary conditions for 
ethical action.209 
 
207 Page 20 above for triangulation and pages 29-30 for the contribution to our understanding of Frankfurt 
made in ‘What students care about’. 
208 Pages 42 above for the contribution of ‘Values ethics and legal ethics’ to our understanding of Frankfurt. 
209 Page 71 above. 
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My work has thereby shown how Frankfurt’s theory can be supported by independent work 
he has not noted or connected his work to; how his work answers a historically felt need 
generated by late modernity; and how his work can be applied to advance educational 
theory and our understanding of ethical action. In these ways I have advanced our 
understanding of his work and its importance for legal education and higher education in 
general. 
 
7.3.B. Contribution to the legal education literature 
7.3.B.i. Practice of legal education research 
Researchers into legal education who are motivated by their practice of legal education face 
difficulties in articulating their research aims, methods, and methodological orientation. The 
problem is most acute for those who come to legal education research from a legal practice 
background. My work articulates features of the legal academic discipline that can be 
utilised in research into legal education.210 Furthermore, in this thesis I have articulated a 
type of triangulation that helps deal with the difficulties of using multi-disciplinary 
sources.211 
 
7.3.B.ii. Identification of the student’s interest 
Student-centred educational theory has struggled with the problem of what is in the 
student learner’s interest, and how this interest can be identified, ever since student-
centred educational theory was given its classic formulation by Dewey. The centrality of the 
students’ interest in student-centred educational theory has made this persistent lack of 
conceptual clarity an important weakness in such theories. I have made significant progress 
in providing a persuasive account of what is in the interest of the law student in this thesis. 
In ‘What students care about’ I first used Frankfurt to generate an abstract or formal 
 
210 Page 18-19 above. 
211 Pages 20 above. 
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response to the question of what is meant by the interest of the law student (the 
formulation and pursuit of wholehearted second order desires).212 
In ‘Values ethics and legal ethics’ I partially populated the formal answer generated in ‘What 
students care about’ by analysing the ‘third apprenticeship’ idea developed in Educating 
Lawyers. This elucidated both the importance of the choice made by law students to study 
law for identifying their interests, and the important limits that should be respected in the 
undergraduate law degree in England and Wales at least. In brief the undergraduate law 
student should be offered the identity of lawyer for adoption but not forced to adopt this 
identity, and of course, it is not in the interests of a law student to be offered misleading or 
false visions of the lawyer. 
The article also introduced the idea of the reflexive self-identity project. This idea means 
that contemporary law students have a concern with their self-narratives and life plans, and 
this is another point of contact with the third apprenticeship in legal education. However, it 
also means that the successful development of the self-identity project is in the interest of 
the law student, and therefore legal education that is student-centred should support 
students in this project. Although this element of the student’s interest was first identified 
in ‘Values ethics and legal ethics’ it was further developed in chapters one and eight of Uses 
of Values. Chapter one explored the difficulties posed by disparate self-identities and 
different lifeworlds. It was argued that it is not in the interests of all students to be 
supported in developing one self-narrative – both disparate starting points and differing 
commitments meant this would be counter-productive. What is in the students’ interest is 
being equipped to reason and make good choices in their ‘life politics’. Legal education can 
support this process by recognising pluralism, validating the enterprise, supporting 
reasoning, providing useful vocabularies and potential role models. Chapter eight focussed 
on the importance of identity and commitment work before the student is put under ethical 
pressure. A good legal education should help students reflect upon their values and decide 
what values, and therefore what type of person, they want to endorse.  
Thus, the insistence on the centrality of the student to the legal education project generated 
a significant elaboration of what is in the law student’s interest. What my work makes very 
 
212 Pages 29 above. 
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clear is that modernity gives freedoms and choices that can be difficult to use well, helping 
our students to successfully construct self-identities that support their wellbeing in 
educational settings and beyond is in their interest and therefore should shape legal 
educational practice. 
 
7.3.B.iii. Student engagement 
In ‘What students care about’ I applied Frankfurt’s theoretical insights to the problem of 
student wellbeing, engagement and academic motivation. This in itself was an important 
addition to the literature on student engagement. I also applied the insights of self-
determination theory to the same issues, an early example in the UK setting. However, it 
was not until chapter four of Uses of Values that I fully explored this ground.  
Chapter four broke new ground in the application of self-determination theory to 
educational practice in the law school. It is the most practice orientated section of this 
thesis and it explains and illustrates why it is important to work with truthful (accurate, 
evidence based, coherent) models of student motivation. It is not enough to have a theory, 
the theory must align with the reality it attempts to describe and explain. The chapter 
therefore evaluates competing theories of motivation and identifies self-determination 
theory as the strongest available theory for the legal educator.  
This theoretical evaluation is important for practice for two reasons: first, incorrect theories 
can undermine practice; second, because the process identifies unexamined beliefs of the 
educator. Hence, this aspect of the chapter is not merely descriptive and evaluative, it is 
also an exemplary for those designing legal curricula and delivering legal education. The 
chapter interlaces theory and practical examples, because it seeks to bridge the world of 
practice-based knowledge and the world of theoretical knowledge. The contribution to 
human knowledge is not a new discovery or insight in either realm but the bringing together 
of the two realms in fruitful synthesis. 
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7.3.B.iv. Vision of the law degree 
The purpose of legal education is raised in ‘Values ethics and legal ethics’ but is only fully 
surfaced in chapter one of Uses of Values. ‘Values ethics and legal ethics’ produced an 
account of what how one might approach legal education in general and ethics education in 
particular informed by novel theoretical insights derived from the synthesis of Frankfurt and 
Giddens noted above.213 It also developed a critical account of the vision of ethical 
education suggested by the learning outcomes educational technology deployed by the 
LETR report and raised an alternative account rooted in student identity. The engagement 
with alternative visions at the level of what should be considered capable of assessment had 
an independent value for our understanding of legal education.  
There is no reason to suppose that what is capable of assessment is what is most valuable in 
education. Whenever constructive alignment exceeds its role as a means to seek coherence 
in educational practice it starts to impose an unattractive unarticulated vision of education. 
The debates over the purpose of undergraduate legal education are present in the language 
and techniques of outcomes-based education. The technocratic frame smuggles in value 
positions that have not been subjected to scrutiny. The critical analysis in the article 
revealed problems hidden by the use of words and practices that were familiar in 
educational practice when the report was compiled. This revelation was itself of value and 
original.  
However, the article was written primarily with another end in mind – to articulate a vision 
of legal education as a student-centred enterprise that could overcome the tired dichotomy 
of liberal education versus professional training. It did this by making the self-identity 
project of the student the unifying purpose, one which could easily accommodate both 
liberal and professional aspirations. From the perspective of the student self-identity project 
the third apprenticeship of Educating Lawyers was an example of the integrative power of 
available models for student identity. This approach was continued in chapter one of Uses of 
Values. 
Chapter one made use of the synthesis of Frankfurt and Giddens on self-identity and the 
links with the third apprenticeship made in ‘Values ethics and legal values’. The chapter 
 
213 Pages 42-43 above. 
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placed this synthesis into broader contexts – the self-identity project as an aspect of 
modernity and the debates over the purpose of legal education within the wider discourse 
on the purpose of university education. Once this was done it was possible to identify real 
problems posed to student-centred education by the diversity of the student body and 
contemporary values. No doubt one reason technocratic practice is permitted to smuggle 
value positions into educational practice is because widespread value difference makes 
open discussion of what values to inculcate potentially embarrassing. 
The chapter accepted the need to address concerns over a lack of authoritative values 
directly by arguing for pluralism and the validity of truth as a concept. From this foundation 
the chapter put forward a series of value positions that could be justified in a plural 
educational environment that would support the self-identity projects of the students and 
thus serve as organising concepts for a student-centred legal education. This vision for legal 
education adds to the literature on legal education in an original, reasoned and valuable 
manner. 
 
7.3.C. Novel synthesis 
I have already noted the fruitful synthesis of Frankfurt, Giddens, and the concept of the 
third apprenticeship from Educating Lawyers, and Dewey. I have also noted the synthesis of 
theoretical knowledge and educational practice-based knowledge in connection with 
chapter four of Uses of Values in particular. Also, much of what I have described as 
triangulation could be viewed as synthesis – a successful triangulation identifies 
unperceived links between Frankfurt and Damasio and studies of law student wellbeing and 
self-determination theory. Therefore, I shall restrict the account of synthesis given here to 
the synthesis of Frankfurt, Williams and Giddens with the four component model of ethical 
action created by Rest and Narvaez.  
This synthesis was undertaken in chapter eight of Uses of Values.214 The literature on ethics 
education shows a tendency towards over-emphasis on ethical reasoning, and neglect of 
ethical efficacy and ethical motivation, ethical sensitivity receives a moderate amount of 
 
214 Pages 69-72 above. 
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attention. Recently ethical efficacy has been addressed by Mary Gentile and this area has 
taken off in terms of teaching.215 Moral motivation remains neglected. 
Moral motivation is concerned with the ethical commitments, intuitive responses, and 
feeling of right action of a person.216 The synthesis was of Frankfurt whose work has proved 
so productive in my research, Giddens, Williams, the Oliners and Rest and Narvaez who set 
out the four component model of ethical action. From Frankfurt and Williams I took the 
related ideas of the ground project (Williams) and the second order desire, both of which I 
treated as fundamental commitments that partially constituted the person. This, as above, I 
then placed within the context of the reflexive self-identity project of Giddens, thereby both 
normalising the ideas and putting them into a historical context. These investigators and 
theorists all placed emphasis, not on reasoning, but on commitment and identity.  
 
7.3.D. Practice 
The question: What is entailed by a student-centred approach to legal education? was 
inspired by commitment to my educational practice. My legal education research has been 
in part an attempt to make my professional knowledge common and capable of being 
reviewed, adopted and adapted by my fellow legal educators.217 It has also been an attempt 
to apply research productively to my practice.218 Finally, my research led me to re-examine 
our understanding of the purposes and appropriate practice of higher education in general 
and legal education in particular.219 
My research has repeatedly located the practice of legal education within broader concerns, 
with the individual seeking of a meaningful life, within the conditions of modernity, within a 
diverse society. This repeated re-positioning of legal education was driven by the problems 
 
215 Mary C Gentile, Giving Voice to Values: How to Speak Your Mind When You Know What's Right (Yale 
University Press 2012). 
216 By “feeling of right action” I am seek to capture the  essence of the reports of people who have acted 
ethically, sometimes at great personal cost or risk, that they just did what anyone would do. Such responses 
are reported in Samuel P Oliner and Pearl M Oliner, Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe (Free 
Press 1988) and Anne Colby and William Damon, Some Do Care: Contemporary Lives of Moral Commitment 
(Free Press 1994). 
217 Page 15 above. 
218 Pages 44-45, 60, 62-63, 72, and 83 above. 
219 Pages 4-45 above. 
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caused by insisting upon a student-centred approach, because being student-centred entails 
serious investigation and reflection upon what is in the students’ interests. I have no reason 
to suppose the research presented in this thesis has exhausted this investigation. What I do 
argue is that it has made the radical nature of the question apparent.  
My final contribution to human knowledge through this thesis is the identification of the 
power of the research question. A power this thesis illustrates but does not claim to have 
exhausted.  
 
7.4 Final Reflections 
This thesis explodes a set of common-sense beliefs about legal education in the UK.220 In 
itself this conceptual and empirically informed work of destruction is not novel, as it draws 
upon earlier analyses and investigations. However, something is gained by bringing these 
critical accounts together and organising them around the research question: what is 
entailed by a student-centred approach to legal education? Because this makes it painfully 
clear that neglect of the problem of delivering a student-centred legal education is neglect 
of any truly educative purpose.  
The research question pushed against commonly assumed boundaries delimiting legal 
education. Whilst legal education might start for a student in year one of an undergraduate 
degree and end in year three upon graduation this time slice of a student’s life is obviously a 
prolonged event or process in the life of that student.221 Viewing the degree as the subject 
of analysis delimits legal education in terms of institutional cycles, processes, and purposes 
rather than in terms of the meaning of the degree for the students. Students have a pre-
degree past and a post-degree future and the degree is meaningful and important to them 
because of these facts.222 This is not because how a student experiences being a law student 
is unimportant, those three years have substantial value in themselves, but because the 
 
220 For example: the “teaching and learning as parcel transfer” metaphor at 12-13 and 37; the effects on and 
utility of rewards for learning at 61-63; and the myth of positivist neutrality at 41 above; and publication 2 and 
publication 3, ‘1.1 Do No Harm’ below. 
221 For the purposes of simplicity I am assuming a law student whose formal legal education ends upon 
graduation. 
222 As emphasised by John Dewey, see: n 4 above. 
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degree is part of an ever elaborating and developing narrative of the student. It plays an 
important part, but only a part, in the identity project of the student.223  
Viewed from the perspective of someone hoping to become a law student legal education 
can serve innumerable purposes – vindication of intellectual capacity; adoption of a middle-
class status; a necessary stage in being able to make provision for a family; escape from a 
village life that provided no endurable role; affirmation of British identity; need to 
understand how life can be so unfair. Viewed from the perspective of someone who has 
been a law student legal education is a source of innumerable aspects of the graduate: 
economic security; a desire to pursue justice; reluctance to rush to judgment; sensitivity to 
potential conflicts between values; social status; awareness of the contingency of life.  224 
Even such a short and limited set of lists makes it clear student-centred legal education 
cannot prioritise all the disparate and potentially conflicting purposes and futures it serves. 
Thus, the central dilemma of the research question is revealed: how can legal education 
serve the purposes and needs of law students given their diversity of origins, purposes, and 
futures? This question is considered above through consideration of what is in the interest 
of law students. Even if it were desirable one cannot rely upon the transmission of 
gentlemanly values through close social contact between students and academics.225 We 
have a mass education system that serves a diverse student group.226 Therefore, we need to 
identify common interests of most or preferably all students and devise methods of 
delivering legal education that permit students to tailor their own legal education. 
In the late-modern world everyone is engaged in forging an identity for themselves because 
traditional identities are unstable or unavailable. This universal process is particularly salient 
in the period of transition from childhood to adulthood. All students have identity projects 
 
223 See: chapter 3 above. 
224 All of these examples in these two sentences are referable to students whom I have talked with about their 
education in my practice as a legal academic. 
225 John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University (first published 1852, Baronius Press 2006), 92-93: “when I 
speak of Knowledge which is its own end, when I call it liberal knowledges, or a gentleman’s knowledge, when 
I educate for it, and make it the scope of a University.”, 120: “if I had to choose between a so called University, 
which dispensed with residence and tutorial superintendence … and a University which had no professors or 
examinations at all, but merely brought a number of young men together for three or four years … I have no 
hesitation in giving preference to that University which did nothing …”. 
226 See: 58-59 and 66 above. 
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and many undergraduates are engaged in the process of transition to adulthood.227 
Therefore, serving this enterprise manages to maintain a student-centred focus whilst 
avoiding becoming lost in the welter of different student expectations, hopes, and 
aspirations. 
Given this insight it is possible to re-think what we are doing when we do legal education to 
make our practice student-centred. Students care about some things when they begin their 
legal education, and self-awareness of what they care about can inform self-knowledge. 
What one cares about changes in response to experiences including educational 
experiences. Educational experiences have two types of impact on this reflective process: 
they facilitate the assessment of substantive values; they provide conceptual tools for 
thinking about values.228  
A student-centred legal education should support this process of student reflection on 
values (what the student cares about) in a positive manner in the various ways the thesis 
suggested, and in other ways that I have not had space to include or that I have not 
imagined. Role models should be presented;229 the linguistic and conceptual tools for such a 
meta value discourse should be provided;230 social space for respectful value discussion 
should be provided;231 value conflicts should be explored.232 Legal materials are a natural 
source for these types of discussion, and legal processes such as trial are an institutional 
attempt to fashion a process that permits value disputes to be resolved rationally and 
without violence.233 
Of course, this insight applies to higher education generally and not only legal education. 
Thus, this thesis is a part of the discourse that exists around the purpose of higher education 
and the university. The problems of legal education are a sub-set of the problems of 
 
227 See: chapter 3 above. 
228 See: Appiah n 192, and Derek Bok, Our Underachieving Collages: A candid look at how much students learn 
and why they should be learning more (Princeton University Press 2009), 150: “It is not the place of faculty 
members to prescribe what undergraduates ought to consider virtuous. But surely faculties should do 
whatever they can to prepare their students to arrive at thoughtful judgments of their own” above; and 
publication 3 below. 
229 See: 45-47 and 65 above, and publication 5, sections 7 and 8 below. 
230 See: n 228. 
231 Discussed in publication 4 below at text around n 40. 
232 See: 40-41 above. 
233 See: Barbara J Shapiro, Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720 (Cornell University Press 2000) on the influence 
of legal rationality on early modern science. 
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education. Hence the use and relevance of works that explore modern higher education or 
the nature of university education to this thesis.234 
As the thesis makes clear this support for the reflexive self-identity project should not be 
directive, in part because there is no reflective consensus on many of these value questions, 
in part because the diversity of the student body makes any such attempt pre-ordained to 
failure.235 Furthermore, any such attempt would be a deviation from a student-centred legal 
education. It would be an attempt not to support the student identity project but to 
determine its outcome in an attempt to impose some value of the academic upon the 
student.236 As argued above education should so far as possible eschew coercion and 
manipulation in favour of persuasion in its practices.237 
Support for the student identity project, by giving conceptual tools, social space, 
authoritative recognition of the value of the process of reflection, and exemplars provides a 
powerful guide to addressing the interests of all of the students. However, it does not 
provide a solution to the problem of the diversity of student expectations, purposes, and 
aspirations. On its own it does not help students uninterested in academic directed self-
reflection. 
As the thesis explains people are generally happier, everything else being equal, if they feel 
they are doing what they decide to do. Self-determination theory tells us that the belief that 
one is choosing what to do, and that in doing so one is able to pursue one’s curiosity and 
sense of delight has a strong impact on motivation and wellbeing. Furthermore, the theory 
tells us how to encourage that feeling, we do so by supporting peoples’ feelings of 
competence, autonomy, and relatedness. Therefore, we should design and deliver legal 
 
234 See: Derek Bok, Our Underachieving Collages: A candid look at how much students learn and why they 
should be learning more (Princeton University Press 2009); Derek Bok, Universities in the Marketplace: The 
Commercialization of Higher Education (Princeton University Press 2009); Anthony Bradney, Conversations, 
Choices and Chances: The Liberal Law School in the Twenty-First Century (Bloomsbury Publishing 2003); John 
Brennan, Robert Edwards, Muir Houston, David Jary, Yann Lebeau, Michael Osborne and John T E Richardson, 
Improving What is Learned in University: An Exploration of the Social and Organisational Diversity of University 
Education (Routledge 2010); Stefan Collini, What are Universities For? (Penguin 2012); Stefan Collini, Speaking 
of Universities (Verso 2017); Stanley Fish, Save the World in Your Own Time (Oxford University Press 2012); 
John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University (first published 1852, Baronius Press 2006); Martha Nussbaum, 
Cultivating Humanity – Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education (Harvard University Press 1997). 
235 See: n 228. 
236 I have argued for a limited set of legal and educational values that can be justifiably advanced in legal 
education in publication 3 below. 
237 See: 64-65 above. 
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education with careful attention to supporting the human needs for autonomy, 
competence, and relatedness.238 
Support for the student identity project calls for a social space in which reflection on values 
can take place, this process is likely to form bonds between participants. It is a way to build 
relatedness. Support for student reflection on values and life goals should build a sense of 
competence. One thing we all find ourselves doing is building self-narratives and working on 
our self-identity, in the context of late modernity it is something we do without external 
pressure. Engagement in one’s self-identity project has an autonomous aspect. Thus, each 
aspect of the dilemma of student-centred legal education can be addressed by the same 
educational techniques and initiatives as has been demonstrated in the numerous examples 
contained in this thesis.239 
Finally, I have argued that legal education can achieve this educative end by combining 
elements traditionally thought of as in irreconcilable tension, the liberal and the vocational 
models of a law degree.240 In part this is because a student-centred perspective makes of 
the degree an event in a life and that life has needs of both lifelong learning for flourishing 
and for the adoption of economical roles in life. In part it is because identity has numerous 
aspects, and, if anything the different elements derived from the liberal and vocational 
models are too few to serve the self-identity project. Finally, it is because a student-centred 
approach to legal education permits the taking of the best from each model in the cause of 
best serving the interests of the students whose education we are entrusted with. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
238 See: chapter 5 above. 
239 See: publication 1, publication 4, and publication 5 below. 
240 See n 6 above. 
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Abstract 
The LETR Report recommended increased attention to ethics and values and to critical thinking. 
These aims could be achieved jointly through teaching ethical thinking: not as theory but as part of 
developing the capacity for ethical conduct. Such a pedagogy has the potential to become a QLD 
signature pedagogy supporting “life-narratives” of students. 
The LETR Report recommends a review of the QLD emphasising legal values and ethics. Concern with 
values and ethics is linked to concern with professional conduct. Maintaining the law degree as a 
general or liberal qualification is also strongly desired. These potentially conflicting drivers generate 
ambivalence towards legal ethics as a subject for study, especially if legal ethics is perceived as 
teaching the professional codes. 
Resolution of this tension is achievable through recognising the potential role of ethical teaching as 
part of an identity apprenticeship. Developing ethical character is as much a liberal as a professional 
aim. Ethics teaching can play an integrative role in the QLD. 
Formation of student identity is a central part of Higher Education taking colouration from being 
situated in legal education. In this context teaching legal ethics becomes the use of a salient example 
for carrying out the broader project of developing ethical capacity. 
 
Teaching of professional ethics and values for integrity and quality 
The importance of ethics and values within legal education and training is stressed by the 
final report of the Legal Education and Training Review independent research team (LETR 
Report). “Ethics” includes professional ethics and “values” those values specifically that 
underpin the rule of law: these two areas link up with a concern with professionalism. This 
emphasis on ethics and values is situated within a regulatory context. This means that ethics 
and values are important when they serve the broader objectives of supporting systemic 
integrity and service quality, rather than for their own sake. The perspective of the team 
was informed by the needs of the justice system and the legal services market: the general 
public, providers, and consumers, as well regulators.  
As an educator committed to increasing the role and range of values based teaching and 
learning in legal education and working in academic higher education my perspective is 
different. My starting point is that value informed legal education and ethical education is 
beneficial for my students, both those who go on to become legal service providers and 
those who do not. Even in the context of professional training and continuing professional 
development a concern with facilitating the growth of the capabilities of the learner to 
reason and act ethically is my focus.  
The Foreword to the LETR Report identifies several “key messages”, most of which seem to 
be broad objectives for legal education and training. Given first place is conservation of the 
existing strengths of legal education, training and professional practice. However, 
immediately after conservation is the need to encourage flexibility and responsiveness to 
changes originating from disparate causal agents. To conserve yet facilitate change: and not 
merely peripheral change but changes that are likely to touch all aspects of professional 
practice. At best this is dynamic tension that will give energy and direction to reform efforts, 
at worst it is contradictory.  
The complexity of developments in the UK legal services market is striking. There have been 
unprecedented advances in information technology. The economic context of legal practice 
has changed. State subsidy of legal services has been under attack for many years. The 
conditional fee has generated problems and opportunities. Concurrently “globalisation” has 
given rise to international competition in legal services. The structure and identity of 
providers of legal services has also started to change.  There is growing diversification of 
professional providers (the LETR Report was commissioned by ILEX Professional Standards 
as well as the Bar Standards Board and Solicitors’ Regulation Authority) as well as greater 
specialisation within and between firms; and the possibilities for the structure of business 
organisations providing legal services has been revolutionised. This diversification, 
fragmentation, and reorganisation have been driven in part by statutory change and in part 
by technological and market forces. Finally, but most obviously pertinent to the 
commissioners of the LETR, changes in regulatory models and structures operating in the 
market require a response from regulators.  
Another key message is a desire to increase diversity in the professions. It seems fair to 
portray conservation, flexibility, diversity, and regulatory challenges as problems that need 
addressing: tasks for the professional bodies, regulators, and service providers.  
With some resemblance to hope at the bottom of the jar opened by Pandora is the key 
message of the importance of ethics, or professional ethics and values. Ethical education 
and training is more in the nature of a remedy for problems identified in other key messages. 
Although the Foreword identifies work based learning, including continuing professional 
development, as a possible source of solutions in the future it is as yet very problematic.1 
                                                          
1 Although optimistic about work based learning the Report records evidence of substantial dissatisfaction with 
current Continuing Professional Development (CPD) provision and practice: see LETR Report [2.147] – [2.163]. 
There are also concerns about the coherence, consistency and effectiveness of traditional work place training, 
see: [6.61] and [6.63] the crucial factor is the quality of supervision. This means solutions of the problems 
identified at [6.62] are essential. Supervision is a candidate for prescribed CPD [5.96] – [5.97]. So, if reform of 
Also, wider use of outcomes based regulation with alignment of learning and teaching, and 
assessment, with appropriate outcomes is put forward as a powerful tool for coordination 
and the achievement of consistency and regulatory purposes.2 However, an outcomes 
defined approach is largely undeveloped outside of the academy, although ILEX has already 
implemented a learning outcomes approach. 
Thus, although the potential importance of new approaches to education and training is 
recognised these must be considered to be areas that are as yet under development. For 
example more variety in, more extensive use of, and better focussing of work place learning 
is potentially important: for facilitating diversity, ensuring competence, and providing a 
powerful experiential pedagogy.  
The use of professional ethics to constrain professional action, to empower the professional 
in resisting improper pressure, and as a well established feature of professional education 
and training, marks ethics out. It is familiar and we have experience in its use in educational 
practice. It is familiar as an aspect of professional practice that is important, useful, and 
valued. An ethically informed legal education and training can hope to both conserve 
professional standards and at the same time facilitate beneficial change: for the nature of 
ethical principles is that they are capable of application in new circumstances.  And this 
should make those committed to teaching in a value informed way that encourages ethical 
growth a little wary. There is a lot that can be accomplished through the inculcation of 
values and the facilitation of ethical behaviour – but it cannot be a panacea. Furthermore, 
there is a tension between ethical education that attempts more than teaching the code 
and assessment of outcomes based educational practices that must be negotiated very 
carefully.3  
Two cheers for the research team 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
CPD succeeds then it might remedy some problems of supervision in work based learning. Obviously this will 
need a new and far more rigorous audit process of work based learning [6.71]. All of these integrated parallel 
reforms are to be co-ordinated through standards expressed as outcomes, and standardised assessment: 
except for CPD which needs to give more recognition to informal but structured (therefore, not standardised) 
learning practices [6.95] and [7.27] – [7.28]. Each proposed reform is problematic and integration across the 
reforms is even more problematic. The current state of work based learning is clearly one the research team 
feels is in need of reform rather than available as a source of solutions. As well as providing assurances of 
competence at the beginning and during a professional career, and developing professional attributes, work 
based learning is hopefully going to alleviate the problems of social mobility posed by problems of access to 
the profession [6.51] – [6.54].The Report recognises the infeasibility of a grand reform in such complex matters 
and recommends setting up a Legal Education Council to try and inform continuous regulatory reforms at 
recommendation 25. 
2LETR Report p. ix: “enhance consistency of education and training through a more robust system of learning 
outcomes and standards, and increased standardisation of assessment”, [4.106], [4.122], and 
Recommendations 1 – 5. 
3 See: LETR Report [4.94]  [4.110], [4.134], and [4.139] which identify problems with outcomes in this area; but 
these problems seem to be forgotten at [4.140]. Also, see below in particular the text between notes 11 and 
16 for an exploration of this problem. 
The support found by the research team for a greater emphasis on values and ethics is 
impressive and welcome. To summarise: 
“Ethics, values and professionalism … was rated the most important knowledge area in 
the LETR online survey, a result which echoed the demand for a greater emphasis on 
professional ethics and conduct across the qualitative data and stakeholder responses 
to Discussion papers … A majority of respondents took the view that ethics and 
professionalism need to be developed throughout the continuum of education and 
training.” 4 
In short, although there already exists some ethical and value informed education and 
training it is felt more would be a good thing. At undergraduate level (and GDL) expanding 
the foundation subjects would cut into time available and limit academic freedom. Although 
there was some support for professionalism or ethics as a foundation subject it was a 
minority who favoured this.5 The proposal for the undergraduate stage of legal education 
was: 
“Hence, it is proposed that the QLD/GDL should include outcomes that advance an 
awareness and understanding of the values embedded in law, legal processes and 
solutions, and the role of lawyers in advancing those values. Further … that some 
understanding of underlying legal values should be incorporated in the education and 
training of any authorised person.” 6 
To sum up: 
“The perceived centrality of professionalism and ethics to practice across the regulated 
workforce is one of clearest conclusions to be drawn from the LETR research.” 7 
A lot of people see the teaching of ethics as a known and potentially effective solution to a 
lot of problems. The research team agrees and recommends, inter alia, that the 
undergraduate stage of legal education should direct some resources in this direction. 
However, there are no recommendations as to content, or delivery, and expressly no 
recommendation for “professional conduct” to become a foundation subject.8 
The final recommendations on ethics and values are 6 and 7: 
                                                          
4 LETR Report [4.65] – [4.67] 
5 Indeed, there is some evidence that  teaching ethics as a discrete subject can be ineffective, see: Ernest T. 
Pascarella and Patrick T. Terenzini, How College Affects Students: A Third Decade of Research: 2  (2005) John 
Wiley & Sons Inc,  San Francisco, Ca, at p. 355: “Ethics courses. Another purposeful intervention designed to 
facilitate growth in principled moral reasoning is a course focussed on ethics. This approach has been 
particularly visible in undergraduate business curricula … The weight of evidence from these studies is 
somewhat equivocal …. We suspect that the mixed findings for this body of evidence reflect to some extent 
the fact that ethics interventions in the various studies differed substantially in their content, emphasis, and 
implementation. On balance, across all studies the effect on principled moral reasoning of exposure to either 
ethics courses or interventions is probably positive, though quite modest in magnitude.” 
6LETR Report [4.104]. 
7 LETR Report [7.10]. 
8 LETR Report [7.89]. 
“Recommendation 6 
 LSET [Legal Services Education and Training] schemes should include appropriate 
learning outcomes in respect of professional ethics, legal research and the 
demonstration of written and oral communication skills. 
Recommendation 7  
The learning outcomes at initial stages of LSET should include reference (as appropriate 
to the individual practitioner’s role) to an understanding of the relationship between 
morality and law, the values underpinning the legal system, and the role of lawyers in 
relation to those values.” 
Both the revelation of the degree of support for greater emphasis on values and ethics in 
legal education and training, and the clear indication that it is a matter for all stages of legal 
education, are to be welcomed. However, a full set of three cheers must be denied, because 
of the understandable but potentially treacherous issue of perspective. The viewpoint of the 
research team was not the same as the viewpoint of the academic institution considering 
what might be appropriate undergraduate learning outcomes. 
How the perspective of the research team obscures educational implications 
This LETR Report is welcome to those who wish to see more attention given to values and 
ethics in legal education generally and the academic stage in particular. Less welcome are 
two features of the treatment of ethics and values in the Report.  
First, ethics teaching risks becoming a vehicle for social engineering - it risks being put 
forward as an instrument for regulatory aims. It cannot be a vehicle for delivering the full 
commitment to client of the traditional professional for the price of the lowest cost 
competitive supplier whilst maintaining the values of justice and delivering to the financial 
investor the required 15% return on capital. In the words of Kurt Lewin: 
“It seems to be easier for society to change education than for education to change 
society.” 9 
There is a tendency for utopian hopes to be pinned upon educational initiatives, but neither 
education nor regulation can square the circle of inconsistent policy imperatives.10  
Educators must be careful not to impose unrealistic demands upon our students, and our 
                                                          
9 Kurt Lewin, Some Social-Psychological Differences Between the United States and Germany (1936) in 
Resolving Social Conflicts and Field Theory in Social Science (1997) Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association, (2010) electronic edition.  
10 The problem is not unique to legal services or the UK, see: David F. Labaree, Someone Has to Fail: The zero-
sum game of public schooling (2010) Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass at loc 10: “We Americans 
have long pinned our hopes on education. It’s the main way we try to express our ideals and solve our 
problems. … So we assign these social missions to schools, and educators gamely agree to carry them out. 
When the school system inevitably fails to produce the desired results, we ask reformers to fix it. … The system 
never seems to work the way we want it to, but we never give up hope … just keep tinkering.”  
educational institutions. Alignment of the educational experience with the best interests of 
the learner and not the perceived needs of the legal services market is crucial. We can help 
the profession and the regulators, but we cannot do it by subsuming the interests of the 
students to the market. That would be unethical for educators and a very unstable 
foundation for the teaching and learning of ethics and professional values. 
Second, the Report notes11 but loses sight of the peculiar nature of ethics education as 
being more than cognitive or skills based. Ethics is primarily about behaviour rather than 
argumentation. The theory of ethics is not ethics. Indeed there is a risk that teaching theory 
of ethics enables the unethical learner to develop powers of rationalisation that facilitate 
unethical behaviour: 
“I remember one CEO who told me that while interviewing a recent MBA graduate for a 
job, he asked the man whether he had taken a course in business ethics. When the 
interviewee answered yes, the CEO asked him what he had learned. The job candidate 
explained that he had learned about all the models of ethical analysis – deontology, 
virtue ethics, consequentialism, and so on – and that whenever he encountered a 
conflict, he could decide what he wanted to do and then select the model of ethical 
reasoning that would best support his choice.” 12 
If one reviews the recommendations and proposal quoted above the LETR Report seems to 
have reverted to a cognitive approach to ethics demanding: “outcomes that advance an 
awareness and understanding”. This is in part because the Report deals with “integration” 
as a separate aspect of educational endeavour to ethics and values.13 However, the best 
contender for an educational intervention that is integrative in the required sense is an 
ethical or moral one concerned with both the values of the individual and those of the 
system. Indeed, this integrative role of ethics and considerations of values in legal education 
was emphasised by the recent Carnegie Report which developed the idea of three 
apprenticeships reflecting three dimensions of professional work: the intellectual or 
cognitive (thinking); expert practice (performing); identity (behaving). The Report expanded 
upon the general nature and content of the third apprenticeship: 
“The third apprenticeship, which we call the apprenticeship of identity and purpose, 
introduces students to the purposes and attitudes that are guided by the values for 
which the professional community is responsible … it also shares aspects of liberal 
education in attempting to provide a wide, ethically sensitive perspective … the 
essential goal … is to teach the skills and inclinations, along with the ethical standards, 
                                                          
11 LETR Report at: [4.65], [4.83] – [4.86],  
12 Mary Gentile, Giving Voice to Values: How to speak your mind when you know what’s right (2010) Yale 
University Press, New Haven, electronic edition, at loc. 103. 
13 LETR Report [4.76], Table 4.3 – five of the six classes of “competencies” have ethical components or would 
potentially be developed through ethical education, context is the odd one out.  
social roles, and responsibilities … it is the ethical-social apprenticeship through which 
the student’s professional self can be … explored and developed.” 14 
One purpose of this third apprenticeship is to carry out the integration of the intellectual 
and practical and identity aspects of legal education:  
“Because it directly addresses professional life in all its dimensions, the apprenticeship 
of identity and purpose is the natural site for integration.” 15 
In short one of the most exciting aspects of teaching ethics or making values central in legal 
education is the impact it can have upon the identity and sense of self being developed by 
the student learner. But in this the cognitive aspect of ethical teaching is not primary, it 
serves the greater purpose. It is from such an understanding of ethics as being about 
behaviour not words that the legal educator can most effectively serve the felt needs of the 
legal practitioners and the legal regulators. This aspect of ethical education causes one point 
of friction with outcomes based assessment practice: the possibility of an authentic metric 
seems deeply problematic.  
The issue is whether future behaviour will be affected by ethical education and training. The 
answer is unknowable until the circumstances that test the question arise. In this area 
therefore, the better approach is sometimes to demand experience with the processes 
involved in ethical education: such as dilemma argument; or exposure to powerful role 
models; or opportunities to engage in service activities; or exposure to material on diversity 
that counteracts common negative stereo-types. One can assess for engagement (presence 
and completion of tasks), and understanding (explaining the theory or substantive content 
of taught materials and application of the same), and even perceptual sensitivity (can 
students see issues raised by representing a buyer and seller in the same transaction). In an 
experiential setting, such as a clinic, the reflective practice method of teaching and 
assessment offers scope for a somewhat more realistic assessment of such qualities. But 
even this is a poor proxy for the real issue – how the student will act in the future in an 
unsupervised environment under the pressures of life. Essentially a key aim of ethical 
education that cannot be assessed is the internalisation of ethical standards into the self-
identity of the student, and it is not only futile to try and assess this outcome directly but 
also intrusive. Educationally it fails to respect student autonomy sufficiently, and 
professionally it substitutes a passive compliance for a critical and sincere internalisation of 
professional ethics and identity. 
                                                          
14 William M, Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch Wegner, Lloyd Bond, Lee S. Shulman Educating Lawyers: 
Preparation for the Profession of Law (2007) Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, CA, at p. 28, loc. 430-439. 
15Ibid. at p. 196, loc.  2773. See also at p. 14, loc. 263 : “The third element of the framework – professional 
identity – joins the first two elements and is, we believe, the catalyst of an integrated legal education. The 
third element of our framework for legal education, which is sometimes described as professionalism, social 
responsibility, or ethics, draws to the foreground the purposes of the profession and formation of the identity 
of lawyers guided by those purposes.” 
Undergraduate students value highly the personal development they experience at 
University. The SOMUL project termed this the “identity-projects” of the students.16 This 
usage echoes the terminology of Giddens who argued that modernity imposes a project on 
individuals, because ascribed roles and identities are inadequate outside of traditional social 
orders, modern life does not produce unchanging cycles of life and ascribed role identity. 
Who we are becomes a problem we have to deal with, self-awareness and social instability 
means that: 
“Self-identity today is a reflexive achievement. The narrative of self-identity has 
to be shaped, altered and reflexively sustained in relation to rapidly changing 
circumstance of social life.” 17 
Identity is not singular, we can have numerous identities that play a role in our life 
narrative.18 One potentially important identity is professional, and as Peter Birks remarked: 
 “A law school fails in its teaching if it does not give its graduates the opportunity to 
make a moral commitment to their subject and through their subject to the public 
good.” 19 
In other words undergraduate students need to decide who they are, they are aware of this 
process of becoming, and consider University to be valuable because it is a time and place 
they can use to pursue this need. In the words of the report on the SOMUL project: 
“not everyone experiences major personal change as a result of going to university. But 
most do.” 20 
This need generates a duty in legal educators to try and support the students in this process 
of constructing identities for themselves. To be clear: the students will act in any event, and 
we have no warrant to try to impose an identity upon the students; hence, the great care 
needed to identify the correct perspective of the educator as opposed to the regulator. 
However, we can facilitate without imposing, and to do nothing in the name of neutrality is 
actually a failure on our part: 
 “to give people a conceptual vocabulary is to influence them; but to deprive them of it 
is to cripple them, not to empower them.” 21 
                                                          
16 John Brennan, Robert Edmunds, Muir Houston, David Jary, Yann Lebeau, Michael Osborne and John T.E. 
Richardson, Improving What is Learned at University: An exploration of the social and organisational diversity 
of university education (2010) Abingdon: Routledge 
17 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (1991) Polity, 
Cambridge, at p. 215. 
18 Amartya Sen, Identity & Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (2006) Penguin, London. 
19 Peter Birks in Peter Birks (ed) (1996) What Are Law Schools For? Oxford University Press, Oxford at xiv: 
20 Op. Cit n. 13 at pp.155-156. 
21 Kwame Anthony Appiah (2005) The Ethics of Identity, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ at loc. 1067. 
 One identity we should offer is surely that of a legal professional, we should facilitate and 
make meaningful the possibility of law students making “a moral commitment to their 
subject”. We can do this through giving the students a conceptual vocabulary, and it is a 
conceptual vocabulary drawn from ethics and value discourse. However, a conceptual 
vocabulary is not enough, and it would be better if we also helped them develop awareness, 
the ability to reason critically and validly, courage, and effective strategies for action in 
accordance with their beliefs. Such learning opportunities can help them to integrate their 
experiences, and to make a moral commitment, and to forge an integrated professional 
identity, if they so choose.  
A very summary account of ethical education and another caution around assessment 
There is more than one model of the causative factors that underlie ethical action,22 but one 
that has proved robust and been influential in professional education was developed by 
Rest. In his own words: 
“My view of the major determinants of moral behaviour (the Four Component Model) 
came to be formulated while I was doing a general review of the morality literature … 
the Four Component Model starts with the question, ‘What must we suppose happens 
psychologically in order for moral behaviour to take place?’ We wind up with at least 
four distinct processes.” 23 
The components are: sensitivity – awareness of an ethical issue raised by a situation; 
judgment – the ability to reason correctly about the nature of the ethical issues and to 
identify what an ethical response would be; motivation – wanting to act ethically having 
decided what that would entail; character – the ability to act ethically. The first is about 
perception, which may require sensitivity or empathy, it often requires emotional or social 
intelligence. The second is about cognition and reasoning, there is an influential theory, 
associated with Kohlberg, that moral reasoning is developmental in nature, and that 
undeveloped people simply cannot understand certain types of ethical argument. The third 
is about what one cares about, what one values, which may involve an internalisation of 
values undertaken as part of an identity project. The final component is about courage in 
the face of possible disapproval or opposition and feelings of efficacy. All four of these 
components need to be present for effective ethical action. 
The four component model is useful for educators because it identifies attributes of the 
individual learner that might benefit from informed educational practice. It breaks down the 
otherwise intractable problem of inculcating ethical character into tractable steps. It also 
brings home the other reason why outcome based educational practice can be dangerous in 
                                                          
22 For a model that seeks to explore situational rather than only individualistic factors see:  Richard Moorhead, 
Victoria Hinchly, Christine Parker, David Kershaw, and Soren Holm, Designing Ethics Indicators for Legal 
Services Provision (2012). 
23 James R. Rest and Darcia Narvaez, Moral Development in the Profession: Psychology and Applied Ethics 
(1994) Laurence Erlbaum Associates Inc, Hillsdale, NJ at p. 22. 
ethical education. As well as the artificiality of proxies for ethical character the nature of the 
values adopted (component two and three) is subject to legitimate and radical difference of 
opinion. To try and assess in this sphere (with allowance for less freedom of legitimate 
opinion in the sphere of ethical conduct governed by professional codes) becomes a 
politically divisive conformity test.  
It has been shown that one can cheat the Defining Issues Test for moral reasoning,24 and 
use of the test in education and training would have little effect other than destroying the 
usefulness of the test. However, even if such a form of assessment were practicable the 
Kohlberg stages have been criticised because they allegedly reflect political preferences.25 
Unquestionably at the undergraduate stage of legal education any assessment regime must 
respect value differences expressed by students. We must facilitate the identity projects of 
students rather than trying to co-opt them for the purposes of the profession, or regulators, 
or even the legal system. We must put our confidence in the inherent persuasiveness of the 
values we espouse and resist the temptation to try and impose them through assessment. 
In the words of Derek Bok: 
“It is not the place of faculty members to prescribe what undergraduates ought to 
consider virtuous. But surely faculties should do whatever they can to prepare their 
students to arrive at thoughtful judgments of their own” 26 
Although we might also hope to help our students to become sensitive to ethical issues in 
daily life, and effective moral actors, the emphasis Bok places on student autonomy seems 
correct. In the undergraduate context the ethics of professional service are ones we should 
offer up for consideration, critical reflection, and adoption.  
Conclusions 
Recommendation 10 of the LETR Report calls for a review of the undergraduate qualifying 
law degree and Graduate Diploma in Law and Recommendation 11 states: 
 “There should be a distinct assessment of legal research, writing and critical thinking 
skills at level 5 or above in the Qualifying Law Degree and in the Graduate Diploma in 
Law ...” 
                                                          
24 See: Nicholas Emler and Bernadette Malone, The Relationship Between Moral Reasoning and Political 
Orientation (1983) 45 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1073; Nicholas Emler and Emma Palmer-
Canton, Politics, moral reasoning and the Defining Interest Test: A reply to Barnett et al (1995) (1998) 37 British 
Journal of Social Psychology 457. These studies suggest that even a conscientious annual redrafting of the 
actual questions asked in the DIT would not be effective. The problem is the student is undertaking the test 
with a purpose (passing well) that is not conducive to the test functioning properly. 
25 See in addition to the articles cited above: Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and 
Women’s Development (1990) Harvard University Press; Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development 
Through Experiential Teaching (1995) 1 Clinical Law Review 505. 
26 Derek C. Bok (2006) Our Underachieving Colleges: A Candid Look at How Much Students Learn and Why  they  
Should be Learning More, Princeton University Press, at p. 150. 
This recommendation can be met thorough ethically informed teaching. At Nottingham Law 
School our final year Critical Legal Thinking module combines an ethical and value informed 
curriculum with assessment of the rigour and soundness of students’ critical thinking, 
research skills, and writing skills.27 One way of generating an appropriate set of learning 
outcomes can be through such courses. More generally there is a need to identify what a 
review of the QLD informed by the LETR Report offers, and to chart some predictable 
hazards to the successful navigation of any such review. 
The emphasis on values and ethics and professionalism is an opportunity. As already noted 
recommendations 6 and 7 call for learning outcomes that encompass ethics and values and 
professionalism. Ethical reasoning is pre-eminently critical thinking, and links to 
recommendation 11. Academic providers should regard these recommendations in a 
positive light because they can be used to help students in their identity projects. Thus, the 
argument is that there is a concurrent interest in academic ethics and professional ethics in 
facilitating and supporting the identity-project of each of our students.  
At the same time there is a clear risk or hazard in giving greater emphasis to values and 
taking an interest in the identity-projects of students. We must be careful of what we 
attempt to assess, and accept non-assessable outcomes probably best prescribed (if at all) 
by the observable levels of provision and engagement; and to deny ourselves the power to 
determine which internalised values are the right ones for students to adopt.  
Ethics and values can be taught anywhere in a curriculum: in jurisprudence; or in clinical 
legal education; or in traditional foundation subjects; or optional modules; or specialist 
ethics modules; or in keystone research dissertations. Moral reasoning seems to be 
enhanced by discussion of dilemmas and elaboration of the circumstances of particular 
cases. These features of casuistic reasoning are familiar from case law. Indeed value 
discourse is naturally adaptable to signature pedagogies of legal education. It would seem 
that a values approach would be welcome to legal academics, as it offers a way to enrich the 
very pedagogies we have developed in practice over time. Peter Birks identified one source 
of hesitation: 
“This is difficult because of the proximity of propaganda and indoctrination.”28 
This concern has been addressed above. A concern that ethical education will be no more 
than teaching the codes of professional conduct has also been implicitly rejected above.29 In 
short that would not be appropriate at undergraduate levels. 
                                                          
27 This potential for combining value discourse with jurisprudence was also noted in : Seow Hon Tan, Teaching 
Legal Ideals Through Jurisprudence (2009) 43 The Law Teacher 14. 
28 Peter Birks in Peter Birks (ed) (1996) What Are Law Schools For? Oxford University Press, Oxford at xiv. 
29 For an incisive critical account of such a model see: William H. Simon, The Trouble With Legal Ethics (1991) 
41 Journal of Legal Education 65. 
There seems to be another cause for concern: that values or ethics are soft and not capable 
of rigorous analytical treatment. Possibly some legal academics believe that the law has to 
be freed from the subjective and contested field of values in order to be teachable as law. 
Philippa Foot said:  
“[Q] But people think that sometimes there is a difficulty reconciling morality with 
rationality. 
[PF]They do, but I believe it is a mistake to think you’ve got an independent idea of 
rationality; that there is one idea of rationality and one idea of morality and somehow 
you have to reconcile them. They’re not separate. From the beginning, if you like, 
morality leads rationality and not the other way round.” 30 
Reflection and teaching about values and ethics and professional practice are not a 
distraction from the business of legal education: rather, they are its most effective vehicle. 
In the words of the Carnegie Report:  
“A more effective way to teach is to keep the analytical and the moral, the procedural 
and the substantive in dialogue throughout the process of learning the law.” 31 
Hopefully the forthcoming review of the law degree will enable this potential to be realised 
and put into practice across the higher education sector. 
                                                          
30 Philippa Foot interview in 2001 published in 2013 Sept/Oct issue of Philosophy Now. 
31 Op. Cit  n. 11 at p. 142 Loc. 2021 
CHAPTER 1  
THE VALUES OF LEGAL EDUCATORS 
 
This book is a book about the uses of values in legal education. The primary concern is with legal education as an 
educative enterprise. This leads to a focus upon the development of the student of law.  The first value articulated, 
and indeed endorsed, is that educational practice should be aligned with the interests of the law student first and 
foremost. Therefore, the focus of this book is the impact of legal education upon the law student.  
An alternative approach to legal education is to make alignment with the demands of the profession or society the 
primary task of legal education:1 
‘American society has become more dependent on the legal profession for its functioning than ever before. 
Americans, therefore, have ever more reason to take an interest in the legal profession and, we believe, in 
how lawyers are prepared for their important public responsibilities.’ 
‘What sets these courses apart from the art-and-sciences experience is precisely their context: law school 
as apprenticeship to the profession of law.’ 
 ‘… the common aim of all professional education: specialised knowledge and professional identity.’ 
We will return to competing ideals for legal education below. For now it is sufficient to note that this view comes 
from North America where law school delivers a three-year full-time post-graduate programme, and there is no 
further professional stage (such as the Legal Practice Course or the Bar Professional Training Course) nor any 
compulsory work based apprenticeship stage (such as the Training Contract or Pupillage).  
Although this book has wider concerns than just the undergraduate law degree (the LLB) in the UK, and freely 
uses evidence from other sources, the undergraduate degree is the institutional background to the book. This is 
because it is the area where the author has most experience. Therefore, the default law student is an undergraduate 
at a British university reading for a degree in law.  
The value of alignment advanced here is not empty, and could be contested, as indeed it is by some concerned 
with professional education specifically. We know that not all educational systems have had the best interests of 
the students in mind. The segregated system of education provided for African-Americans and castigated by Carter 
G Woodson was one notorious example of such misalignment.2 Some critics of contemporary legal education in 
the common law world make a similar damning accusation of misalignment with reference to the structure and 
practice of legal education.3  Therefore, it is quite important to start out in a book about values in legal education 
with the identification and assertion of this value for academic and educational practice. 
Assertion of this value does not entail the denial of other important interests that need to be considered in the 
context of legal education. We have noticed already that the public importance of professional education leads 
some to make a concern with professional apprenticeship the primary value for legal education.4 Obviously, legal 
education is a commercial enterprise, as is higher education in general.5 Obviously, legal education plays a role in 
the reproduction of social hierarchies and what has been termed the ‘legitimation of domination’,6 or a related 
idea, or perhaps the same idea more prosaically expressed: ‘individual status attainment’.7 Obviously, legal 
                                                          
1 W.M. SULLIVAN, A. COLBY, J.W. WEGNER, L. BOND and L.S. SHULMAN, Educating Lawyers - Preparation for the Profession 
of Law Jossey-Bass, San Francisco CA 2007, loc. 81, loc. 109, and loc. 111 
2 C.G. WOODSON, The Mis-Education of the Negro, Wilder Publications, Blacksburg VA 2008, p. 8: ‘The thought of the inferiority of the 
Negro is drilled into him in almost every class he enters and in almost every book he studies.’ 
3 B.Z. TAMANAHA, Failing Law Schools University of Chicago Press, Chicago IL 2012, at locs. 3253-54 and 3295-97 calls for reform in 
order to align the interests of Law Schools as educational providers with the interests of law students. 
4 W.M. SULLIVAN, A. COLBY, J.W. WEGNER, L. BOND and L.S. SHULMAN, above n. 1. 
5 D.C. BOK, Universities in the Market Place - The Commercialization of Higher Education, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 2003.  
6 P. BOURDIEU, The State Nobility – Elite Schools in the Field of Power, L.C. CLOUGH (tr.), Polity Press, Cambridge 1996, p. 5 
7 D.F. LABAREE, ‘The American Struggle Over Educational Goals’ in D.F. LABAREE, Education, Markets, and the Public Good, 
Routledge, Abingdon 2007, p. 98 
 
education has to be aware of the legal profession.8 Obviously, the state of legal education will have an impact upon 
the state of the legal system.9 Obviously, the understandings of lawyers, academics, and others who have had 
contact with legal education will impact upon the quality of our legal culture.10 Obviously, legal education will 
have an impact upon lay understanding of the law.11 Obviously, legal research may be useful for the legal system, 
the political system, the ethical culture of society, the economic system, our understanding of co-ordination 
problems, our understanding of language games and human culture.12 Legal education does not take place in a 
vacuum and it is not a simple enterprise. Any account that is blind to the myriad influences upon legal education 
risks becoming a caricature of the reality of practice.  
Therefore, a second value position is necessary for this book to take, a view of this cacophony of voices demanding 
attention. The viewpoint adopted is one of value pluralism, and thus, there will be no claim to identification of a 
principle that can impose a stable hierarchy upon these potentially conflicting demands upon legal education. 
Rather, it is argued that discourse about values is undermined by assertion of a single value as the ultimate, or true, 
or unifying, or overarching, or best value. The alignment of educational practice with the interests of the student 
cannot be the sole value that is given regard when thinking about legal education. However, what is asserted is 
that it is the right value to start with when considering what legal education should be, and a necessary value to 
use when evaluating educational practice. We will return to pluralism below. It is first necessary to more fully 
articulate, and defend the importance and coherence of, a value of alignment of educational practice with the 
interests of the law student. 
It is necessary to be careful and modest when thinking about alignment of educational practice with the interests 
of students. Modest because it must be recognised that educational practice cannot be relied upon to transform 
social practice. Careful, as the assertion of this value hides the problem of knowing what the interests of students 
might be. Thus, we can only try to align our practice to what we have reason to think is in the interests of students. 
It is due to this fact that it is sensible to try and shift as much power to innovate and direct the educational process 
to students as is proper. Nor can we realistically expect to make larger changes in social practice, even if convinced 
that such change would be in the interests of our students. Indeed, often we may find we are fighting a rearguard 
action to defend what we can of their interests from pressures from the multifarious social forces that impact upon 
legal education. However, there is an ubiquitous perspective on these issues that must be noticed: that we should 
allow consumer choice to determine what students interests are thus acting in a way consonant with the 
contemporary zeitgeist.  This topic demands a fuller treatment than can be accommodated in this chapter. The 
impossibility and undesirability of shifting the task of identifying student interests onto the market is demonstrated 
in chapter 2.  
The critical account of consumerism here, and later, is deliberately restricted in scope because of the need for 
realism in establishing aims and ambitions for educational reform. There is no implicit programme for the 
overthrow of the ideology of the market embedded in this work. Legal education cannot cure the ills of the legal 
services market, or of the growing problems around access to justice generated by austerity politics, or the ethical 
                                                          
8 Although details differ across jurisdictions it seems there are always both cultural and institutional links. In the UK the Bar and the Law 
Society have prescribed certain content for a Qualifying Law Degree.  
9 There is a reasonable, if usually unexamined, assumption that legal education will have an effect upon those who go on into legal practice. 
An example: ‘LETR is required to ensure that the future system of legal education and training will be effective and efficient in preparing 
legal service providers to meet the needs of consumers.’ <letr.org.uk> accessed 16.04.2013. 
10 The importance of legal education for general legal culture is oddly underemphasised in academic and regulatory commentary. However, it 
was given attention by Blackstone in his landmark work see: W. BLACKSTONE, ‘On The Study of The Law’ in Commentaries on the Laws 
of England, vol. 1, Oxford 1765-9, <www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone> accessed 16.04.2013. A contemporary awareness of the importance 
of the issue is shown in C.A. MACKINNON, ‘Mainstreaming Feminism in Legal Education’ (2003) 53 Journal of Legal Education 199. 
11 I am unaware of any study of the portrayal of legal education in the mass media, or of public perceptions of legal education, rather than of 
legal practice. A fascinating indication of what such studies might reveal is provided by A. SARAT and S. SCHEINGOLD, The Cultural 
Lives of Cause Lawyers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008.  
12 Law is still a site of dispute over the nature of its research mission: see M. VAN HOEKE, ‘Preface’ in M. VAN HOEKE (ed.), Methodologies 
of Legal Research - Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline, Hart, Oxford 2011, loc. 113: ‘Legal scholarship is torn between 
grasping as much as possible the expanding reality of law and its context, on the one hand, and reducing this complex whole to manageable 
proportions, on the other. In the latter case …, law is largely cut loose from its context, and societal problems are exclusively worded as “legal 
problems” … As a reaction, many attempts have been made, from the nineteenth century onwards, to broaden legal doctrine, or to conceive it 
differently. Adding a social science dimension or a comparative dimension … the question then becomes one of demarcating the borders of 
legal science …’: Contrast the self-assurance of P. BIRKS in P. BIRKS (ed.), What Are Law Schools For?, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
1996, p. viii: ‘For the law schools are discharging a public function essential to a modern democracy. It is a law making function, continually 
directed to the improvement of the law and to the underpinning of its authority or, perhaps the more suitable word in a modern society, its 
legitimacy. The law schools are the guardians of the law in the interests of the public.’  
 
challenges facing our students whether they go into the legal profession or not. Kurt Lewin caught the point with 
his gift for pithy statement:13 
‘It seems to be easier for society to change education than for education to change society.’ 
Legal education is a part of the educational system and the entire system is subject to forces quite beyond it to 
resist. Lewin had in mind the radical and traumatic impact of the Nazification of Germany including education. 
Lewin wrote of an ‘authoritarian style’ of social life as typified by Germany in the 1930s. He contrasted this with 
a ‘democratic style’ as typified by the United States to which he had emigrated. These contrasting models were 
far more clearly demarcated than those facing higher education today. Even so the increasing influence of market 
models for collective action, including for the design and provision of higher education, raises real and increasing 
concerns about the respect given to educational values within educational institutions. To quote Derek Bok:14 
‘By trying so hard to acquire more money for their work, universities may compromise values that are 
essential to the continued confidence and loyalty of faculty, students, alumni, and even the general public.’ 
And that is the view from Harvard University. 
In short we cannot hope to be socially transformative agents in our educational practice. The rejection of 
consumerism as a panacea for the problems of legal education is not a battle cry against the modern zeitgeist. Nor 
is it a call for an insulated or inward looking model of legal education. What is important is to understand what 
market forces can, and what they cannot, achieve. All institutions of higher education face external demands, and 
we will find Lewin’s observation as true today as in the 1930s. However, that academics and institutions of higher 
education are ships upon a great ocean does not mean they cannot steer, nor that they cannot have a mission of 
real significance to perform. We are subject to forces outside our control but we are not out of control unless we 
relinquish those means of navigation available to us. 
To quote Lewin once again, in the same article:15 
‘Education tends to develop certain types of behaviour, certain types of attitudes in the children or other 
persons with whom it deals. The kind of behaviour and the attitude it tries to develop, and the means it uses, 
are not merely determined by abstract philosophy or scientifically developed methods, but are essentially a 
result of the sociological properties of the group in which this education occurs. In considering the effect 
of the social group on the educational system, one generally thinks of the ideals, principles, and attitudes 
which are common within this group. Indeed, ideals and principles play an important part in education. But 
one will have to distinguish the ideals and principles which are officially recognized from those rules which 
in reality determine the events in this social group. Education depends on the real state of the social group 
in which it occurs.’ 
In our contemporary setting Lewin forces us to consider how much responsibility should be given to consumer 
choice, or market demand, in reforming legal education. The idea of consumer choice is a powerful ideal or attitude 
at work in modern society. If this ideology is not reflected upon it becomes a default position. It influences formal 
reform proposals, and those relying upon it have a rhetorical vocabulary of liberation from conservatism, 
paternalism, and outworn educational traditions they can deploy. When we consider ‘the rules which in reality 
determine’ conduct it also plays a role, that the student chose to purchase something is a readymade justification 
for a practice.  Finally, it removes the need to engage in protracted discourse about values because it substitutes 
the values of the student for those of the educator. And in the ideology of consumerism the customer is always 
right. 
Consumer choice is a powerful value in modern thinking. It serves as a means to give people what they want.  If 
students can be given choice, it might be argued, then they will demand through market processes the legal 
education that they want, and what they want is the best measure of what they need. There are a host of objections 
that could be made to this approach that are informed by the interests, perspectives, and associated values that Bok 
identified in the quotation above. Further, there are practical and theoretical objections to attempts to establish a 
                                                          
13 K. LEWIN, ‘Some Social-Psychological Differences Between the United States and Germany’ (1936) in Resolving Social Conflicts and 
Field Theory in Social Science, American Psychological Association, Washington DC 1997.  
14 D.C. BOK, above n. 5. 
15 K. LEWIN, above n. 13.  
consumer market in legal educational services. Finally, there are questions of principle and policy around the 
finance of legal education. However, all of these more general questions and arguments are not the subject matter 
of this book. The primary relevance of consumerism for this book is whether the achievement of alignment being 
advanced as a primary value for educational practice can be met through consumer choice. The illusory and self-
defeating nature of attempts to identify the best interests of students through consumer choice is explored in chapter 
2. The chapter focuses narrowly on why consumer choice cannot play the required roles of identification and 
alignment of student interests with legal education. 
 
1. ALIGNING WITH THE INTERESTS OF LAW STUDENTS  
 
If we reject a consumerist ideology then we have to try to bring into alignment educational practice and student 
interests through other means. To some extent the remainder of this book is an extended essay on how this might 
be accomplished. Chapter 3 examines what values students should be encouraged to endorse and internalise. It is 
argued that the proposed practice is aligned with the interests of students. However, there are some general values 
that should inform the practice of legal educators, and the remainder of this chapter is devoted to a consideration 
of these values. Specifically, the chapter argues that legal educators: should try to do no harm to the welfare of law 
students; should supports student autonomy by taking a pluralist stance towards value conflicts; should encourage 
law students to reflect upon what they care about, and to spend some time thinking about their own values, and 
offer support for this process; should try to enhance the capabilities of law students; should promote sound 
reasoning and clear expression; should try and promote an interest in the seeking of the truth in students; and 
should include students into the community of scholarship to the fullest extent practicable. There is reason to 
suppose that each of these educational aims is in the interest of law students. However, the general approach is not 
an attempt to enumerate what is in the best interests of students, but to try and discover what is in the interests of 
students through educational practice. 
There is an emphasis on the importance of the first value: that we should seek to do no harm. This is in part because 
it was the realisation that the risk of harm was real that led to the author’s engagement with the problems of legal 
education as a topic of research. Therefore, it was a crucial stage in the process that led to this book. This is in part 
because it is research into legal education and student well-being that firmly closes the door to any argument that 
paternalism offers an alternative to consumerism as a source of the knowledge necessary to align students’ interests 
with legal education. The evidence that demands a rejection of a paternalism based on academic expertise is 
reviewed in chapter 2, following the explanation of why consumerism must be rejected as a source of the same 
knowledge. In effect chapter 2 is the chapter of shadow values, those values or approaches to legal education that 
are rejected by adoption of the values and vision of legal education that this book advocates. Putting these shadow 
values in a separate chapter allows for an account of the positive values that inform the book and the academic 
practice it advocates. 
 
 DO NO HARM 
 
There is evidence to suggest that legal education can have a harmful effect upon the self-reported welfare and 
mental health of law students. To be clear there is evidence that legal education is harmful to some law students. 
We delay a review of the research evidence until chapter 2, but the anecdotal evidence that inspired the author to 
focus upon the problems of legal education is recounted here. 
The author first became interested in the possible importance of values in legal education after noticing the high 
levels of personal distress being shown by law students in his law school. The pastoral advisor employed by the 
law school indicated that she saw almost one in four of our very substantial intake of students over the three years 
of study. Given the reluctance many people feel about admitting the need for help and support, and alternative 
sources of support both official and unofficial, this suggested that even higher levels of difficulty or distress existed 
in the student body.  It suggested that some need for support was more or less normal for our students. As these 
are law students they are among the most academically successful young people admitted to our institution. 
This appeared paradoxical, and was a genuine surprise. I felt my relationships with the students were good, and 
friendly, and that I was generally trying to be supportive. Student feedback, both formal and informal, suggested 
I was well liked and that the students felt my teaching was interesting. At this time in my career I was lecturing to 
a whole year group of first years in the second term and a whole year group of third- or final-year students in the 
first term. It was hard to believe that I could be missing the indications of such widespread distress. Note that those 
most alienated were not attending classes at the institution, and were seeing neither the pastoral advisor nor myself. 
These students would form the bulk of the depressing first year tail of fails, some of whom would never progress 
into the second year. 
Reflection confirmed some indications were present that all was not well. I would attend the induction week 
activities and meet enthusiastic and excited young people thrilled to be studying law. By week three, when small 
group teaching begun, these same first-year students had changed in demeanour, and were hesitant, anxious, and 
socially lacking in confidence. I had joked about ‘what we do to them’ to quench that enthusiasm so quickly at the 
start of their legal education, but had not seriously thought we might be harming them.  
My personal tutees started telling me about humiliating interactions and difficulties in communicating with some 
of my colleagues, especially during small group teaching. I had not realised that I had managed to stop them doing 
so in the past. I simply started asking in personal appointments with personal tutees: ‘How are your small groups 
going - are you finding them useful?’ 
I began to notice and worry about inconsequential remarks between colleagues about how hopeless students were 
nowadays. I noticed how often colleagues took what I call a schoolmarm attitude to students, not unkind, but not 
respectful. It could be termed a paternalistic attitude, but it seemed to me to verge on a patronising attitude. 
I asked the pastoral advisor why the students she was seeing had wanted to study law. I thought their sense of 
alienation may be due to their misplaced and unrealistic expectations about law and legal education. She told me 
they had wanted to be able to earn a living, but mostly that they had wanted to do good in their work life.16 They 
wanted to help people. Shameful to admit, I was stunned by this revelation. I had shared in the common belief 
amongst legal academics that modern students are driven by instrumental concerns towards study and the law, 
motivated by the promise of money and the need to get through the assessment with as little trouble as necessary.17 
I asked some colleagues what they remembered about their days as law students. The clearest answer was: ‘being 
told what I thought did not matter, and might be tolerated, but was not important for legal education’. I asked the 
pastoral advisor what she thought was at the root of the unhappiness she was dealing with. She thought the students 
felt that they had little to offer. They were trying but not sure why they were doing what they were doing, and they 
were feeling very insecure. They generally assumed any fault was their own, and not that of the institution. 
Perhaps the students had entered into a course of study which they thought was informed by the importance of 
right and wrong. Once committed to this study they were told that their views of what was right and what was 
wrong were irrelevant to their study. They were told to identify why the judge had decided the case the way he 
had (almost invariably it was a he), to identify the legal issue. Suddenly all those jokes I used, to illustrate why 
law was not for the faint-hearted and that it was not justice but the letter of the law that we were concerned with, 
felt misplaced. Perhaps I had been interpreted as displaying a cynicism towards right and wrong that had left my 
                                                          
16 The danger of assuming students are motivated by a desire to achieve material success seems to be widespread. From the USA: ‘As one 
student said, “I wish the faculty had a more diverse idea about what success in the law is. There seems to be one version of success in the law 
where you go to this big firm and the firm owns your soul for the rest of your life and that’s success. It is unlike other professions where you 
are shown the alternatives.” This comment was echoed by students on virtually all the campuses we visited, and many expressed their sense of 
vulnerability to the pressure.’ W.M. SULLIVAN, A. COLBY, J.W. WEGNER, L. BOND and L.S. SHULMAN, above n. 1, p. 150, loc. 
2130. For an awareness of the importance of giving space in legal education for students to commit to idealistic ends in the UK see: P. BIRKS 
in P. BIRKS (ed), above n. 12, xiv: ‘The next matter which takes time is idealism. … A law school fails in its teaching if it does not give its 
graduates the opportunity to make a moral commitment to their subject and through their subject to the public good.’ 
17 My assumption, that students were more interested in getting qualified and into well-paid work than in getting educated and helping clients, 
was probably symptomatic of my unreflective beliefs around motivation; for my informed position see chapter 4 below. The mis-ascription of 
material motivations to others by those in authority seems to be common: A. KOHN, Punished by Rewards - The Trouble with Gold Stars, 
Incentive Plans, A’s, Praise, and Other Bribes, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York NY 2000, p. 130: ‘Several studies over the last few 
decades have found that when people are asked to guess what matters to their co-workers – or in the case of managers, to their subordinates – 
they assume money is at the top of the list. But put the question directly – “What do you care about?” – and the results look very different, To 
wit: When samples of industrial employees in 1946 and 1986 were asked what they looked for in a job, they ranked “good wages” fifth out of 
ten possible factors. In the more recent survey, “interesting work” was number one. Supervisors, however, assumed workers cared most about 
money’.  
 
students emotionally bruised and confused.18  Perhaps my well-meant, worldly-wise advice19 - to attend to the text 
of the law, to authority, to the detail, to the procedure, my attempt to help them identify the elements of the legal 
craft - was making my students fall into confusion.20 
If we take alignment of educational practice with the best interests of students as the primary value for legal 
academics at undergraduate level then the possibility of harming students through our educational practice raises 
two issues. First, the presence of such harm in practice wholly undermines any claim to an expertise capable of 
informing a valid paternalistic identification of the best interests of students. Doing no harm is a minimal ethical 
requirement for an ethic of alignment with the best interests of students.  The relevant evidence is considered below 
(in chapter 2) in an exploration of why we cannot rely upon academic expertise to identify the best interests of 
students under a paternalistic model of educational practice. Second, it makes reflection upon whether we can 
avoid student harm, or the avoidable risk of harm, an ethical priority. It makes further reflection on the nature, 
purpose, and practice of legal education an ethical priority for legal academics. It is this concern that informs the 
rest of this chapter. The issues are important because the positions arrived at directly affect the experience of 
students in legal education. 
 
 PLURALISM AND AUTONOMY 
It seems clear that the studies on student distress and legal education rule out any comfortable assumption that 
educational institutions and academics know best, and that students should put their trust in their law schools. If 
we seek a source of knowledge about what is in students’ best interests we must reject consumerism, and, the 
evidence demands, we also reject paternalism, at least in legal education. Legal educators have not known what is 
in the best interests of law students, or knowing the same have not acted upon the knowledge. If the consumerism 
or paternalism choice were a true dilemma we would be in trouble. However, it is not a true dilemma and we have 
a clear third option: the support of student autonomy in the context of an expressly pluralist understanding of 
human values. 
In the context of considering what values should inform academic and institutional practice, pluralism and the 
encouragement of student autonomy are closely linked concepts. Pluralism as a working belief rejects any notion 
that academics have access to the truth about what constitutes the good. This is because pluralism insists that there 
are different goods that are incommensurable and inconsistent. There are only goods and not any one Good.21 In 
light of this the educationally crucial task for the student is to think about, reflect upon, and choose what goods 
she should seek. This is effectively a description of acting autonomously.22 In the words of Derek Bok:23 
                                                          
18 There is some evidence, beyond the professional experience of myself, my colleagues, and our pastoral advisor, that law students feel they 
are being taught it is wrong to have ethical responses, to feel involved with the law, and legal process, and social justice, from the investigation 
of US Law Schools. ‘Many in our focus groups expressed this sort of confusion about what they feared were the implications of this 
dispassionate perspective for the nature of their roles as lawyers, diminishing their hopes that they might serve substantive goods in their 
careers.’ W.M. SULLIVAN, A. COLBY, J.W. WEGNER, L. BOND and L.S. SHULMAN, above n. 1, p. 141, loc. 2006. 
19 Well meant but not thought through. There is a need to distance oneself from the facts and establish legal criteria of relevance and importance. 
However, merely establishing distance is not enough: ‘They are warned not to let their moral concerns or compassion for the people in the 
cases they discuss cloud their legal analysis. This warning does help students escape the grip of misconceptions about how the law works in 
order to hone their analytical skills. But when the misconceptions are not addressed directly, students have no way of learning when and how 
their moral concerns may be relevant to their work as lawyers and when these concerns could throw them off track.’ W.M. SULLIVAN, A. 
COLBY, J.W. WEGNER, L. BOND and L.S. SHULMAN, above n. 1, p. 187, loc. 2657. 
20 I fear I was trying to induce ‘ethical anaesthesia’ or even ‘moral lobotomy’, terms coined to describe the general effects of the infamous first 
year of Law School in the USA. K.N. LLEWELLYN, The Bramble Bush (1951), Oceana Publications Inc., New York NY 1996, p. 116: ‘The 
hardest job of the first year is to lop off your common sense, knock your ethics into temporary anesthesia.’ W.M. SULLIVAN, A. COLBY, 
J.W. WEGNER, L. BOND and L.S. SHULMAN, above n. 1, loc. 1116:  ‘We certainly discovered that the same process is very much at 
work in today’s law schools. Faculty, like students, vary considerably as to how worrisome they find this “lopping” and “knocking,” this 
temporary moral lobotomy. However, virtually everyone with whom we spoke was aware that this process was a major facet of the case-
dialogue pedagogy of the first year.’ 
21 I. BERLIN, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’ in H. HARDY and R. HAUSHEER (eds.), I. BERLIN, The Crooked Timber of Humanity – An 
Anthology of Essays, Pimlico, London 2003, pp. 1-19. 
22 K.A. APPIAH, The Ethics of Identity, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 2005. 
23 D.C. BOK, Our Underachieving Colleges – A Candid Look at How Much Students Learn and Why They Should Be Learning More, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton NJ 2006, p. 150. 
 
‘It is not the place of faculty members to prescribe what undergraduates ought to consider virtuous. But 
surely faculties should do whatever they can to prepare their students to arrive at thoughtful judgments of 
their own.’ 
The suggestion is not to assume that students already know how they desire to live their lives (consumer choice) 
nor to assume that academics know how their students should live their lives (paternalism) but that the task of 
higher education is to support the students in making the best choices for themselves.  
Pluralism and autonomy as values for students will receive more attention in chapters 3, 8 and 9. Suffice it to say 
that they are being put forward as shared values for academics and educators as well as for students. 
 
2. TAKING OURSELVES SERIOUSLY: THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT  
 
Harry Frankfurt has written extensively on the rationality and importance of considering what is important to each 
of us – he argues that what we want to want is an important question for each individual.24 Such reflection is an 
important part of any fully autonomous life. It is a question that informs what Bernard Williams called ‘ground 
projects’.25 It informs what Giddens called ‘life politics’.26 The question of what one cares about does not have to 
be difficult or abstruse or intellectual. However, the question is difficult to talk about. What legal education can 
do is validate the desire to talk about the question, and provide a model discourse and vocabulary to help a student 
to articulate and reason about the question successfully. 
We can offer aid to the student who is trying to decide what he cares about. Such does not need to be directive. 
However, the classic legal educational response of inducing moral anaesthesia or even moral lobotomy is deeply 
unhelpful.27 What would be more helpful is a way to talk about the question. In the words of Appiah:28 
‘[T]o give people a conceptual vocabulary is to influence them; but to deprive them of it is to cripple them, 
not to empower them.’ 
If we accept that education is transformative, as is argued in this book, then it must impact upon the future self-
identity of the student. If we accept, as has been argued above, that we should strive to enhance student autonomy, 
then we are under a duty to try and help our students deal with this autonomy and this necessity to construct a 
meaningful self-identity. The alternative is to accept avoidable risk of student harm. A man without a ground 
project was for Williams a man with no reason to live. If pluralism means we cannot give students an account of 
the Good, then we must try and equip them with the means to think about what goods it is that they desire to desire. 
Therefore, one value that should inform our practice is the value of taking our values and our students’ values 
seriously. 
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 BUILD CAPABILITIES 
A discourse and vocabulary for reflection upon values builds a capacity for ethical reflection and life planning. It 
gives clues as to potential integrating ground projects, and coherent narratives of the self. This is a capability 
building because it enables a choice to be made that was not previously available. Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum have argued that the purpose of economic development should be to increase and improve the life 
choices available to people,29 and the end of educative practice should be to enhance and inform the available 
possible choices for the educated.30 At least in the version developed by Sen this approach informs a profoundly 
practical and situated approach to justice.31  
One can easily adapt the work of Nussbaum and Sen to legal education. It suits educational practice because it 
starts from the qualities and needs and abilities of the learner. The aim is to enhance the situation of each learner 
by creating new capabilities or enhancing existing ones. What the learner does with these capabilities is not the 
business of the educator. However, the approach is informed by an empirically grounded optimism about how 
people will use their new opportunities and powers. 
As the capability approach starts with paying attention to the current capabilities of the learner, and then seeks the 
most efficient means to enhance that learner’s choices, it can serve as a method for alignment of educative practice 
with student need. It seeks to increase total welfare, as does classic utilitarianism; but it does so with two crucial 
differences. First, it is far richer in the amount and type of information it considers important. Who is benefited is 
relevant, how a benefit comes about is relevant, the quality or nature of a benefit is relevant, and who chooses the 
benefit is relevant. Second, what is sought to be increased is not pleasure, or goods and services as a proxy for 
pleasure. The key measure of success is greater effective and meaningful choice for people, in the words of Sen:32 
‘Expansion of freedom is viewed in this approach, both as the primary end and as the principal means of 
development. Development consists of the removal of substantial unfreedoms that leave people with little 
choice and little opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency.’ 
In the words of Nussbaum:33 
‘The Capabilities Approach … holds that the key question to ask, when comparing societies and assessing 
them for their basic decency or justice, is, “What is each person able to do and to be?” In other words, the 
approach takes each person as an end … it is focussed on choice or freedom … It thus commits itself to 
respect for people’s powers of self-definition. The approach is resolutely pluralist about value’. 
Adaption of this approach to a value-informed legal education seems entirely apposite because the principles that 
inform the capability approach or human development approach are consonant with the modern mission of higher 
education already sketched out above: an educational practice that endeavours to serve the student, and aims at the 
welfare of the student, and to do so by supporting autonomy, and building the student’s capacity for effective self 
authorship. Building capability gives choices to learners, not imposes them upon learners.  
To avoid ambiguity, what is proposed here is not proselytising for the human development approach as a 
substantive set of values in public policy. What is being argued for is the adaptation of the human development 
approach to higher education in general and legal education in particular. It is an attempt to make the task of 
aligning the best interests of the students with the curriculum and practice of legal education operationally doable. 
It is an attempt to make a fruitful borrowing from the development discourse into the educational discourse. 
The proposed role of the capability approach in this book is an attempt to find a means to overcome the old, tired, 
and unproductive contrast between the liberal and the professional in legal education; or more polemically between 
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education and training as a model for the law school.34 The educational or liberal ideal pulls law and legal education 
towards the general development of character and intellect in the student, and the professional or training ideal 
pulls towards adequate preparation for a professional practice through attention to a traditional corpus of subjects, 
the development of analytical and practical skills, and the inculcation of professional ethical concerns. This 
contrast is of course one aspect of the larger contrast described by Stefan Collini as the historical repetitive 
argument over the teaching of useful or useless knowledge as the legitimate purpose of the university.35  
The debate takes place in the shadow of the social role of the university, and especially elite institutions of higher 
education, as grantors of legitimacy for social privilege, and as the preeminent source for the acquisition of cultural 
capital.36 The demand for access to ever higher levels of educational qualification has been driven by a consumer 
demand for social, economic and professional advancement.37 There is a tendency for the liberal or useless ideal 
to be tied to elite and prestige education,38 and the professional or useful ideal to be associated with wider access, 
diversity, democratic and meritocratic values.39  
Defenders of the liberal ideal of a university reject assertions that the liberal ideal should be understood as tied to 
the social prejudices and reactionary temperament of its most famous exponent:40 
‘The cumulative changes of recent decades are commonly talked about in terms of the transition from an 
“elite” to a “mass” system of higher education, and there is a tendency, which I think we should resist, to 
identify “useless” subjects with the former and “useful” subjects with the latter. Those who wish, 
nostalgically or defiantly, to cling to what they believe to be the values of the good old days tend to turn to 
their Newman for support and comfort. I should make clear, once again, that I do not intend to encourage 
or endorse that reaction: a properly democratic system of higher education is surely something we should 
welcome, and anyway it is here to stay.’ 
What Collini argues is essential to a university education is not any exclusivity, nor any pattern of life (such as 
provided by campus universities that encourage student residence),41 nor any subject matter of study (useful or 
useless); rather it is the freedom to seek to explore the assumptions that underlie the subject matter of study:42 
‘One rough and ready distinction between university education and professional training is that education 
relativizes and constantly calls into question the information which training simply transmits. In this sense, 
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education encourages the student to recognise the ways in which particular bits of knowledge are not fixed 
or eternal or universal or self sufficient.’ 
Thus, Collini is clearly claiming the role of the heterodox voice for the university. Liberal education is essentially 
about academic freedom to question. 
Elsewhere I have suggested that the most attractive aspects of the liberal educational ideal are:43 
‘most important is probably the individualistic focus of education implied by liberal education … Liberal 
education is concerned with the development of the individual student … second … an open-minded 
education, as opposed to a dogmatic education … that includes the possibility that the student will 
ultimately reject the underlying ethical approach of the teacher … Third … a liberal education implies a 
generous spirit towards the task of education …’ 
At that time my hope was to try and identify features of the liberal ideal around which legal academics could find 
consensus and build a collegial identity. The proposed use of a capability approach marks a turning away from 
this hope, and an attempt to forge an approach that avoids falling back into arguments that pit the useful or 
professional or training against the useless or liberal or educational. One reason to think that this may be fruitful 
are the principled positions argued for and held by Martha Nussbaum, as both capability advocate and defender of 
the humanities in American liberal college degrees.44 
A capabilities approach captures many of the features that made a liberal ideal attractive. It is concerned with the 
enhancement of individual students, and avoids elitism in this task. Indeed the logic of human development 
prioritises not the most accomplished of the population but those who have least freedoms. The approach is open-
minded about the nature of the good, explicitly pluralistic, and optimistic about the consequences of giving people 
effective power to make choices. For Sen freedom is both the measure of development,45 and the means of 
development:46 ‘achievement of development is thoroughly dependant on the free agency of people’. Finally, the 
capabilities approach is essentially generous. It is based on a concern with the welfare of people, and a concern to 
generate more freedom, because greater freedom enables people to live better lives. It makes the realised benefits 
to people the measure of success, and it does not suffer from the parsimonious attitude towards benefits associated, 
fairly or unfairly, with utilitarian ideals.  
As well as capturing valuable aspects of the liberal tradition it captures goods sought by the professional tradition. 
There is no contradiction from the human development point of view between enhancing choice and making 
students more employable. Being able to obtain employment enhances choice. There is no contradiction between 
the recognition of the need for reasonable arrangements for students subject to disabilities and human development. 
The principle of justice it advances means disabled people have a claim to extra resources to raise or enhance their 
capabilities, to enable them to exercise freedom:47 
‘An understanding of the moral and political demands of disability is important not only because it is such 
a widespread and impairing feature of humanity, but also because of the tragic consequences of disability 
can actually be substantially overcome with determined societal help and imaginative intervention.’ 
There is no tension between widening access and the capabilities approach to education as freedom for all people, 
the enhancement and building of capability for all members of society, is both the measure of and means for 
achieving success.  
Given the transformative nature of education it is important that we have some conception of what it is we are 
trying to achieve. What it is that higher education, the university, is trying to achieve, must be envisioned at a very 
abstract level of generality. Higher education is very disparate. What the law school is trying to achieve still needs 
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to be envisioned abstractly; the student body and the legal services market, and the life circumstances of graduates 
of the law school are very disparate, and becoming more so. The liberal ideal offered a rather contemplative and 
intellectual ideal type:48 
‘He apprehends the great outlines of knowledge … A habit of mind is formed which lasts through life, of 
which the attributes are, freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation and wisdom … a philosophical 
habit. This then I would assign as the special fruit of the education furnished at a University … the main 
purpose of a University in its treatment of its students.’ 
The alternative approach, the professional or training or useful approach, does not choose to define the educative 
task primarily in terms of the development of the student as an individual. It seeks to advance socially useful aims 
through education. The professional ideal offers as an ideal type one who has internalised as a ground plan, or 
identified as something that is cared about, the ethical position of the professional practitioner, in the words of the 
recent Carnegie Foundation report into legal education in the USA:49 
‘the common aim of all professional education: specialised knowledge and professional identity.’ 
If left without explanation and elaboration this statement is an impoverished overview of the professional ideal as 
it severely underestimates the creative and transformative ambitions for institutions of professional education. It 
does not articulate clearly the self-reflective and critical parts that the US law school has to play in creating 
professional identity:50 
‘Professional schools are not only where expert knowledge and judgment are communicated from advanced 
practitioner to beginner; they are also the place where the profession puts its defining values and exemplars 
on display, where future practitioners can begin both to assume and critically examine their future 
identities.’ 
It does not bring into focus the important emphasis placed on the active role of the learner in choosing to become 
a professional. Professional identity cannot be imposed, nor is it forced upon unwilling candidates. There needs to 
be a willing seeking for professional identity that explains application and entry into law school, and that law 
school can support and ideally enable:51 
‘Ultimately, the goal of formative education must be more than socialization seen as molding human clay 
from without. Rather, formative education must enable students to become self-reflective about and self-
directing in their own development. Seen from a formative perspective, law school ought to provide the 
richest context possible for students to explore and make their own the profession’s possibilities for a useful 
and fulfilling life.’ 
It also begs misunderstanding, because of assumptions about available standpoint built into the liberal ideal. Rather 
than detached and contemplative the professional ideal is engaged and active, the student is seeking to understand 
the very practice of the student:52 
‘The mark of professional expertise is the ability to both act and think well in uncertain situations. The task 
of professional education is to facilitate novices’ growth into similar capacities to act with competence, 
moving toward expertise, In order to do this, students need access to forms of social interaction that embody 
the basic understanding, skill, and meaning that, together, make up professional activity.’  
The primacy the professional ideal places in the value of preparation for the profession must be rejected if the 
primacy of the development of the student is to be defended. Also, such an alignment violates the commitment to 
belief in pluralism of the good, and the associated value of student autonomy in choosing goods. Therefore, the 
professional ideal cannot be wholly absorbed into the capability approach to educative aims that this book tries to 
advance. However, the commitment to practice skills is clearly capability enhancing. Furthermore, the support for 
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a commitment by students to a professional identity is in itself capability enhancing. Freedom to choose is a 
freedom to commit, although of course commitment must restrict subsequent choice. The point is structurally 
similar to the point made by Appiah about supplying a conceptual vocabulary quoted above.53 If we support 
students in the development of the qualities necessary to found a competent professional practice, and hold out as 
desirable to students the values of professional practice, then we influence them. But to refuse to do so is not 
enabling. It does not empower students to be radically unprepared for practice. It leaves them, and their future 
clients, vulnerable and anxious. Fundamentally, freedom is valuable because it can be exercised. 
Across all three approaches (liberal, professional and capability) is recognition of the central importance of the 
personal development of individual students, what the report of the SOMUL project called ‘identity projects’. 
Indeed, it is this feature of undergraduate education that UK students themselves single out as being the most 
important value of university education:54 
‘However, some students point to their academic experiences as a major source of personal change whereas 
others point to the more general experiences of life at university and of leaving home for the first time as 
the major source of change. … [T]hey were more about “confidence” than about “competence”. They were 
more about the acquisition of “social and cultural capital” than the “human capital” associated with 
knowledge and skills. More generally “reflexive” changes in student identities … are evident but so too is 
the weight of previous more ascribed identities. Also, as noted in other surveys of university learning … 
there is also the issue of whether changes in student identity are the outcome of university experience or 
simply of “growing up”. Plainly both are involved. … the “affirmation” of both “imported” and “new” 
identities occurs within higher education as part of what can be termed “identity projects” …  And not 
everyone experiences major personal change as a result of going to university. But most do.’ 
The vital difference in the approaches we have been considering is that the capability ideal for higher education,55 
as well as the liberal ideal for undergraduate education, each view identity as a field of student discovery, choice, 
and largely undetermined development. The professional ideal sees the choice of identity project as being taken 
prior to study, and the realm of discovery and choice as more circumscribed, because the range of acceptable 
termini of development are pre-determined. However, even this distinction should not be overdrawn, as the 
formation of ‘subject identity’ is both a desired product of undergraduate education in the UK, and there is 
empirical evidence that undergraduate education is effective at forming subject identities in graduates.56 There is 
a real and important difference between the ideals, but there are elements of choice and elements of prior desired 
outcome in them all. 
There is another educationally important differentiation between the ideals, in terms of what they value 
educationally. The liberal ideal values primarily the cognitive, or linguistic and logical-mathematical intelligences. 
The professional and capabilities ideals each allow for a broader valuation of intelligences, valuing not only the 
linguistic and logical-mathematical but also, in particular, the personal intelligences, and, to a lesser extent, the 
bodily-kinaesthetic intelligence.57 In legal education this is sometimes described in terms of opposition between 
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doctrine (liberal, linguistic and logical-mathematical intelligences) and skills (professional, personal and bodily-
kinaesthetic intelligences). The Carnegie report adopted a division of legal professional education into three 
apprenticeships, reflecting three dimensions of professional work: the intellectual or cognitive (thinking); expert 
practice (performing); and identity (behaving). The report argued that US law school education was unbalanced, 
giving too much emphasis to the cognitive apprenticeship at the expense of neglecting the practice and identity 
apprenticeships. It is suggested that a human development approach has no inherent tendency towards over-
emphasis on developing linguistic and logical-mathematical capabilities. Rather, it has an inherent bias towards 
usefulness that makes it consonant with attempts in legal education to shift the centre towards practice expertise 
as a model,58or clinical education, or practical reason or nous.59 However, as with the distinction between 
prescribed and open choice in identity formation the distinction is not categorical, and liberal education in the arts 
is often centred on intelligences other than the linguistic and mathematical. 
Of course it is important to remember when reflecting on the North American literature that the UK law school is 
not directly comparable to the US law school. As an undergraduate stage in higher education, and the first of three 
stages in the path to professional qualification, it is less closely tied to preparation for professional practice. 
However, nor is the UK law school called upon to instil ‘a philosophical habit’, as opposed to an active or engaged 
habit, into its students, as the liberal tradition favours. It is argued here that what legal education in the UK, and in 
particular the undergraduate degree, is called upon to do is to enhance the capabilities of its students, and to thereby 
increase the effective freedom of choice open to them. In this it can take lessons from both the ideal of a liberal 
education and the ideal of professional education. 
 
 PROMOTE SOUND REASONING AND CLEAR EXPRESSION  
Law is of course about power.  
However, and educationally vitally, it is about language and reason. The ability to locate weakness or error in an 
argument is a safeguard against being manipulated, overawed, misdirected, mistaken or confused. The abilities to 
construct, and recognise the need to be constrained by, valid arguments are fundamental to theoretical and practical 
reasoning. Legal academics are appointed and promoted, in part, because of their facility in reasoning. This is an 
area of expertise where we do generally know better.  
Expression is far from inconsequential for the success of reasoning. It is not merely logical competence - the 
manipulation of premises and conclusions - that is needed. One must find the right expression for the thought, or 
proposal, or issue. It is almost impossible to hold in practice to the analytical distinctions between substance and 
form, or expression and concept. In the words of Montaigne:60 
‘I sometimes hear people who apologise for not being able to say what they mean, maintaining that their 
heads are so full of fine things that they cannot deliver them for want of eloquence. That is moonshine. Do 
you know what I think? It is a matter of shadowy notions coming to them from some unformed concepts 
which they are unable to untangle and to clarify in their minds: consequently they cannot deliver them 
externally. They do not yet know what they mean. Just watch them giving a little stammer as they are about 
to deliver their brain-child: you can tell that they have labouring-pains not at childbirth but during 
conception!’ 
The use of language and reason to ask questions, think about problems, and decide what to do is of immense 
importance in the law and in life. One can use numbers in a similarly life enhancing way, or one can be functionally 
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innumerate and baffled by numerical reasoning. There is a real value in being able to think and talk and write and 
figure and in being able to combine the two primary symbolic systems we have developed for reasoning.  
Legal reason is not ‘natural reason’ but an ‘artificial reason’ according to Coke.61 However, it is still reasoning, 
albeit - to borrow some powerful analogies and images from Ronald Dworkin - a reasoning that has the structural 
peculiarities of the chain novel or comic book title. Each link in the chain of reason is constrained by links forged 
in the past, and it would take a Hercules of the intellect to forge all the disparate elements together and shape new 
links correctly and elegantly time after time.62 The corpus of law reports is the collective articulation by the judges 
of their reasoning and decisions; of their attempts to reason within the confines of the law and hopefully towards 
justice. These judges were helped and hindered in their endeavour by lawyers who were reasoning not merely 
artificially but to a very definite and pre-set purpose: the advancement of their clients’ cause. All of this reasoning 
was constrained not only by legal categories, the very stuff of artificial reason, but by legal process, which provides 
the matrix of artificial reason. 
The law, as it is taught in law schools, includes words and arguments about words, or ‘doctrine’. This is valuable, 
and of value to students beyond its inherent value as constituting the investigation of the law. Expression and 
reasoning can be practiced and improved, and legal education should be about practice and improvement in these 
areas. 
We should value good reasoning, both linguistic and numerical. We should value clear and effective expression. 
We should seek to improve the abilities of students in these areas. We should use teaching techniques to do so, 
such as: modelling; and provision of timely and useful feedback; and giving time for reflection; and scaffolding; 
and the introduction of useful vocabulary and conceptual structures; and breaking down the complex end 
operations into simpler sub-operations that students can master; and use of narratives to illustrate the importance 
of success and failure in reasoning and expression; and through question and answer; and student presentation; 
and through assessment tasks, and so it goes on. 
Hopefully this value is not contentious. 
 
 PROMOTE THE SEEKING OF TRUTH BY STUDENTS  
Valuing the seeking of truth may be contentious. It may be thought that a commitment to pluralism precludes 
commitment to seeking a truth about any significant question. It may be thought that the central importance of 
falsification or scientific revolution in the theory of science precludes us from speaking and writing about 
knowledge of any truth, as all knowledge is potentially subject to revision.63 However, such views are far too 
absolutist. In fact people and communities of practice can and do use intelligibly and usefully various effective 
standards of truth. What probably is futile is to seek for The Truth, the search epitomised by Descartes for certainty 
in knowledge.  
If we abandon the search for truths then we undermine the value of reason and clear expression. It is important for 
legal educators to value the seeking after truth, provided there is sufficient reason to suppose such a seeking is 
rational. Certainly in law more than in some areas of activity the idea of there being a value in truth is important. 
Sincerity or authenticity may be an alternative value in some areas of human activity, perhaps in some artistic 
enterprises, or in love, even for some thinkers in the field of morals or ethics.64 However, much legal 
communication is not sincere or authentic. A representative may speak as instructed by her client; a negotiating 
position may be taken in order to influence the other party, not because it expresses the true position of the speaker; 
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professional practice and expertise requires some distance or objectivity. The professional restraints upon telling 
lies rest upon a belief in the existence and importance of truth, not of sincerity. 
It would be a distraction to try and wrestle with the problems of truth. I will simply report on three approaches to 
truth, from the works of Howard Gardner, Simon Blackburn, and Harry Frankfurt. 
Howard Gardner notes that the concept of truth, or untruth or mistake, is a very early feature of human cognitive 
development:65 
‘Truth has its natural home in human language, but the possibility for ascertaining the true state of affairs 
extends to the prelinguistic infant. From the opening days of life, our five senses tell us what the world is 
like and, by implication what it is not like. A baby reaches for a cup and grabs it confidently – there really 
is a cup there. A baby reaches for a virtual cup, puts her fingers around it, discovers a simulacrum instead, 
and whimpers, acts frustrated, or even wails.’ 
Gardner gives central importance to human senses and human communication in the developing concept of truth. 
However, each can deceive, and mere impression or report becomes inadequate. However, the possibility of 
mistake or delusion produces a positive truth-seeking response; this leads to social institutions for truth seeking:66 
‘In the search for truth, our greatest allies are the scholarly disciplines and the professional crafts – in short, 
areas of expertise that have developed and deepened over the centuries.’ 
From reflection upon academic disciplines and crafts he generates an idea of multiple truths in place of a naïve 
idea of truth:67 
‘Just as scholarly disciplines have their respective truths, professions and crafts have theirs, and these truths 
need to be honed.’ 
From this he moves on to consider multiple criteria and methods of truth seeking: 68 
‘Whether one considers a scholarly discipline, like history, or a craft like the fashioning of a violin, or a 
profession like journalism, it remains appropriate to speak about the pursuit of truth, Each of these spheres 
has its own methods and criteria; each has evolved over time; each must take into account new discoveries, 
fresh opportunities, unanticipated obstacles … From a distance, then, we can observe a continuum of truth-
seeking, ranging from systematic and self-conscious methods of academic scholars (such as scientists) to 
the less formal approaches of professionals (such as journalists) to the targeted variations of craftspeople 
(such as jewellers).’ 
Gardner considers whether truth is applicable to art, but rejects the suggestion, and reviews his argument:69 
‘The notion of a single truth or a single standard of truth now seems hopelessly simpleminded. So, too, the 
notion that truth can be established simply by relying on one’s senses, or by polling the neighbours ... 
Rather, over epochs, and with plenty of twists, turns, and setbacks, human beings have established expertise. 
Both scholarly disciplines and professional crafts allow the determination of truths – truths about how the 
world is and truths about how to act in the world in order to tackle challenges that are often quite complex.’ 
In summary, the idea of what is so, or ‘truth’, is very fundamental to people. We get upset when we find we are 
wrong, but we seek ways to avoid errors and refine our understanding. However, we have come to realise that the 
task is not unitary but various, and informed by why and how we are seeking truth. However, our collective 
experience is that we have got better at discerning reality from illusion over time. Indeed, we have developed 
collective ways to refine and improve our understanding that we constantly deploy. Gardner endorses truth seeking, 
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but not as a single activity, and not as a naïve activity; it requires self awareness and collective action over time. 
Gardner’s basic idea seems to be that people have encounters with the world informed by beliefs about the world, 
and those beliefs are validated or invalidated by the state of the world. The schematic shape of his reasoning is 
developmental, at both the individual and collective level. 
Simon Blackburn has written an illuminating short book on the philosophical treatment of truth.70 His discussion 
locates the range of sensible opinion in a middle ground between two modern extremes of an absolutist search for 
The Truth, and a relativism that embraces aspects of irrationalism and voluntarism. His account shows how both 
extremes actually share a common assumption: that truth is an abstract quality of a statement that is independent 
of people and time and domain. He uses a contrast between traditional and modern scepticism to illustrate this 
shared assumption of the warring modern factions. Traditional sceptical thinking was not a substantive position 
held as a world view. As such it was not capable of being refuted as a world view, as modern absolutists assume 
and seek to do with sceptical arguments, whether through scientific method or philosophical refutation of 
scepticism; this of course was the philosophical project of Descartes. Neither did traditional scepticism claim to 
render reason broken-backed; leaving will and personal preference as the sole remaining justifications for beliefs, 
as some modern relativists argue. Blackburn argues that Nietzsche was the most important source for these aspects 
of modern relativism. Scepticism was traditionally understood as a means to test our beliefs, and reason’s warning 
against dogmatic certainty:71 
‘The sceptic, having recognised all that is to be said on both sides of any question, found that they balanced 
evenly, and therefore suspended belief, resigning himself to a state of epoche or lack of opinion … Today’s 
relativist, persuading themselves that all opinions enjoy the same standing in the light of reason, take it as 
a green light to believe what they like with as much conviction and force as they like. So while ancient 
scepticism was the sworn opponent of dogmatism, today dogmatists feed and flourish on the desecrated 
corpse of reason.’ 
Blackburn counters both absolutists and relativists by situating truth in multiple ways.72 Truth is not something 
added to a true statement: ‘I am Graham Ferris’ means the same as: ‘It is true that I am Graham Ferris’.73 The 
evidence necessary to support the claim depends on the issue – Am I who I claim to be? Is it raining? Does 
following the map get you where you want to go? All statements of truths are informed by, and confined by, what 
we are doing when we express them – they form part of some language game.74  This approach confounds the 
absolutist, as we cannot escape uncertainty through any special authority, in ‘sense data’ or in the ‘empirical’ or 
‘reason’, because truth seeking and stating is a social activity. This confounds the relativist, as although we do 
view things through theory, and our perspectives are partial, these facts do not stop our theories and perspectives 
from being truth seeking and truth establishing. These familiar facts about our human activity when seeking truth 
do not disturb our understanding of truth as a reality, and as something valuable, although they deny truth the 
status of a transcendent value:75 
‘We found that once we have an issue to decide, it comes with its own norms. Once the issue is the issue, 
relativism becomes a distraction. In natural science we have found no reason to qualify Clifford’s optimism 
about the method of harnessing observation to theory … In the human sciences we have learned to respect 
difference of perspective without identifying it with illusion and error … we never found … an underlying 
foundational story telling us, from somewhere outside our own world view, just why that world view is the 
right one. But perhaps we have learned to do without that … we can take the postmodern inverted commas 
off things that ought to matter to us: truth, reason, objectivity and confidence. They are no less, if no more, 
that the virtues that we should all cherish as we try to understand the bewildering world about us.’ 
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In short he concludes that what has driven the philosophical debates has been at least in part a shared assumption 
by both sides of the debate about what a truth has to be in order to be a truth. If we give up the grandiose theoretical 
project we can regain scepticism as a valuable tool for testing our thought and beliefs rather than viewing it as a 
philosophical doomsday weapon. 
Finally, Harry G. Frankfurt does not focus on where our idea of truth comes from, nor on how robust our concept 
of truth and practices of truth seeking are; rather he has considered why truth is important to us.76 He starts by 
noticing how useful truth is in familiar practical concerns; for example how essential some objectivity and factual 
truth is to such a task as building a bridge:77 ‘No one in his right mind would rely on a builder … who does not 
care about the truth’. He acknowledges that in the evaluative sphere truth is less straightforward. However, we rely 
upon reasons for valuing what we value, and for making evaluative judgments. These reasons depend upon the 
reality of truth:78 ‘Unless we know whether we are justified in regarding various factual judgments as true, we 
cannot know whether there is really any sense in feeling and in choosing as we do’. This applies to both societies 
and individuals. From considerations of utility he turns to consideration of why truth is useful, and suggests it is 
because truth corresponds to reality, and we need to plan on the basis of reality. It is possible to live in denial but:79  
‘it is nearly always more advantageous to face the facts with which we must deal than to remain ignorant 
of them. After all, hiding our eyes from reality will not cause any reduction of its dangers and threats.’  
Of course, these truths, pleasant and unpleasant, include truths about ourselves. Without truth rationality itself 
teeters on the brink of pointlessness, and on a more everyday level our personal relationships are impoverished. 
Intimacy depends upon truth, the successful liar cannot be known, and when someone we love betrays us it so 
threatens our sense of reality that we feel a little crazy.80 A world of lies that we believe told by other people is a 
world of delusion. A world of lies told by ourselves to ourselves is a world of self-delusion and is another sort of 
crazy as it leads to practical irrationality.81 Finally, we should value truth because it is the means by which we can 
know ourselves, it is essential for our sense of personal identity:82 
‘We learn we are separate beings in the world, distinct from what is other than ourselves, by coming up 
against obstacles to the fulfilment of our intentions … When certain aspects of our experience fail to submit 
to our wishes … it becomes apparent to us that they are independent of us. That is the origin of our concept 
of reality …. To the extent that we learn in greater detail how we are limited, and what the limits of our 
limitation are, we come thereby to delineate our own boundaries and thus to discern our own shape … This 
not only provides us with an even more emphatic sense of our separateness. It defines for us the specific 
sort of being that we are. Thus, our recognition and understanding of our own identity arises out of, and 
depends integrally on, our appreciation of a reality that is definitely independent of ourselves. In other 
words, it arises out of and depends on our recognition that there are facts and truths over which we cannot 
hope to exercise control.’ 
Thus, Frankfurt links the need for truth to our ability to function in the world, our ability to know and be known 
by others, and even our ability to know ourselves.  
Legal academics should value and seek truths within their own domain; indeed this is one aspect of research and 
scholarship. One major purpose of teaching law is to teach students how to respect legal truth, and how to establish 
legal truth, and recognise legal falsehood. However, it goes further than this concern with subject matter. As 
educators we should be aware of the need for students to recognise the importance of truth for their choices of 
values, and in their plans for life, both professional and more generally. This is not a permission to engage in 
dogmatic assertion of beliefs held to be truths by academics that their students must accept as true. Our modern 
understanding of the nature of truths does not legitimate such activity. But neither does it justify the abandonment 
of truth seeking, nor the intellectually flimsy cynical relativism that exists in the popular culture of the modern 
world. Finally, truth should be valued in education because without a respect for truth it is impossible for students 
to construct a realistic self-identity. Truth should be a vital value for legal academics, as researchers and scholars, 
                                                          
76 H.G. FRANKFURT, On Truth, Pimlico, London 2007. 
77 H.G. FRANKFURT, above n. 76, p. 23. 
78 Ibid. p. 31. 
79 Ibid. p. 57. See: E. WIESEL, Night, M. WIESEL (tr.), Penguin Classics, London 2006, for a seminal work on the consequences of denying 
unbearable truths. 
80 H.G. FRANKFURT, above n. 76, pp. 79-82. 
81 Ibid. pp. 83-84. 
82 Ibid. p. 98. 
and as educators, and in higher education as educators of young people who are coming into adulthood and trying 
to form a sense of self-identity and a life plan. 
 
 INCLUDE STUDENTS IN A SCHOLARLY COMMUNITY 
Expertise, knowledge, power of expression, and cognitive ability are central to the status hierarchies of both the 
academic and legal professions. Students are not expected to start their programmes of study with these qualities. 
Education should entail growth and development of the student in the direction of these esteemed qualities. 
Recognition of this merited status amongst academics and its absence amongst the student body, and the hierarchy 
this disparity implies in the educational process, is necessary and familiar. It partially explains why students are 
willing to pay people like me to teach them. Inequality is at the foundation of educational practice – the less able, 
less knowledgeable, less practiced become enabled, more knowledgeable and effective actors. It has been argued 
that the human proclivity for teaching is the key distinction between humanity and the rest of the animal kingdom.83 
So, given this structural distinction between the expert and the neophyte, what does the urging of a co-operative 
asymmetrical community, made up of students and academics and administrators, in a ‘scholarly community’ 
demand? 
There seem to be three discrete legitimate reasons for valuing the induction of students into a scholarly community, 
and the character of that community will depend in part upon the relative importance given to these three 
motivational forces. Whilst each will undoubtedly co-exist with the others in the educational practice of any 
individual or any institution it is useful for analytical purposes to describe them separately. First is the perpetuation 
of the field or discipline. Second is the development of student identification with the discipline or profession. 
Third is support for the autonomy of the student as a learner.  
Inculcation of students into a scholarly community is not an act of generosity. The discipline can only subsist if it 
is renewed. The power and influence and status of the legal academy depend upon its students internalising aspects 
of the discipline. However, even more vital to the discipline is the induction of the neophyte into the mysteries of 
the practice – legal research and legal understanding as well as legal practice are all dependent upon the success 
of legal education in serving as an apprenticeship. This may seem counter-intuitive, or naively unrealistic, in the 
face of complaints in university staff rooms that teaching duties owed to students act as a distraction from 
intrinsically rewarding research activity. However, there is no solid evidential basis to doubt that teaching is felt 
to be important by legal academics.84 To be clear, it is argued here that one reason that teaching is valued by legal 
academics is because it serves the needs of the discipline. This is an independent source of valuation of teaching 
to its being valued because of the benefits it brings to the students. 
It is important to recall the nature of a discipline as a group activity over time that generates group understanding. 
It is not multiple individuals who each have internalised the corpus and methodologies that serve as separate 
repositories of the discipline. The discipline is the group of researchers practicing the discipline. It is this 
distributed intelligence that constitutes the knowledge and practice of the discipline.  
Jerome Brunner identified the vital links between disciplinary practice and the generation of knowledge and 
understanding:85 
‘The gist of the idea is that it is a grave error to locate intelligence in a single head. It exists as well not only 
in your particular environment of books, dictionaries, and notes, but also in the heads and habits of the 
friends with whom you interact, even in what socially you have come to take as given … It has to do also 
with your having entered a community in whose extended intelligence you share. It is that subtle “sharing” 
that constitutes distributed intelligence. By entering such a community, you have entered not only upon a 
set of conventions of praxis but upon a way of exercising intelligence.’ 
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It is prudent in this context to reiterate that the legal academy is a profession. The legal discipline based in 
universities is ‘an area of more or less systematic inquiries’ and shows the ‘effects of professionalization of the 
field’ in short that it is an academic discipline.86 Thus, in attending to this collective aspect of the academic 
discipline we have an articulation of an idea that was applied in relation to legal education and professional practice 
in the Carnegie report:87 
‘Formal knowledge is not the source of expert practice. The reverse is true: expert practice is the source of 
formal knowledge about practice. Once enacted, skilled performance can be turned into a set of rules and 
procedures for pedagogical use … But the opposite is not possible … holism is real and prior to analysis. 
Theory can - and must - learn from practice.’ 
The assertion that the students of a discipline are also the future of the discipline is most familiar when 
contemplating the advanced student and the traditional the role of the PhD as a qualification for research and 
academic professions.88 The same cultural link, if not the same labour market link, is present between the 
undergraduate or professional students and the legal academy.  
In more prosaic terms the vital role of students for the scholarly community is recognised in the strength of the 
links between research and teaching. Research seems to be dependent upon teaching in law to a large degree:89 
‘The other two functions, research and teaching, are closely linked together. If university lawyers were 
asked which of the two mattered more they would almost all object to the decoupling.’ 
‘[E]ven research-based institutions find it difficult to prosecute research in fields that are never taught … 
in general teaching and research have to go together.’ 
Thus, the very process of disciplinary activity seems to rest upon the inculcation of the students into the discipline. 
The group is in part made up of neophytes, the activity of the group that generates its understanding is coupled up 
with the practice of teaching and learning, and the new leaders of the discipline must be recruited from the student 
body. The intellectual inquiry is in a symbiotic relationship with the educational practice. 
Thus, the first reason for the inclusion of students into the scholarly community is the continued existence of the 
scholarly community or discipline. The dependence of the discipline on the educational practice is not always fully 
appreciated. This reason for inclusion does not demand the recognition of the whole student body as full members 
of the community, as only a few are going to go on to enter the academic profession.90 It is compatible with a 
relatively passive and reactive student role as it is the teaching, rather than the learning, that is the most obvious 
site of the generation of the gains to the discipline of the educative enterprise. 
The second aspect of the scholarly community is the law student rite of passage into the community of those that 
‘think like a lawyer’ - the lawyerly articulation of the adoption of a ‘subject identity’ by students. In the USA the 
Carnegie report has criticised an over-emphasis on the cognitive aspect of thinking like a lawyer, arguing that this 
‘cognitive apprenticeship’ is only one of three necessary apprenticeships that should be present in professional 
legal education.91 The technique for inculcating this lawyerly thought process in the US law school is the ‘signature 
pedagogue’ of the law school, the so called Socratic or case dialogue method:92 
‘Students in these classes know they will have to present more than memorized formulas … Along with the 
pressure to keep up or excel, there is often excitement, as students put aside their laypersons’ reasoning 
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about cases, to try in earnest to “think like a lawyer.” … [T]hese practices carry a profound mystique. They 
also produce lasting results.’  
Thus, a declared aim of legal education is to bring about this transformative change in the student, and it is defined 
as joining the community of ‘lawyers’ so far as typical reasoning processes go. However, there has been criticism 
of the narrowness of the passage, directed to only one aspect of the legal personality, the intellectual. 
It seems likely that this production of a subject identity is linked to the first reason for promoting a scholarly 
community, the health of the discipline as a discipline. It is here that the approach of the Carnegie report is both 
most antagonistic and most sympathetic to the core arguments of this book. Most antagonistic because the creation 
of a professional identity is too closed an educational end for the approach advocated here. It infringes upon the 
value given here to value pluralism and student autonomy. It may be appropriate for those students who wish to 
make a moral commitment to the legal profession, but it would be obstructive to those as yet undecided, or those 
who have rejected the profession as a career. Most sympathetic because of the emphasis the report gives to the 
non-cognitive apprenticeships, and especially the emphasis on the apprenticeship of identity or purpose. Also, the 
critical account in the report of visions of legal education that avoid issues of values through the adoption of an 
‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ posture is wholly congruent with the approach advocated here. There is a shared concern 
that moral anaesthesia is a debilitating condition rather than a useful professional shell. Finally, the strong emphasis 
on the apprenticeship as a transformative process and the importance of identity to adult education is wholly 
consonant across the report and this book. 
The natures of the scholarly communities that this reason for acting might generate are disparate. It is useful to 
think back to the authoritarian and the democratic educational styles discussed by Lewin.93 An authoritarian style 
would be consonant with the views that law requires submission to authority as a discipline and that students grow 
in response to the challenges of a robust teaching and learning environment. The first is a view that could be 
honestly held, and indeed seems to be persuasive to many lawyers to some extent. However, it is very rare to find 
a legal academic who does not endorse and encourage critical thinking about law in his or her educational practice. 
The evidence against the safety and truth of the second view is reviewed in chapter 2. Most legal academics are 
probably not attracted to an authoritarian style. However, a style that emphasises intellectual excellence as 
demonstrated through competitive enterprises is probably more attractive. A democratic style suffers from the 
weaknesses of all democratic process. It relies upon a principle of equality that is antithetical to the educational 
institutional status structure of deserved merit and authority noted above. It places reliance upon the students to 
co-operate and engage in the process. It imposes heavy procedural burdens on the administration of consultation 
and facilitation of public discourse through some viable communicative channel. These features make it difficult 
to implement changes quickly in the face of perceived institutional need. Certainly at the level of academic self-
governance the consistent pressure of the last twenty years has been away from democratic governance of 
institutions and towards managerial or authoritarian models of governance.94  
There is some empirical data available on the formation of subject identity in UK universities from the SOMUL 
project:95 
‘[T]here are important commonalities in the reported effects of the student experience irrespective of setting 
… A continuing commitment to the subjects studied in higher education – and by implication the acquisition 
of a “subject identity” – was important to fewer than half the students sampled. There were significant 
differences between students according to the subjects studied. Perhaps most noticeable … is the much 
lower commitment to their subject by business studies students … Sociology students were more likely to 
emphasise a changed world view.’ 
The relevant survey responses were:96 
Students’ perceptions on how they have changed Business 
studies 
Biosciences Sociology 
I am very committed to the subjects I’ve studied here and would like 
to continue to read/study them in the future 
32 62 54 
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Thus, our first two reasons for acting demand some sort of scholarly community, but do not necessitate any 
particular style of community. It may be authoritarian, and dogmatic. Alternatively it may favour competition and 
elitism. Or it may favour a democratic or critical style. Or they may allow any combination of the above styles. 
There is strong evidence, both of the anecdotal or narrative type and of the orthodox social science type, to indicate 
that students are affected by the style of the educational social group or community. 
The indeterminacy in operational realisation of the first two reasons for encouraging a scholarly community that 
includes at least some of the students means that the importance accorded to the third reason for acting may 
determine the style of the community. The third reason for facilitating a community is to support the autonomy of 
the student as a learner. This makes it qualitatively different in emphasis to the first two concerns. Both the survival 
of the discipline and the inculcation of a subject identity are motivations informed by the imperatives of the 
educators. They are concerned with what the teaching aims to do for the field of inquiry and to the identity of the 
students. In the first the subject of concern is primarily the field and not the students. In the second it is an effect 
upon the student that is defined by someone other than the student (by the academic community) that is aimed at. 
Only in the final reason for acting is the learning and self-direction of the student the primary concern. 
Communities marked by inequalities of capacity can be characterised by dominance and submission, or by support 
and care. The justification of slavery by Aristotle is the classic justification of dominance because of the submissive 
nature of the dominated – the slave.97 Thus, inequality can support privilege for the stronger; but inequality can 
also found duties to the weaker:98 
‘The perspective of obligations of power was presented powerfully by Gautama Buddha in Sutta-
Nipata. Buddha argues there that we have responsibility to animals precisely because of the 
asymmetry between us … since we are enormously more powerful than other species, we have some 
responsibility towards other species that connects exactly with this asymmetry of power. Buddha 
goes on to illustrate the point by an analogy with the responsibility of the mother towards her child 
… because she can do things to influence the child’s life that the child itself cannot do.’ 
The importance of asymmetry within a relationship – whether temporary or permanent – is central to an ethic of 
care:99 
‘In equal relations, we do expect that, under appropriate conditions, the parties will exchange places as 
carer and cared for … However, many relations are not equal or symmetric, and it is analyzing unequal 
relations that we see the special contribution of the cared-for. By recognizing the carer’s efforts, by 
responding in some positive way, the cared-for makes a distinctive contribution to the relation and 
establishes it as caring. In this way, infants contribute to the parent-child relation, patients to the physician-
patient relation, and students to the teacher-student relation … [T]he ethic of care is not about moral credit. 
It is about moral life and what makes it possible. The contributions of the cared-for sustain us in our attempt 
to care.’ 
Educational communities are paradigm examples of communities that recognise the obligations of power and 
experience to care and act in the interests of those who are unable to act for themselves. This aspect of the scholarly 
community is the one that pushes practice towards an alignment with the interests of the student. The ethic of care 
is founded on ‘receptiveness’ in the carer for the state and needs and desires of the cared for. It is the seeking by 
the carer in actual social interaction of what the cared for wants or needs and the subsequent endeavour to meet 
those desires and needs.100 It is also the aspect that pushes practice towards encouragement of student 
independence and a democratic style of social interaction. 
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what he feels as nearly as possible, is the essential part of caring from the view of the one-caring.’  
 
It is necessary to emphasise the importance of the professional identity of legal scholars as educators at this point. 
This is because the relationship between academic and student and lawyer and client is different in crucial respects, 
both in theory and as lived practice. At this point, in constituting the scholarly community that includes the student, 
the legal academic must not think like a lawyer.  
As a matter of principle a lawyer has a restraining role vis-à-vis the client: the relationship is situated within the 
context of loyalties to the system of law and justice that can irritate the alignment of lawyer and client interest.101 
Further, clients are usually adult, and often extremely capable and powerful. The superiority of the lawyer may 
well be limited to the area of professional expertise alone. The status and power relationship may otherwise be in 
favour of the client. Thus, the relationship whilst being one of service lacks asymmetrical features typical of caring 
relationships. Furthermore, there is some evidence that this potentially conflicting relationship is lived as such by 
lawyers. 
As part of the GoodWork project Carrie James investigated whether interviews with professionals revealed gender 
differences in how the relationship between self and other was understood.102 She carried out quantitative analysis 
over many professional domains, and qualitative analysis over three professional domains: law, journalism and 
theatre. It was this qualitative analysis that gives us reason to believe that significant numbers of successful lawyers 
feel that their relationship to clients is a site of conflict rather than primarily a caring relationship. James defined 
a conflict approach to relationships: 103 
‘The conflict approach is consistent with the familiar idea that self and others are dichotomous and 
competing constituencies. In narratives representing this stance, tensions or explicit conflict between 
meeting obligations to self and to others are highly salient. In the terminology favoured by the GoodWork 
team, a misalignment exists between the needs of self and others.’ 
Of the three professional domains subjected to qualitative analysis: 104 
‘Lawyers were more likely than actors or journalists to mention conflict: 38 percent of the lawyers in the 
sample exhibited this stance compared with 22 percent of actors, and no journalists discussed self–other 
responsibilities as central conflicts for them … The fact that a majority of subjects who demonstrated the 
conflict approach were lawyers suggests that the nature of the domain may encourage this mind-set, or that 
the very least convey an understanding of certain responsibilities – to client, for example – as probable 
sources of conflict.’ 
The clearest expression of this conflict was encapsulated in the phrase used by one lawyer that ‘the client is always 
an enemy’, a view that leads to a keen concern with self-protection in the lawyer–client relationship: 105 
‘According to this lawyer [who worked in criminal courts], maintaining strict roles or boundaries between 
self and other is necessary to do good work in the law and to protect his integrity as a professional. 
Furthermore, he explicitly suggested the mind-set of the “client as enemy” is normative in the law.’ 
This defensive approach is of course inimical to a caring relationship. The effects of fear of client betrayal confirms 
Noddings’ insight that the cared-for has an essential role in maintain a caring relationship. It seems that this aspect 
of thinking like a lawyer involves a very guarded approach to clients (and other lawyers). As a community of 
practice the demands of the role of the lawyer makes such an embattled perspective more common than in other 
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professional practices. However, we must not forget that James also found there are alternative responses to the 
pressures of legal practice:106 
‘[I]t is important to note significant variation in self-other approaches within our sample of lawyers. In fact, 
a slightly greater percentage of lawyers described self-other responsibilities as congruent.’ 
In this regard legal academics must ‘think like an educator’ even though they are trying to lead their students to 
‘think like a lawyer’. This produces a very difficult tension in legal education as it generates an inconsistency in 
the shared educational endeavour. Thinking like an educator entails a caring response towards the students, and 
ideally leads a joint and co-operative endeavour. In the words of John Williams:107 
‘[I]t was a successful seminar, one of the best classes Stoner had ever taught. Almost from the first, the 
implications of the subject caught the students, and they all had that sense of discovery that comes when 
one feels that the subject at hand lies at the center of a much larger subject, and when one feels intensely 
that a pursuit of the subject is likely to lead – where, one does not know. The seminar organised itself, and 
the students so involved themselves that Stoner himself became simply one of them, searching as diligently 
as they.’ 
The novelist is describing the same elusive and unstable reciprocal and shared experience that Nel Noddings 
describes:108 
‘In the event that inclusion [of the teacher by the student] becomes actual, the relation is converted, as we 
have noted, from that of teacher-student to one of friendship. This may of course, happen, but even if it 
does, when the teacher assumes her function as teacher, the relation becomes again, temporarily, unequal.’  
As Williams, who taught in higher education for many years, understood, the feeling of comradeship with the 
students is very rewarding for the teacher – we struggle to help our students to be able to do that which we can do, 
and join us in common endeavour as scholars. We share our passion for our subject. 
However, this model of a shared endeavour is dangerous in legal education – because self-protection of the students 
who enter into professional practice demands that they be helped to think like a lawyer, and that includes being 
able to act in a manner that is self-protective. In effect the incongruence between thinking like an educator and 
thinking like a lawyer generates an imperative to teach ‘do as I say’ (protect yourself from client betrayal) not ‘do 
as I do’ (enter into a caring relationship with you that leaves me vulnerable).  
Despite these troublesome problems for legal education the first principle should be that the relationship between 
academic and student is a relationship founded on an asymmetrical caring. The scholarly community can be a 
community of shared endeavour, as sketched in the quotation from Williams. This scholarly community in its 
activities should aspire to an equality of collaborative effort between teacher and learners. However, it is 
imperative that legal education makes the conflicted nature of aspects of legal practice apparent. It seems likely 
that the felt necessity to prepare law students for the harsh realities of legal practice has informed educational 
practice and led to much-criticised tropes, such as the ‘bad man’ approach to the law.109 The evidence reviewed in 
chapter 2 confirms that this is the wrong approach to the educational relationship, because absent a caring 
relationship students come to harm. If this is accepted then one role of values in legal education is to warn students 
of the risk of client betrayal in practice. Students need to become aware of the lived reality of conflicting values 
in society, the law, and legal practice. They can then seek to develop strategies to counter the risks they will face 
if they enter practice: whether through a conflict view of the lawyer–client relationship; or through aligning the 
client group served with the values of the student; or through developing an alternative model of the legal system 
that encourages the seeking of ‘win-win’ outcomes rather than ‘zero-sum’ outcomes, as seems to be a feature of 
lawyers who hold a congruent view of the lawyer–client relationship.110 
A caring community takes interest in and is concerned with the best interests of the cared-for. Thus, this community 
ideal returns us to our first principle of alignment. However, we have moved forward, because a collaborative 
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community is one in which the cared-for can influence the activities of the community. It is through interactions 
between the academics and administrative staff of the University and the students that the best interests of the 
students can be discovered. Thus, reflection upon this aspect of the scholarly community is the key to educational 
practice. What we need to beware of is the complicating and difficult problems posed by the central place in legal 
practice held by conflicting interests. This conflicting interests mind-set familiar to lawyerly thinking is out of 
place in academic legal practice.  
A scholarly community of adult learners is not one of structurally permanent inequality. Education is a process in 
which the learners should become ever more capable - it has features of a rite of passage. It remains difficult to 
realise all the potential gains from this developmental aspect of higher education. The shared experience of legal 
education has helped inform academic practice, as academics in particular reflect upon their experiences and use 
them to guide practice. However, there remains much to be done in educational practice to unlock the potential 
insights of our students as partners in the educational process. The ideal scholarly community would not only try 
to reproduce itself through its teaching practice but to renew and reinvigorate itself as well. The secret to moving 
towards this ideal lies in realising the essentially caring nature of the educative relationship, and giving full effect 
to both sides of that relationship: both the caring party and cared-for have important roles to play, and ultimately 
the asymmetrical relationship should become one of equality, and the cared-for can offer reciprocal care when 
circumstances change. Such a community reproduces itself and evolves culturally through time. It is towards such 
a community ideal that a values-oriented approach to legal education pushes us. 
 
 CHAPTER 4  
STUDENT MOTIVATION  
 
1. INTRODUCTION: THE IDEA OF INTRINSIC MOTIVATION 
Concerns with student well-being and student engagement in their studies led to the research activity and 
exploratory changes in teaching practice that inform this book. One obvious place to seek guidance on issues of 
well-being and motivation was psychological theories. Essentially, such studies pointed towards the central 
importance of student identity and student values for educational practice. This chapter traces the conceptual and 
practice process that led to this understanding. 
If one acts for the enjoyment or sense of achievement derived from the action then the action is ‘intrinsically’ 
motivated. What is ‘intrinsic’ about the motivation may be the reason for acting. It is important to note what types 
of reason are considered intrinsically motivating: curiosity, exploration, feelings of competence or power; and 
what types of reason would not be so considered: it would please my mother or my son; it is necessary if I am to 
achieve my goals; one needs to take care when marking essays because it is a serious professional responsibility. 
Alternatively, what is ‘intrinsic’ about the motivation may be the lived experience of acting. Some activities simply 
feel good, draw the eye, and are tempting. Thus, most people like to chat and laugh together, to play sports, to 
listen to music and move to the beat. Of course not all social groups are attractive, we rarely enjoy sports we are 
unusually poor at playing, and someone else’s music can be the very opposite of attractive. In short it cannot be 
merely the activity itself that makes it intrinsically motivating, it must be the interaction between the act and the 
actor. Apart from any other factors, what used to be intrinsically attractive can become dull with familiarity and 
repetition: novelty is often a part of what makes something intrinsically motivating. Finally, it is clearly not the 
case that these two aspects are mutually exclusive or contradictory. Often an activity may be intrinsically 
motivating because it shows both aspects.1  
Thus, there seem to be at least two aspects of ‘intrinsic’ motivation identifiable. The first aspect is termed intrinsic 
because the actor acts for her own reasons. Deploying a spatial metaphor we can say that the locus of control 
comes from inside the actor. The second aspect is termed intrinsic because of the feelings associated with the 
activity: one acts because doing so is satisfying and rewarding; motivation is derived from the activity itself. Such 
activity is sometimes called ‘autotelic’. 
Intrinsic motivation has been the subject matter of two influential psychological models devoted to its theoretical 
exploration reflecting this dichotomy of aspect. ‘Self-determination theory’ started from a concern with the 
perceived locus of control, as internal or external to the self.2  The approach associated with the work of Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi, which will be referred to as the ‘flow’ approach, started from an interest in the feelings 
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associated with the activity.3 These two theoretical approaches are not exhaustive of the field, but they have been 
the most thoroughly elaborated and influential. 
There does not seem to be any necessary contradiction between these two theoretical approaches to the subject of 
intrinsic motivation. Each of the two theoretical approaches tends to emphasise one aspect of intrinsic motivation 
in explanation and theoretical elaboration. The crucial difference seems to be in the questions asked rather than in 
the explanations given. Moreover, the two approaches share several important features. Each approach is interested 
in well-being and performance. Each tends towards a humanistic approach to psychology: positing inherent human 
psychological ‘needs’, and a tendency towards self-actualisation.4  
The emphasis here will be on self-determination theory, as the theoretical structure is more conducive to being 
deployed in an educational setting. However, this should not be understood to imply a rejection of flow theory as 
an explanatory model.5 
 
2. THE ORIGINS OF SELF-DETERMINATION THEORY  
The story of self-determination theory starts with the hypothesis of intrinsic motivation by experimental 
psychologists in an attempt to explain how rewards that were intended to reinforce behaviours could actually have 
the opposite effect. In the early seventies several researchers independently verified experimentally a phenomenon 
that ran against the grain of the dominant model of learning based on operant conditioning.6 The anomalous finding 
was that rewards could reduce subsequent engagement in an activity, rather than act as a reinforcement that led to 
behaviour modification in the direction of the reinforced behaviour. Rewards generated less not more of the 
rewarded behaviour. The hypothetical explanation put forward was that reward could lead to disengagement from 
an activity that had been initially intrinsically interesting and attractive. The studies gave experimental and 
empirical confirmation to the intuition that had informed several progressive educational reform movements: that 
educational institutions, with their structures of control and assessment, could create boredom and imaginative 
disengagement.7 In the words of one of the early studies the use of rewards risked turning play into work.8  
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Thus, researchers devised self-determination theory through attempts to explain the occurrence of a de-motivating 
effect from the giving of reward,9 and as later studies showed the similar de-motivating effects of deadlines, 
supervision, and some forms of feedback.10 The effect could be subtle, and it did not always follow verbal rewards 
in the form of positive feedback. The effect seemed to violate a fundamental principle of operative conditioning 
theory: that learning was adequately conceived of as a response to environmental stimuli, that organisms learnt 
from the reward or (less effectively) punishment of expressed behaviour. It was hypothesised that the de-
motivation was caused by the way a learner perceived and understood the reward.  
Hence, the first theoretical construct was called ‘cognitive evaluation theory’. The theory made the perception and 
understanding of the learner the crucial explanatory factor. If the learner understood that the reward indicated the 
task was being undertaken to further the purposes of the reward-giver, this could de-motivate the learner. It was 
de-motivating when, in the absence of reward, the learner felt the activity was either chosen by the learner, or for 
purposes serving the learner. In the terms used by self-determination theorists the perceived locus of causation was 
shifted by the reward, from the learner to an external agent. The learner was no longer choosing but was being 
manipulated. Rather than exercising autonomy in trying to carry out the task the rewarded learner felt she was 
being used to further some plan of the experimenter. Hence the valued quality in an action known as ‘autonomy’ 
was lost. The result was the previously intrinsically desirable activity became less attractive, as it was associated 
with being controlled by an external agent.  
Cognitive evaluation theory accounted for the developing experimental evidence. It explained the loss of intrinsic 
motivation for interesting tasks – the experimental anomaly – and also why a reward that was unexpected, and 
therefore not perceived as intended to manipulate the learner’s behaviour, did not undermine intrinsic motivation.11 
It could also explain why a reward that was perceived as an integral part of the activity was not de-motivating, as 
it also was not perceived as intended to control the learner’s behaviour.12 Finally, it explained why verbal feedback 
would be perceived as sometimes de-motivating (when it was perceived as controlling) and sometimes as not de-
motivating (when it was perceived as supportive).13 
Cognitive evaluation theory became part of a developing model of human motivation. It was foundational for self-
determination theory and it identified a sense of autonomy as an important and valued feature of people’s 
experience. By putting the understanding and action of the learner in the centre of the analysis, rather than having 
a focus on the encroaching environmental stimuli, the self-action of the learner became a central concern for any 
resulting model of learning. The intrinsically motivated, or desirable, activity was what the learner wanted to do. 
The activities in the experiments were not typically based on consumption, eating or drinking, the archetypical 
reinforcements in operative conditioning with animals. They involved effort and were directed to an end. They 
included examples of activities learners might engage in for the purpose of getting better at them. Such concerns 
were obviously consonant with theories of learning that took a developmental approach to learning,14 that saw the 
learner as reliably self-directed developmentally,15 and that deployed such concepts as human needs for 
activities.16 If we start our investigations from observations of desirable or enjoyable activities then it soon 
becomes necessary to identify why learners find some activities desirable. 
Edward Deci and Richard Ryan in particular were responsible for expanding the explanatory ambitions of 
cognitive evaluation theory into self-determination theory, a more ambitious account of human motivation and 
well-being. In the course of this development, autonomy was identified as one of three psychological needs that 
people have: the other two human needs being a need to feel competent, and a need for relatedness.17 People 
naturally desire to engage in activities that they feel support or strengthen autonomy, feelings of competence, or 
relatedness. The motivation for engaging in such activities is intrinsic. Activities that threaten the satisfaction of 
these needs are felt to be undesirable. Such activities are not intrinsically motivated, and if such activities are 
valuable then some extrinsic ‘regulation’ of the learner is needed. To maintain the activity, and any learning that 
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is associated with it, the learner needs some motivational impetus beyond the attraction of the activity itself. The 
more an activity responds to these needs, the more self-determined the activity is. Thus, from identification of 
intrinsic motivation, revealed by rewards interfering with it, the theory has developed to put forward an account 
of a very few basic human needs that explain why some activities are intrinsically motivated. 
Obviously, in legal education many activities are not going to be intrinsically motivating for learners. However, 
they may be very important because of their educational purpose. Thus, one might learn the legal citation system 
in order to find law reports, but few of us derived genuine pleasure from distinctions between square and round 
brackets that had to be learned. To broaden its usefulness and potential application cognitive evaluation theory had 
to develop into self-determination theory. Self-determination theory posits a continuum of autonomous motivation. 
It also recognises non-autonomous motivations, the rewards and punishments of operative conditioning theory. A 
concern with intrinsic motivation led to the need to identify, elaborate, and try to understand extrinsic motivation. 
 
3. EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION  
The conceptual corollary of intrinsic motivation is ‘extrinsic’ motivation. Extrinsic motivation originates from 
outside the self, or derives not from the activity itself but from some consequence of carrying out the activity. The 
dominant model of ‘motivation’ in the middle of the twentieth century was the one implicit in operant conditioning 
theory or behaviourism. Strictly speaking behaviourism tried to avoid positing such ‘mental’ states as ‘motivation’ 
and to restrict the subject matter of psychological science to observable behaviour.18 Thus, it had no concept of 
extrinsic motivation; rather it had the concept of ‘reinforcement’.19 As we know it was the failure of desirable 
stimuli, the failure of rewards, to reinforce that led to the formulation of cognitive evaluation theory. Thus, the 
formulation of a concept of extrinsic motivation was originally parasitic upon intrinsic motivation; it was the other 
type of motivation. However, this crude dichotomy was soon rejected as inadequate.  
Self-determination theorists have developed a more complex account of motivation than a simple dualism of 
intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation. To offer an adequate account of human motivation it is necessary to make a 
broader and more elaborate set of distinctions.20 An important feature of this account is a total rejection of any 
dichotomy between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The opposite of intrinsic motivation is not extrinsic 
motivation, as extrinsic motivation is still motivation. The opposite is ‘amotivation’, no motivation, and therefore 
no relevant activity.21 In higher education this is the student who ‘drops out’, who fails to attend, who does not 
submit assessments. It is important to remember the possibility as extrinsic motivation is important in practical 
life, and one important feature of extrinsic motivation is that it is motivation.22 
Probably of least importance for improving educational practice is intrinsic motivation. Pure intrinsic motivation, 
joy in activity, is fairly unusual in the student body in higher education. No activity by teaching staff or institutions 
is likely to induce universal intrinsic motivation. Where some students are intrinsically motivated, their self-
regulation is precious: both because it will hold up the performance of those students, and because intrinsically 
motivated students may serve as role models for others – the presence of intrinsic motivation may be socially 
salient to the culture of an institution. Therefore, where intrinsic motivation exists the key educational imperative 
is to not disrupt the student’s motivation. It was the realisation that ‘rewards’ or ‘incentives’, attempts to encourage 
activity and improve performance, could actually reduce commitment and degrade performance that led to the 
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see section 5. 
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(2013) 19 (3) The International Journal of Pedagogy and Curriculum. 
conceptualisation of ‘intrinsic motivation’.23 We will return to the problems of interference between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivational features of an institution below. 
Extrinsic motivation requires an extended and differentiated account.24 Self-determination theory has developed a 
typology for external motivation that is both differentiated and dynamic.25 The expression ‘regulation’ is used to 
describe the manner in which different types of extrinsic motivation operate.26 The different types can be described 
as running along a scale from motivation that is most externally located and least self-directed towards more self-
directed whilst still extrinsic motivation. Before giving a short account of these various forms of regulation of 
behaviour it is important to reiterate that the description is of a dynamic not a static system. Obviously the attitudes 
of a student to aspects of study are not fixed. An ill-considered interference with an intrinsically motivated student 
can damage or even destroy intrinsic motivation. A well-considered intervention can lead to a student becoming 
more self-determined or even intrinsically motivated. Thus, the usefulness of self-determination theory in this area 
is in helping us to structure a teaching curriculum, a teaching methodology, and an institutional structure that 
supports students in developing a more intrinsic motivation for academic study. 
Extrinsic motivation has been conceptualised as a continuum with four identifiable regulatory types by Deci and 
Ryan.27 Each of the four requires our attention.28 
External regulation is regulation of behaviour perceived by the learner as coming from outside the self altogether. 
Thus, it is how self-determination theory describes the reward or punishment model of common sense psychology 
and behaviourism. The action is not undertaken for any reason that is relevant to the action – the action itself is at 
best neutral as a motivational force. The reason the action is undertaken is some non-essential or contingent 
consequence of the action (promised reward or threatened punishment). Obviously it is the consequence which is 
motivationally active in this model. If obtaining the reward is contingent upon undertaking the action then the 
actor will undertake the action. Whether the action is pleasant, indifferent, or obnoxious to the actor is not salient.  
When the author began his post-graduate legal education, what was then called Law Society Finals Part 2, this 
approach to motivation was almost reverentially demonstrated to his cohort. The entire student group was 
addressed in a lecture. It was obviously a lecture that was relished by the lecturer. We were instructed:  
‘Look to your left. [Dramatic pause, to allow the turning of heads] Look to your right. [Pause] One of you 
three will fail this course.’  
The idea, it seemed, was to motivate us to study hard by making clear to us that failure was a real possibility. The 
one in three statistic did indeed reflect national fail rates for the course. This practice continued at the relevant 
institution for many years after my attendance. It relied entirely upon external regulation and focused upon a 
relatively distant punishment for its motivating effects. As such it was justifiable under no psychologically 
respectable model of student motivation. It was very controlling; and denied the existence of any hope in the 
collective psyche of the staff that the course might be intrinsically interesting; and it suggested the lack of 
competence in a large and undetermined part of the student cohort; and the particular dramatic technique (one of 
you three will fail) invited competition rather than relatedness and cooperation between the students. For all these 
reasons the technique could have been designed to frustrate rather than facilitate self-determination. The focus 
upon punishment distant in time, and, contingent upon students being able to produce complex and ill-defined 
behaviour, also failed to satisfy the basic requirements for operant conditioning.  
Introjected regulation is like an internalised version of external regulation. Just as the institution of censorship can 
lead to self-censorship, to forestall unwanted official attention, so the perceived goals and values of others can 
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determine the choices of someone. In effect the self chooses what it thinks someone else would want it to do, in 
order to avoid offending or disappointing that imagined other. The imagined other may not be a person. If a person 
feels they should want to do something, or to be something, and therefore they are motivated to engage in some 
activity, then the regulatory style is introjected. The demand is for compliance to some demand that feels external 
to the self, although there may be a desire to be what one should be. One suggestive description of what leads to 
introjected regulation is that it is what happens when people ‘swallow whole and do not digest’ aspects of the 
environment.29  
Introjected regulation is associated with powerful negative feelings if the actor does not perform as he should: 
guilt, shame and loss of self-esteem. It is as if values have been accepted but not endorsed by the actor. The tension 
between the purposes of the other, who offers rewards and punishments to induce behaviour, and the self’s own 
goals has become internalised. The self does not want the things it is striving to obtain, yet it accepts that it should 
want them and act in ways that advance their achievement. Perhaps there is lack of reflection upon what it means 
to value something, the undigested value; perhaps the value has been adopted not for itself but to do what it is 
thought will please another. Regardless of the reasons for its existence introjected regulation is the least self-
determined form of internalised motivation. 
Identified regulation is in effect, to use the metaphor of undigested values leading to introjections, a digested 
internalisation of a goal or value. If the self adopts a value or goal then activity that expresses or develops that 
value, or that makes progress towards the goal, is undertaken because that value or goal is important to the actor. 
If students identify with values or goals, and they can see the links between the values or goals that they have 
identified with and their study tasks, then they are likely to be well motivated, and therefore more successful. This 
is self-determined regulation of behaviour because it proceeds from and advances the desires of the self. 
The difference between introjected and identified, and the transition between them, is difficult to grasp in abstract 
terms. An experience of the author in the course of his legal education and training might help to clarify.  
I had completed the academic stages of legal education and entered into the work-based apprenticeship period of 
two years of ‘articles’ as it was then known. In this period I was employed by a firm of solicitors and working for 
clients, but under the close supervision of senior solicitors in the firm. One ‘seat’ was in the criminal department 
of the firm, advising suspects being interviewed by the police, and working in teams defending those facing 
criminal charges or criminal trial.  
I had to defend a man who was accused of a sexual crime against a minor. The defendant had previous convictions 
for sexual abuse of minors, and it seemed likely that he had committed the offence charged. However, his 
instructions were clear: he had not committed the offence, and the alleged events did not take place. I found acting 
for him conscientiously difficult. The duty to represent a client in a professional manner was one I was aware of, 
and the thought that I was not able to act professionally in this case made me feel inadequate and confused.  
I raised the problem with my supervisor and he gave me a typed excerpt from the address to the jury of Erskine in 
the trial of Tom Paine for seditious libel in 1792.30 The publication that led to the prosecution, Tom Paine’s Rights 
of Man, was probably the most notorious (or famous) book of its day. Only the beginning of the address had been 
reproduced, the remaining text, which was concerned with the freedom of the press, was not typed up. 
My supervising solicitor invited me to read the excerpt, and when I had, we had a conversation about its contents 
and the defence of the client.  
For those unfamiliar with the address to the jury, Erskine first dealt with prejudicial evidence led by the 
prosecution, and allowed in by the judge, at a time of high political excitement. Erskine tried to counteract the 
effects of this prosecution misconduct. The Attorney General had also made a distinct point of stating that he was 
personally committed to the prosecution. Erskine had been defamed and criticised for agreeing to represent Paine, 
and he did suffer professionally as a result of doing so.31 Erskine rejected the idea that he had to believe what the 
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defendant believed in order to defend him, that an advocate endorsed the views of his client by representing him. 
He rejected the idea that the lawyer should decide for himself whether an accused deserved to be found guilty, to 
in effect pre-try the defendant, and only defend those he thought to be innocent. He asserted the importance of 
counsel being available to any defendant if justice was to be done. The words in which he did so are still sometimes 
quoted as a classic statement of an important ethical principle for advocates:32  
‘For, from the moment that any advocate can be permitted to say, that he will or will not stand between the 
crown and a subject arraigned in the court where he daily sits to practise, from that moment the liberties of 
England are at an end.’ 
The effects upon me of this reading, and subsequent conversation, and reflection upon the role of defence advocate, 
was to change my feelings about the value of the advocate’s role, and my own participation in the defence of a 
man I thought was probably guilty. I had already accepted, without any deep consideration, the ethics of my 
profession, and was aware of the ethical rules around representation of defendants to criminal charges. However, 
I had not digested the material. The professional ethics were just another type of rule I had to be aware of and 
avoid breaching. Following the intervention of my supervising solicitor I identified with the values protected by 
the rule. I now wanted to abide by the rule because it enabled me to be the lawyer I wanted to be; it enabled me to 
serve a value in my work that I had become personally committed to.  
This shift from introjected to identified regulation was brought about by appealing to my reason. There was no 
attempt to deal with my concern through the assertion of authority. Implicit in this was choice, although it was not 
suggested that I stop working on the case if I did not resolve my conflicting feelings. I suspect if I had earnestly 
requested the same I would have been allowed to do so; however, the thought of ‘giving up’ did not even occur to 
me at the time. In any event I felt that my autonomy was being respected, I was being offered help to resolve a 
problem, rather than being told to toughen up and get on with it. But the manner in which the help was offered 
was supportive in other ways also.  
My concern was taken seriously, and indeed it had been anticipated that a decent man might feel conflicting 
impulses: between professional loyalty to the client and feeling the vulnerable should be protected from predators.  
My competence was assumed, and called upon, when the eighteenth century address was handed over for me to 
read. Not a summary nor an updated version, nor a version with the relevant passages highlighted. I had undergone 
an academic education and the reading of difficult texts was a central part of that education; this was an area where 
I had skills, and they were recognised.  
The document with Erskine’s address to the jury embodied tradition and offered membership in three different 
communities. First, it was the classic statement of an important professional ethical principle, that lawyers must 
stand ready to represent the unpopular, and if necessary suffer the contamination of their social stigma in so doing, 
in order to make the rule of law real. It also gave sage guidance on why we cannot concern ourselves with our own 
opinions of our clients’ guilt, and thus gave reasons to adopt what is a difficult perspective to adopt. These 
substantive aspects of the text linked me to the community of legal representatives (not barristers as I am a 
solicitor). Second, it linked me to all those other articled clerks who had been through this process. The document 
was clearly well thumbed. I was part of a community connected by a relationship with my supervising solicitor. I 
was a member of a community of decent young people who had needed to think and feel their way through this 
issue to become professionally fit lawyers. Finally, I was through the discussion of the document part of the team 
in the firm who had to deal with these conflicts. The strain does not go away, and it is important for all those 
involved to recognise the strain, and talk about it, and deal with it ethically and properly. 
Hopefully this rather long account demonstrates the meaning and importance of the shift from introjected to 
identified regulation. It also illustrates the intimate links between this transition and the values held by the student 
(in this case apprentice). It also illustrates how this transition can be facilitated by teaching practice, allowing and 
helping the learner to do what only the learner can do, by supporting the process. It seems likely that the key 
division between regulatory styles is between the externally regulated and the introjected on the one side and 
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identification on the other side. However, there is one more step towards a fully self-determined regulation that 
still stops just short of intrinsic motivation, and that was not achieved in the example above. 
Integrated regulation is not merely the adoption of individual values or goals but the integration of the adopted 
values and goals with each other and with the self that has adopted them. Thus, each value with which the self has 
become identified is aligned with the other values and desires of the self. This might be described as knowing who 
you are and feeling happy about who that person is. It has clear similarities to the state of being Frankfurt has 
termed ‘wholehearted’. Anyone who has been able to resolve the inherent tensions in being a spouse, and parent, 
and son or daughter, and sister or brother, and lawyer, and teacher, and researcher, and friend, and looking after 
themselves in being all these things, would be integrated. It may be a state more often aspired to than achieved, 
but one can become more or less integrated.  
Thus, self-determination theory has identified a range of extrinsic regulation of behaviour, ways that an activity 
that is not intrinsically enjoyable or attractive can be kept up. The range runs from least self-determined: external 
motivation and introjected regulation; to most self-determined with identified and integrated regulation. The more 
self-determined a regulatory style is the better in terms of motivational persistence and feelings of well-being. The 
range is not a description of the motivational character of individuals, thus a person might become more or less 
self-determined in their regulatory style. Nor is it a developmental range: an individual does not need to pass from 
external, to introjected, to reach identified regulation. It is possible to start from identified regulation, or of course 
intrinsic motivation, towards an activity. The concepts are descriptive of a learning process, and thus are inherently 
dynamic, and internalisation is the dynamic process. 
It is through the development of an elaborated conceptualisation of extrinsic motivation that self-determination 
theory becomes a powerful aid in teaching and learning. It helps us to identify what should be effective in trying 
to enhance student motivation, and as will be seen below warns us against mistakes in this area. Although the 
theory started with cognitive evaluation theory and a focus upon intrinsic motivation, a single-minded focus on 
this educationally exceptional state was found to be inadequate because:33 
‘Throughout life, people face the challenge of developing self-regulation of activities that are useful for 
effective functioning in the social world but are not inherently interesting and thus not intrinsically 
motivated.’ 
 
4. HELPING STUDENTS BECOME MORE SELF-DETERMINED  
It is obviously self defeating to try and force people to be self-determined. Yet the more self-determined students 
are, the greater their well-being, and the stronger and more effective their motivation. Therefore, it would be 
desirable to make students more self-determined. We have seen above that identification with values can encourage 
self-determination, as identification involves a person taking the value as their own. A person wants to pursue 
activities which are aligned with a value her self has identified with, which advance that value, which develop 
capacities to act effectively in relation to that value. In these circumstances she is capable of self-determined 
regulation; her motivation is internally located. So, the problem is helping people become more self-determined.  
Self-determination theory views the person as an organism that seeks what it needs.34 The human needs that self-
determination theory posits are for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Needs should enhance well-being, so 
if one feels autonomous, competent and part of a group then one should feel well and happy or fulfilled.35 Needs 
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should be universal, so men and women, and people from different cultures, and people of different ages should 
share needs, that is all feel better if their autonomy, competence and feelings of relatedness are enhanced.36 Of 
course what activities allow people to feel competent, for example, will vary very widely across groups and 
individuals.  
 SOME EXPERIENTIAL SUPPORT FOR THE THEORY 
Taking this account of human needs, and the idea of the learner as someone who would naturally be attracted to 
and find satisfaction in activity that satisfied these needs, the author and his colleagues used these three needs as 
guides for designing a curriculum for a module and teaching the module. The idea was that if the module respected 
autonomy; recognised, rewarded and developed competence; and was delivered within a social environment that 
was supportive, and had features of a community to create relatedness; then it would enhance feelings of well-
being, and encourage internalisation of the ethos of the module and its aims, because it would be meeting the needs 
of the students. We hoped to encourage self-determined regulation of activity in the students through a design and 
practice that was supportive of the needs of the students. The module was Critical Legal Thinking, a final-year 
undergraduate jurisprudence module, the student group was around 120 students, and the module team were the 
author, Rebecca Huxley-Binns, and Andrea Nicholson. The module was very successful, student results were very 
strong, and student questionnaire feedback indicted high levels of engagement with the module. There were a lot 
of students who reported that the module was hard and that they enjoyed it. The module continues to run and is 
still successful; student feedback continues to be enthusiastic. We think that we had some success in facilitating 
self-determined regulation through giving attention to the needs of the students in our approach to design and 
delivery. 
Autonomy support was provided in several ways. We gave attention to assessment in particular. Final-year 
assessment is important to our students because it will determine the classification of their undergraduate degree. 
We felt providing for some autonomous choice around assessment would be symbolically very important. 
Institutionally we were limited in the form of the assessment (it had to be a 6,000 word essay and an oral 
presentation of ten minutes with ten minutes of questions). We had considerably more freedom around what the 
subject matter of the assessment would be, so we used this to maximise student autonomy. We provided three set 
titles, with student choice over which they attempted. We also provided for a fourth title drafted by the student, 
subject to approval and drafting help from the academic staff. This possibility was received enthusiastically; 
although only around twenty students actually drafted their own question, all the students had enhanced feelings 
of choice around the assessment. Given the controlling nature of assessment we felt this openness to negotiate how 
a learner wanted to be assessed was valuable.  
In an effort to support autonomy we also resisted any attempt to force an answer, or set of answers, upon students 
in class or in assessment. The module had an express and implicit emphasis on pluralism.37 One dramatic way of 
emphasising this was organising the lecture programme as a series of guest lectures by members of staff not on 
the module team. We refused to have a few authoritative voices that lectured, led seminar discussion, and assessed. 
By displaying diversity of opinion amongst staff we tried to legitimate variation of opinion. This also enabled us 
to emphasise the autonomy of staff, and thus was a cultural endorsement of autonomy. Finally, in our group 
sessions we emphasised the possible validity of different questions and different answers, but this aspect of our 
practice will be picked up below. 
We felt competence was a very important area to give attention to. There is a tendency for legal education to 
emphasise not being wrong, and to take little interest in the opinions of the students. As has been noticed elsewhere, 
learners often find legal education in the common law tradition debilitating.38 As justice is a virtue and easily 
approached through ethics, we decided to make this our approach because it allowed us to seek information from 
the students. This is because the intuitive response of people to ethical problems are various and important for 
ethical reasoning. All of our students could bring something of value to the early seminar discussions, because 
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their individual intuitive reaction to dilemmas was the subject matter of the sessions. Everyone could start from 
some base of competence. We could then develop in class the ability to reason about these intuitions and how 
juristic theories were either concordant or antagonistic to these intuitive feelings. We also tried to utilise media 
that our students were competent with. Text, especially extended text, is not the preferred medium for 
communication for many of our students. We located and obtained permission to use the lectures on justice by 
Michael Sandel originally delivered to students at Harvard.39 Almost all students are skilled at watching and 
following this type of material. Also, his approach modelled our seminar discussions and commitment to pluralism. 
Relatedness was the final human need we tried to meet. There were two major aspects to this. First, the small 
groups sessions, and the discussion of intuitive ethical responses. This material is quite personal in nature. It reveals 
information about what people value. If we are asking students to share such information then several things 
follow. First, staff must be open to share also, and avoid judgmental responses to the intuitive reactions of students 
at both the verbal and body language level. Second, students must respect the views of their peers and not deride 
or mock them. Third, the atmosphere needs to be relaxed and not earnestly charged. Although sharing such 
information makes one vulnerable, the process is in fact a natural social one that people will do without prompting 
if allowed to do so. Fourth, it must be possible to discuss, and even critically consider, the different intuitive 
reactions but avoiding ad hominem arguments. Therefore, the sessions become devoted to the subject matter of 
intuitive reactions to ethical problems but the process the sessions are devoted to is one of developing respectful 
discussion of ethical problems by the group. A group that shares such information and develops a respectful and 
relaxed style of discourse is a group that builds social capital.40 It is a group that provides and supports relatedness. 
Thus, the seminar sessions were used to build relatedness taking advantage of natural social processes and the 
nature of the subject matter. Relatedness was also built in a less immediate way. The attitude towards the jurists 
and other thinkers, and to the members of the academic staff, and to student peers was one of shared endeavour. 
Although it was perfectly proper to disagree with jurists or each other, the central task was one of trying to 
understand the hopes and work of the jurists. Pluralism accepts that no one has the answer to any important 
question. Several defensible answers exist to such questions, and usually several indefensible ones also. The 
students were invited to join a continuing quest for meaning and solutions to real problems of meaning and social 
co-ordination - they were invited to be scholars. This also gave a sense of relatedness through shared endeavour 
across time, status, and culture. 
Critical Legal Thinking was an example of a real-life attempt to use the insights of self-determination theory to 
enhance student well-being and motivation. It was an enterprise compromised by the demands of the institution 
and the experience of the students and the demands of other social forces; it was very far from a laboratory 
experiment. The students and staff all enjoyed the module, results were very good, students worked hard and 
achieved well, above the average for taught courses on the degree programme. It is worth reporting upon because 
it reflects a successful experience for those involved. It was not intended to be, and was not, a test of self-
determination theory in legal education. It was the use of self-determination theory in legal education.  
 SOME EXPERIMENTAL SUPPORT FOR THE THEORY 
An attempt to test the use of the differentiation of regulatory styles in extrinsic motivation and to test the efficacy 
of attempts to facilitate and encourage self-determined regulation was an experiment carried out by Deci, Eghari, 
Patrick and Leone.41 The experiment was designed to answer two questions. First, if there really was a difference 
between introjected regulation on one hand and identified or integrated on the other hand. Second, whether 
presence of one, two or three ‘supportive conditions’ would encourage the more self-determined form of 
regulation. They set up a dull task, to avoid the risk of intrinsic motivation interfering with the experiment, pressing 
a space-bar when a dot of light appeared on a monitor screen. The three supportive conditions were: providing a 
reason for the activity; acknowledging that the task was dull; instructions were given in a way that suggested the 
subject had choices. The non-supportive conditions were: no reason for the activity was given; no 
acknowledgement that the task was dull or irksome was given; instructions were relayed in a controlling fashion 
using such expressions as you should, must, and have to. There were 192 ‘subjects’ who took part in the 
experiment, all of whom were psychology students at a North American College whom were offered credit for 
taking part. The group of subjects included both men and women but no significant sex differences were identified 
in the results.  
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The experimenters measured motivation in two ways. First, by measuring continuance at the task after the 
experimenter had declared the experiment finished: subjects were invited to carry on if they wished to do so while 
the experimenter fetched a questionnaire. Second, through a questionnaire that asked about the subjects’ attitudes 
to the task. From analysis of the questionnaire responses, statistically significant support was found for the 
conception of difference in motivational regulation between the groups who experienced self-determination 
supporting conditions and the groups that did not. Essentially, the group given supportive conditions found 
meaning in the activity. From analysis of persistence in the activity measure, statistically significant evidence was 
found for effects upon persistence of the different experimental conditions. Essentially, when two or three 
supportive conditions were present there was more persistence, but when one or none were present there was less. 
Oddly, in the light of the theory, no supportive conditions led to greater levels of persistence than the presence of 
one supportive condition. 
The experiment has been described at length for four reasons. First, it illustrates how artificial the experimental 
technique is when contrasted with something as important to the learner and complex and prolonged as legal 
education.  
Second, it illustrates how sensitive people are to minor changes in the social situation. Essentially, the self-
determination supportive conditions amounted to treating the subjects with the respect due to rational people. They 
were given reasons for acting in a certain way, shown consideration with regard to their feelings, and asked to do 
things and given some choice over how the task was undertaken. These subtle and undemanding social conditions 
were enough to change how willing people were to do something, how they felt about what they were doing, and 
what sense they made of the activity. By artificially stripping away complexity the experimental method allows us 
to observe and confirm the presence of such delicate social and psychological processes.  
Third, the experiment allows us to reflect back upon the learning experience of the author when he found himself 
representing a man accused of sexual offences against a minor. Self-determination theory, as illustrated by this 
experiment, gives an explanatory model for why the intervention by the supervising solicitor was so effective. His 
actions assumed that I deserved and needed a good reason for doing what the job demanded. His response fully 
acknowledged the reasonableness and appropriateness of my feelings about the task. His response did not use the 
very real authority he had over me. Furthermore, as noted above he encouraged me to recognise and develop my 
competence and enhanced my feelings of relatedness. However, he did not do this to fulfil the requirements of 
self-determination theory. He did this because he recognised me as a decent human being and fellow professional 
in the making. What this experiment makes very plain is that one reason self-determination theory works is because 
it recognises the learner as a fully human being whose co-operation needs to be sought and not something that 
needs to be manipulated into acting as desired. 
Fourth, the experiment found that the condition that led to the least persistence was the presence of only one of the 
three supportive conditions. Where there was no encouragement for self-determination there was relatively 
significant persistence in a dull and intrinsically unrewarding task. This was despite not valuing that task as shown 
by the questionnaire responses. It seems possible that the extrinsic motivational range of regulation may have a 
discontinuous aspect to it. Sometimes the movement from interjected to identification or integration may be a 
natural enough progression, as was illustrated by the experience of the author faced with representing the 
defendant. However, sometimes the two approaches to regulation may be conflicting or contradictory; more of 
one may require less of the other. The experiment raises the possibility that there may not be merely one risk of 
de-motivation through rewarding or punishing behaviour. One familiar risk is of external interference in the 
presence of intrinsic motivation, the phenomenon that first inspired cognitive evaluation theory. This experiment 
suggests what may be a far more common risk, the risk of substituting introjected regulation where in its absence 
identified or integrated regulation could have been established.  
In teaching terms we may be faced with two potentially effective but contradictory approaches to student 
motivation. We may strive to establish either introjected regulation, or to establish identification or integration. 
However, it is worth quoting from the conclusions of the experimenters, who in somewhat more rarefied terms 
seem to be identifying the possibility that we are faced with a choice of aim in legal education, and indeed in 
education generally:42 
‘Perhaps the most important finding of the present research was that the type of internalization – namely, 
integration versus introjections – appears to have been dichotomously dependant on whether the context 
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tended to be supportive of self-determination promoted integration (as represented by positive correlations 
between behaviour and self-reports), whereas those that were nonsupportive of self-determination promoted 
introjections (as represented by negative correlations). 
These results are consistent with a kind of threshold (rather than incremental) model of promoting 
integration … Integration seems to require a general ambience of support for self-determination, whereas 
introjections results when there is a general ambience of non-support.’ 
We have already established that the ‘ambience of support’ amounted to treating people as responsible agents 
whose co-operation was sought. We have seen how in the world outside the laboratory this approach is concerned 
with the values held, and sense of self of the individual, and the sense they have of belonging and wanting to 
belong to a community. We have argued that the intrinsically motivated individual should be treasured, and we 
should try not to interfere with her activity. This experiment suggests that there are good reasons, in terms of 
teaching efficacy, to abjure the attempt to motivate through both external and introjected regulation. This is not 
because such regulation is altogether ineffective, but because it is less effective and results in lower well-being for 
the learner than identified or integrated regulation, and we cannot act to encourage both at the same time. It seems 
we must consider the theoretical contradictions between different models of learning, because the consequences 
of facilitating both are not harmonious, the relevant facilitative conditions cannot be combined. Rather the learning 
environments required are discordant and we must choose one or another. What the researchers termed ‘ambience’ 
is not an accretion of separate social conditions that can be added regardless of what other conditions are present, 
it is the holistic character of a situation.  
 
5. INCENTIVES AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES  
As has been noted cognitive-evaluation theory and flow theory, and other theories that posit concepts of intrinsic 
motivation as causative or explanatory factors in their models of learning, were reactions to the dominance in 
Anglo-American academic psychology of operant conditioning learning theory, otherwise known as 
behaviourism.43 Explanations favoured by behavioural theory did not require any internal process by learners, or 
organisms to use the favoured term. This physical reductionism, which was tied to such influential movements as 
logical and legal positivism, was rejected as a workable scientific paradigm in the third quarter of the twentieth 
century. Thus, it was not only in the field of motivation and learning that this restrictive approach to the subject 
matter of psychology was rejected, and the consequences of this rejection are sometimes referred to as part of ‘the 
cognitive revolution’.44 However, the basic model of learning described by the theory of operant conditioning has 
not dropped out of use at all. The psychological theory was part of a wider interest in ‘incentives’ and we will 
return to this wider context below.45 
Classic formulations of the theory of learning through operative conditioning do not use the term ‘motivation’ as 
that would involve the ascription of importance to a non-observable phenomenon. The key concept is 
‘reinforcement’. Positive reinforcement is provision of a ‘stimulus’ of which an organism seeks repetition.46 In 
operative conditioning procedures animals would typically be kept hungry, and provision of food would be the 
reinforcing stimulus. However, experiments sometimes explored alternative sources of reinforcement. There is no 
need for a concept of motivation in this model, because it is absorbed into the concepts of behaviour (act), stimulus 
(environmental event; it seems ‘stimulus’ incorporates some idea of perception; if unperceived an event would not 
be a stimulus), and reinforcement (stimulus that increases the probability of the action being repeated). The pigeon 
pecks at a defined area (act), a pellet of food is delivered (stimulus), and the pigeon repeats the act (reinforcement).  
It will be apparent that positive reinforcement is not a discrete fact or event (eating the food pellet is not 
reinforcement) but a relationship between an earlier event (pecking), a present event (the ‘stimulus’ of getting and 
eating the food), and later events (the repeated behaviour). A stimulus reinforces if the act by the organism which 
immediately preceded the stimulus is more likely to be repeated after the stimulus than chance would bring about. 
Motivation would be an internal characteristic of the organism. Behaviourism avoids the need to acknowledge any 
such characteristic. There are only facts or events that occur in sequential order. It is an effect of an event – 
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reinforcement – that leads to behaviour change (or learning) that has efficacy. The aim is to explain what happens 
to the organism to alter its behaviour without imputing any internal, and therefore unobservable, events. 
It will be noted that motivation can be described as observable behaviour: it is the tendency to persist in action or 
efforts to effect an action (or obtain a goal). The difference between a motivational and a behaviouristic explanation 
is not primarily about what is observable and what is internal, and thus not observable. The difference is what 
factors are given causal effect. In behaviourism the description of events in the external environment is sufficient 
for a complete explanation of behaviour change. Therefore, there is no temptation to explore perspectives internal 
to the organism; ex hypothesi they are excluded from causal efficacy.  
Thus, reinforcement-based explanations are inherently committed to a view of motivation as something that 
operates outside the organism. The behaviourist is committed to external motivational efficacy because internal 
motivation is not expressible by the concepts available to the theorist. It is theoretically inconceivable. It is 
ineffable. The problem for behaviourism was that in order to render the internal state of the organism unnecessary 
for causal explanation the concept of ‘reinforcement’ was put under considerable pressure.  
‘Reinforcement’ was generally used in two different, but usually overlapping, senses. This ambiguity supported 
the theory in two ways. It aligned the theory with a version of folk psychology, and it made it seem that the theory 
was independent of any unobservable element. It achieved both of these ends by eliding ‘positive reinforcement’ 
with ‘reward’. When the rat pressed the bar and then received the food it was rewarded for pressing the bar – it 
obtained food and assuaged its hunger by eating it; and it was reinforced – it was more likely to press the bar again. 
Folk psychology explains the reinforcement by the reward, as we assume the rat associated the bar pressing with 
the reward. The desirability of the reinforcement, its reward character, is independent of the observation of repeated 
behaviour that follows its receipt. This is contingent. Food is desirable to a hungry rat. There is no conceptual link 
between desirability and positive reinforcement in behaviourist theory, that which is observed to be associated 
with increased frequency of a behaviour is reinforcement. The hunger of the rat is not a part of this explanation. 
We can trace the beginnings of the transformation from reward to reinforcement in the writings of behaviourists 
in the 1930s and 1940s. Ruth Grant notes a variety of usage to describe the external stimulus that would become 
the reinforcement. She notes such terms as ‘environmental stimulus’, goal stimulus’ and ‘goal object’ and quotes 
Hull:47 
‘The concept of incentive in behaviour theory corresponds roughly to the common-sense notion of reward. 
More technically, the incentive is that substance or commodity in the environment which satisfies a need, 
i.e. which reduces a drive.’ 
Here the reliance of behaviourism upon folk psychology of reward, and its concept of behaviour as being a 
disturbance or imbalance in the organism, are both on display. 
The ambiguity might seem unlikely to ever lead to confusion: as that which reinforces is likely to be desirable. 
Certainly, when dealing with hungry animals in tightly controlled laboratory conditions the two can be aligned. 
The ambiguity became visible, and the embarrassment caused by the impossibility of even articulating a contrast 
between internal and external motivations acute, when more complex and less tightly controllable conditions 
generated unexpected results. If provision of something that was desired (food for the hungry rat) made behaviour 
less likely (acted as a negative reinforcement) and doing nothing resulted in more of the behaviour (acted as a 
positive reinforcement) then reinforcement may be an absence of response by the environment. Thus, the 
psychological experiments in the 1970s that identified an inhibiting effect from reward made the ambiguity visible 
and created a significant problem for behaviourism. 
The paradigm experimental situation of the hungry animal and the food stimulus obscured the tension within the 
concept of reinforcement, because it was designed by people who understood that hungry animals will be 
motivated to do whatever produces food. The folk-psychology insight, that food rewards hungry animals and can 
be used to mould animal behaviour, informs the experimental paradigm. The technical description of reinforcement 
as any stimulus that is ‘observed to precede a greater probability of repetition of behaviour’ does not expressly or 
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conceptually require the ‘stimulus as reward’ mechanism. Animals manipulated in highly restricted environments 
will never expose the ambiguity. 
In the 1970s it was experiments involving human subjects that generated unexpected results. The provision of 
desired stimuli did not reinforce behaviour. The behaviour was being carried out, and behaviour was being 
persisted in, without any external reinforcement; furthermore, the introduction of stimuli intended to reinforce - 
the introduction of rewards - decreased the behaviour. Conceptually, behaviourism had very limited options for 
explanation. The behaviour could be explained as self-reinforcing behaviour. The persistence of the behaviour is 
explained by the behaviour being reinforcing of the behaviour. Here the key concept of reinforcement seems quite 
circular and non-explanatory. It is hard to avoid this circularity, whilst remaining inside the conceptual structure. 
The alternatively was to go outside the behaviourist theoretical constraint. A natural way to explain behaviour that 
required no external reinforcing stimulus was to say it was intrinsically motivated, the behaviour itself was 
desirable, or enjoyable, or valuable to the organism. The articulation of intrinsic motivation almost automatically 
carries with it its corollary of extrinsic motivation, and that fits behaviour that requires an external reinforcing 
stimulus quite naturally.  
It has been necessary to develop this account because the difference between the two models of learning is 
fundamental in two ways.  
Behaviourism deals with behaviour as something that is caused: it is the result of something originating in the 
environment impacting upon the agent - an essentially mechanistic explanation. The initial behaviour that will be 
shaped by operant conditioning is treated as random; it has no meaning. Motivational theories deal with behaviour 
as initiated by the agent in interacting with the environment, as such the purpose or perception of the agent must 
be considered as a causative feature of the description – an explanation essentially concerned with what things 
mean to the agent. The assumption is that behaviour will not be random, but directed by internal features of the 
agent.  
Behaviourist explanations do not recognise the agent as a moral being; it is a thing to be acted upon. Motivational 
theories can, and with human subjects in order to encourage self-determination must, treat the agent as a moral 
being.  
These structural differences mean that reliance upon either model is liable to generate interference effects upon 
attempts to use the other model. Actions designed to shape behaviour using operative conditioning will interfere 
with attempts to recognise and support self-determination. Actions taken to support self-determination will corrupt 
or even remove linkages between the desired behaviour and the rewarding or punishing institutional response. 
Thus, from the perspective of either explanatory model the actions taken under the presumptions of the other are 
senseless; they seem irrational and counterproductive. 
This basic conflict of conceptual description affects the relationship between motivationally informed theories 
such as self-determination theory and the folk psychology of reward and punishment. Alfie Kohn describes the 
synthesis of folk psychology with the learning model of behaviourism as ‘pop behaviourism’. Pop behaviourism 
has certainly not been swept aside by any cognitive revolution. It is often described by those who use its conceptual 
structure as the use of ‘incentives’ to influence behaviour. Psychological research into the motivational impact of 
rewards has been gathered and put to polemical use by Kohn.48 His work identifies the synergistic links between 
the conceptual structure of behaviourism and the folk psychology of reward and punishment in a persuasive 
extended argument.  
Kohn deploys research by self-determination theorists and by flow theorists amongst others. His central argument 
is that extrinsic motivational interventions are counter-productive and morally unsound. He argues that promising 
rewards to encourage behaviour that is capable of intrinsic motivation is actually de-motivating.49 Further, 
rewarding does not work in the way those deploying rewards want it to work. It influences behaviour as agents 
seek the reward, but they do this rather than trying to improve performance in the behaviour desired by the person 
rewarding; it is a classic system productive of unintended consequences. Rewards denied can quickly become seen 
by those denied them as punishing, and behaviourist models identified negative reinforcement as a poor substitute 
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for positive reinforcement. Agents focussed on rewards tend to eschew experimentation and risk taking in the 
activity rewarded, as it is a less effective means to obtain the reward, another systemic unintended consequence of 
using pop reward and punishment as behaviour modifiers. Rewards or punishments are often ineffective if they 
are used to alleviate a pressing institutional problem, because they do not seek to address the underlying cause of 
the problem. Finally, rewards corrupt relationships as they seek to manipulate rather than persuade.50  
It is important to realise how important this attack upon behaviour modification through incentive is for educational 
practice, because it undermines and casts doubt upon very common and well-meant educational practice and 
reform proposals. However, the conceptual resort to an intrinsic versus extrinsic dichotomy means we must treat 
Kohn’s synthesis with caution.  
Kohn does lead us to wider perspectives on motivation. Obviously, many practically and theoretically inclined 
people outside of academic psychology have been interested in motivation. The author’s supervising solicitor had 
a keen practitioner’s eye to effective motivational intervention as illustrated above. Management theory and 
practice, educational theory and practice, economic theory and practice, political theory and practice are all fields 
in which how behaviour may be influenced, and what people will learn from an experience or communication, are 
vital questions. In his synthesis Kohn addresses organisational theory and practice, educational theory and practice, 
and the raising of children in theory and practice. One factor that he emphasises and that we need to be aware of 
is the importance of power relations in the context of affecting the behaviour of others. This in turn reminds us of 
the importance of our values as legal educators when we contemplate how we should approach questions of student 
motivation. 
If, as the analysis above indicates, motivationally informed theories and incentive based theories interfere with 
each other, then one would expect to find some awareness of this problem in the literatures. Indeed this is the case. 
Bruno Frey, an economist, talks about the crowding out of choices informed by a concern with the public interest 
by the offer of monetary reward; and the loss of employee motivation following ‘incentivising’ reform of 
emolument. He expressed the basic insight as a formal proposition:51 
‘The (relative) Price Effect which captures the price system’s essential mechanism is fully accepted. The 
Crowding-Out Effect introduced here is an additional force working in exactly the opposite direction: a 
higher monetary reward offered may reduce an activity rather than increasing it.’ 
 Ruth Grant, a political scientist, highlights the need to view incentives as a means of exercising power, and to 
recognise the ethical consequences of that insight:52  
‘Persuasion, along with coercion and incentives, must be included among the alternative means of exerting 
power. Incentives attempt to circumvent the need for persuasion by giving people extrinsic reasons to make 
the choices that the person or institution offering the incentive wishes them to make. When incentives are 
employed, there is no need to convince people that collective goals are good or to motivate them to pursue 
those goals by appeals to rational argument or personal convictions.’ 
Obviously, therefore, an institutional emphasis on the deployment of incentives will tend to exclude the concern 
with student values that is central to the argument of this book. Incentives avoid the need to be concerned with 
what the people incentivised value or care about. This is because they are informed by a theory of causality that 
places the effective cause outside the learner; the concept of the incentive externalises motivation in the same way 
reinforcement does. 
In the educational field a widespread ineffectiveness of financial incentive schemes to improve educational 
performance was reported by Roland Fryer Jr:53 
‘In the 2007–2008 and 2008–2009 school years, we conducted incentive experiments in public schools in 
Chicago, Dallas, and New York City – three prototypically low-performing urban school districts – 
distributing a total of $9.4 million to roughly 27,000 students in 203 schools (figures include treatment and 
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control). All treatments were school-based randomized trials, which varied from city to city on several 
dimensions: what was rewarded, how often students were given incentives, the grade levels that 
participated, and the magnitude of the rewards. The key features of each experiment consisted of monetary 
payments to students (directly deposited into bank accounts opened for each student or paid by check to the 
student) for performance in school according to a simple incentive scheme … The results from our incentive 
experiments are surprising. The impact of financial incentives on student achievement is statistically 0 in 
each city.’ 
In an educational setting this actually represents a negative outcome, because of the demonstration effect. As Derek 
Bok reminds us, students are keen observers of the practice of educational institutions, especially if that practice 
is contrary to professed institutional values:54 
‘Another educational cost that commercialisation can incur has to do with the moral example such 
behaviour gives to students and others in the academic community.’ 
It will be recalled that the use of incentives is an attempt to manipulate rather than to persuade students. It is based 
upon a model of a passive agent who is affected by reinforcement. It is not an attempt at cooperation, and it lacks 
those features of an intervention supportive of self-determination that we discussed above. Although ineffective 
in changing behaviour in the way the incentive was designed to operate, the attempt to incentivise, or buy, student 
performance was still an attempt to exercise power manipulatively. This runs counter to concerns with working 
together, mutual respect, and educational practice being for the sake of the educated, for one would not need to 
manipulate someone else into acting in their own interests. If we think of analogues with legal ethics, such an 
approach would run counter to respect for client autonomy at the very least. In Bok’s words:55 
‘In colleges and professional schools alike, courses on practical ethics are now a common feature of the 
curriculum. Although classes of this kind can serve a valuable purpose, students will surely be less inclined 
to take them seriously if they perceive that the institution offering the courses compromises its own moral 
principles … In deciding how to lead their lives, undergraduates often learn more from the example of 
authority than they do from lectures in a classroom.’ 
The brute fact is that behaviourism, pop behaviourism, financial incentives, or rewards and punishment as a means 
to try and ‘motivate’ students are all varieties of a single model of learning, one that denies the need to concern 
oneself with the values or autonomy of the learner. Such attempts can have bad effects whether we describe those 
bad effects as: undermining intrinsic motivation; or creating an ambience suitable for and supportive of introjected 
regulation of behaviour; or of crowding out intrinsic motivation; or being ethically questionable attempts to exert 
power; or bad moral examples. 
Interventions that are not based upon the behaviourist paradigm include: showing concern with the values of 
students; engagement with students as autonomous individuals; support for and creation of groups or social spaces 
or communities in which feel students feel connected; and respect for students as people who have valuable skills 
and competences to deploy. The evidence in this chapter suggests that this approach is the practical and effective 
means to facilitate student motivation. That student self-determination and student choice of values and goals are 
essential parts of facilitating effective student motivation. In the context of legal education, where many of our 
students will go on to practice law professionally, these factors extend beyond the student experience to the issue 
of an education that can serve as a preparation for an ethical professional life. 
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CHAPTER 8  
ETHICAL IDENTITY  
 
It has been recognised that teaching legal ethics should not be restricted to teaching legal professional codes 
of conduct, but that it often is so treated when legal ethics form part of a compulsory curriculum. As 
Deborah L. Rhode writes:1 
‘Although ABA accreditation standards require schools to offer instruction in professional 
responsibility, the vast majority satisfy their obligation with a single mandatory course that focuses 
on bar disciplinary codes. Too often, the result is “legal ethics without the ethics”. Students learn 
what the codes require but lack foundations for critical analysis.’ 
However, this emphasis on the cognitive and theoretical itself has been criticised as too narrow.  
In this chapter and the next the broader aspects of ethics are the focus of attention - those components of 
effective moral action characterised as moral motivation and moral character by Rest. It is probably in this 
area of ethics, the area that impinges most upon the personal morality and identity of students, that anxiety 
about the proper limits of academic action is most acute. It is also in this area that detailed knowledge of 
professional codes is irrelevant except as illustrative material. It is in this area that an undergraduate degree 
designed to support the personal identity development of students is most clearly justified in educational 
terms. Finally, the systemic impacts of legal education are likely to be important in this area, as a failure to 
support students in developing an ethical set of priorities invites the adoption of unethical values by young 
people. 
 
1. TEACHING MORAL MOTIVATION  
 
To be morally motivated is to care about some moral or ethical value more than other values that are present 
in some situation.2 In this context ‘values’ mean anything that someone treats as having value.3  
It is important to remember that the four-component schema for ethical action is an analytical construct. It 
may not reflect psychological causality, nor a sequence of events in practice. A particular risk of distortion 
comes from our cultural narratives of moral heroism. In the words of Samuel and Pearl Oliner:4 
‘The emphasis on autonomous thought as the only real basis for morality continues to enjoy 
widespread acceptance. The lonely rugged individualist, forsaking home and comfort and charting 
new paths in pursuit of a personal vision, is our heroic fantasy – perhaps more embraced by men 
than women but nonetheless a cultural ideal. His spiritual equivalent is the moral hero, arriving at 
his own conclusions regarding right and wrong after internal struggle, guided primarily by intellect 
and rationality. It is this vision that underlies much of Western philosophy and psychology. In a 
culture that values individualism and rational thought most highly, a morality rooted in autonomy is 
                                                          
1 D.L. RHODE, ‘Ethics in Practice’ in D.L. RHODE (ed.), Ethics in Practice: Lawyers’ Roles, Responsibilities, and Regulation, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2000, p. 21. 
2 It is better to avoid a ‘moral’ versus ‘non-moral’ categorisation into mutually exclusive sets of values: ‘The use of two categories, “moral” 
and “non-moral” suggests to numerous writers on the topic that the cases to be investigated fall into two neatly demarcated and opposed 
categories … in everyday life we find, instead, a complex spectrum of cases, interrelated and overlapping in ways not captured by any 
dichotomous taxonomy.’ M.C. NUSSBAUM, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1986, p. 29. 
3 H.G. FRANKFURT, ‘The Importance of What We Care About, Identification and Wholeheartedness’ in The Importance of What We Care 
About, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998; H.G. FRANKFURT, ‘On The Usefulness of Final Ends’ and ‘On Caring’ in Necessity, 
Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999; and H.G. FRANKFURT, The Reasons of Love, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton NJ 2004; B. WILLIAMS, ‘Persons, Character and Morality’ in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1981.  
4 S.P. OLINER and P.M. OLINER, Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe, Free Press, New York NY 1988, p. 257. The 
reference to Adorno is to T.W. ADORNO et al., The Authoritarian Personality, WW Norton, New York NY 1950. 
considered most praiseworthy. Those who behave correctly – ethically in fact – but do so in 
compliance with social norms or standards set by individuals or groups close to them or because of 
empathic arousal are presumed to be in some way morally deficient. That few individuals behave 
virtuously because of autonomous contemplation of abstract principles – a finding that has been 
reiterated in numerous studies including Adorno’s and our own – has not deterred advocates of 
independent moral reasoning from advancing it as the most morally admirable style. In some sense, 
rarity may even confirm its virtue, since it conforms to our cultural notion of the hero as a rather 
lonely person. 
An individual who notices a problem, reflects upon it, decides that it is right to act, and then acts (the four-
component model in sequence and ascribed to a single agent) matches this cultural hero type. However, 
moral motivation is not likely to be derived from contemplation of abstract principles as applied to the 
exigencies of the moment. There is a danger that the components are treated as a narrative explanatory 
structure. If this is done we will be misled.  
Therefore, it is necessary to reflect upon what might generate moral motivation. It will be argued that the 
sources for moral motivation are likely to be close to features that are not purely cognitive, not entirely 
volitional, and that are important as part of an individual’s identity. Therefore, it is inappropriate to grade 
students for factors that indicate moral motivation of the type desired by the institution. Any assessment 
should be directed to either: self-knowledge (of the student); or assessment of the success of the educational 
practice (assessment of the institution). 
 
2. WHY DO PEOPLE ACT MORALLY? 
Samuel Oliner has spent many years trying to figure out what inclines people to act altruistically, rather 
than to remain passive bystanders, or to act wickedly. His research interests have been influenced by his 
own experiences as a Jewish boy in occupied Poland during World War II.5 He was helped by non-Jewish 
Poles. One woman in particular put her life, and the lives of her family, in jeopardy to assist Oliner when 
he came to her for help. He wanted to know why some people behaved in such an altruistic manner. There 
is no purchase here for assumptions of rational self-interest as a universal key to unlocking the secrets of 
human motivation.   
To try and understand the motives of those who had helped Jewish people living under the Nazi regimes in 
Europe, Samuel and Pearl Oliner identified people who had offered such aid, at a significant personal risk, 
without demanding payment or personal advantage in return. These people, rescuers, were interviewed and 
questionnaires were completed from their answers to questions. In each case the claim of a rescuer to have 
helped Jews was substantiated by third-party testimony. Some people who had not given aid were also 
interviewed as a control, and the questionnaires were also completed for them. These nonrescuers were not 
perpetrators of atrocity, but they had not been identified as having been moved to offer aid to Jewish people. 
The full process was administered to 231 rescuers,6 and a control sample of 126. However, it was discovered 
that this control sample was not uniform: 53 claimed to have been part of resistance groups, or to have 
helped Jews, or both. Therefore, the control group was sub-divided into two: actives (53) and bystanders 
(73). The actives claimed to have acted against the Nazi authorities; the bystanders made no such claims. 
Finally, 150 Jews who had been helped were interviewed. This group provided a third-party view of the 
apparent motivations of rescuers.7 
The questionnaire examined not just the attitudes of the interviewees. There were sections devoted to:  birth-
family background and upbringing; occupation, education, religious views, values, and disciplinary 
practices of parents (or significant others); youth and education, and beliefs and self-perceptions of the 
interviewee; life in the years before the war, including whether the interviewee was married, their 
occupation, education, political beliefs, and religious or community life; the events of the time immediately 
leading up to the war, and during the war; and post-war life – a section that included personality tests. Thus 
the questionnaire collected many types of information, and a lot of information beyond the fact of the rescue 
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itself. Particular attention was paid to any knowledge of, or links with, Jewish people in the life of the 
interviewee.  
Thus, the research allowed extensive qualitative material to be reviewed in the light provided by statistical 
comparison for the groups (rescuers versus nonrescuers and rescuers versus bystanders were the most 
revealing). The accounts of the rescuers were checkable against the accounts of those they had rescued (the 
third-party confirmations) and against the perceptions of those who had been rescued (the 150 Jewish 
interviewees).  
The Oliners concluded:8 
‘Rescuers, like nonrescuers, worried both before and during the war about feeding, sheltering, and 
protecting themselves and their families. What distinguished rescuers was not their lack of concern 
with self, external approval, or achievement, but rather their capacity for extensive relationships – 
their stronger sense of attachment to others and their feeling of responsibility for the welfare of 
others, including those outside their immediate familial or communal circles. While some tried to 
resist the burdens imposed by such attachments, their sense of personal obligation did not allow 
them to do so. The help they extended to Jews was rarely the result of a perception of Jews as 
particularly worthy, but was rather a reflection of their characteristic ways of determining moral 
values and actions. For some rescuers, helping Jews was a matter of heightened empathy for people 
in pain. For others, it was due to internalized norms of social groups to whom they were strongly 
attached. And for a small minority, it was a question of loyalty to overriding, autonomous principles 
rooted in justice or caring.’ 
The most infrequent type of rescuer was the person who owed personal allegiance to abstract principles: 
whether justice principles or principles of care. The felt sense of obligation was more often fuelled by 
discomfort and distress at the idea of the pain being suffered by others; or, by shared ideas about what was 
right or wrong. Principles are important for explaining the behaviour of rescuers, but they are not driving, 
they are not the primary motivational force. They might be said to articulate why it is right to act, but the 
call to action is more usually rooted in human empathy or group standards of conduct. 
This is not to downplay the importance of felt ethical beliefs. The point is that they are felt. The logic of 
the rescuers’ reaction seems to be something like what follows. Some principles are so important that their 
violation is an outrage to me as a person who holds them to be true.  It is wrong to treat people in a way 
that violates those humane principles, any people. It is not that some people deserve decent treatment, but 
that all people deserve decent treatment. To single out any group as undeserving is wrong. People who are 
threatened with being mistreated in such a way deserve our help. By helping we express our selves as these 
principles are fundamental to us. I think the Oliners make a similar argument:9 
‘For most rescuers, then, helping Jews was an expression of ethical principles that extended to all of 
humanity and, while reflecting concern with equity and justice, was predominantly rooted in care. 
While other feelings – such as hatred of Nazis, religion, and patriotism, or even deference to an 
accepted authority whose values the rescuer shared – influenced them, most rescuers explain their 
actions as responses to a challenge to their fundamental ethical principles. This sense that ethical 
principles were at stake distinguished rescuers from their compatriots who participated in resistance 
activities only. For these resisters, hatred of Nazis and patriotism were most often considered 
sufficient reasons for their behaviours; for rescuers, however, such reasons were rarely sufficient.’ 
What the research question and methodology made very clear is that the motivation, the feeling that some 
principles were fundamentally important and a compassionate response to distress, predated the occasion 
for moral action. 
If we return to the four components for moral action we find that establishment of moral motivation must 
precede perception and reasoning for effective action to occur. Moral motivation is more like a spring-
loaded trap than a stage in a sequential process. If the trap is loaded, and the principles are felt to be 
fundamental, then perception of what reasoning tells the agent is wrong will spring the trap. It will be too 
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late at the time of reflection in practice to start working on motivation. Thus, the importance of the character 
of the person facing a moral challenge is confirmed by the Oliners’ results. Character, predisposition to act 
when faced with cruelty or injustice, needs to be developed before the need to respond arises. One cannot 
expect people to develop motivation when faced with threats to their safety. As the Oliners’ noted we all, 
rescuers and bystanders alike, fear for the wellbeing of ourselves and our loved ones. The difference is that 
rescuers cannot remain impassive in the face of cruelty. 
The formation of character is not just a matter for higher education or legal education. The Oliners’ called 
for greater attention to be given to moral motivations in schools. Workplaces and professions have a role 
to play.  All social institutions are implicated in the success or failure of society to inculcate altruistic values. 
Families are important in this process:10 
‘Because of their solid family relationships, such children tend to internalize their parents’ values, 
increasingly incorporating standards for personal integrity and care within their own value systems. 
While they may articulate such standards as cognitive principles, they experience them viscerally. 
They provide an organizing framework for their life activities and assessments of right and wrong. 
Even minor infractions distress them, and fundamental violations threaten them with a sense of 
chaos.’ 
This alerts us to two important consequences of the results of the Oliners’ research. First, it may be unfair 
to blame those who lack moral motivation, sometimes called moral courage in terms resonant with our 
starting point of moral heroism, for their lack of motivation. If one has no familial model for strong moral 
motivation then it is far more difficult to achieve moral courage. Second, it is who we are that is at issue. 
This is not a matter of being persuaded by an arithmetical demonstration. This is not a matter of knowledge 
transmission. This is about who we are. It is the close links between who we are, issues of identity, and 
what we care about, that which guides our lives, that is considered next. 
In a later study Samuel Oliner interviewed Carnegie heroes (people who have risked their own life to save 
the life of another), and Hospice Volunteers. He combined this data with his research into rescuers of Jews 
in Nazi Europe. He also considered studies of military heroes, moral leaders, and philanthropists. He used 
these data sets to inform reflection upon the nature of altruistic action, both life-threatening or ‘heroic’ and 
prosaic or ‘conventional’. One important conclusion he reached was the need for an internalisation of 
principles if they are to be realised in practice:11 
‘What is the implication of these helper/rescuers, and what can we learn from their rich narratives? 
Looking at the group of individuals we interviewed, I can say, first, that ordinary people are capable 
of both heroic and conventional altruism and that they are ordinary members of a moral community 
who have internalized the ethics of caring, virtue, and social responsibility form their loved ones, as 
well as being in contact with other moral leaders in a certain period of their life. They have 
internalized the notion that persecution, oppression, and the lack of helping others in not an 
acceptable part of their moral universe.’ 
The impact upon life and identity of such acts of internalisation is our next topic. 
 
3. WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR A PERSON TO HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE? 
Some things we value, such as self-protection, personal aggrandisement, sexual satisfaction, are not 
generally considered ethical values.12 Other values, such as loyalty to one’s friends and family, protection 
of one’s projects, or keeping a promise are considered ethical in nature, but not perhaps altruistic. Some 
values, such as trying to protect vulnerable strangers, or seeking to advance social justice, are considered 
fully ethical. These fully ethical or altruistic values are generally linked to religious values, and the golden 
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rule is a strong unifying principle linking discrete valued acts: when acting ethically one is often trying to 
treat others as one would wish to be treated.13   
One can treat the care given to family, friends, community as ethical in nature.14 Oliner assumes care is an 
ethical response, and identifies it as a very important source of altruistic behaviour. One can treat caring for 
individuals as an essentially non-ethical felt necessity.15 It is assumed here that what we decide to label 
‘ethical’ or ‘moral’ is less important than the fact that we recognise that restricted accounts of morality are 
insufficient to our end of encouraging actual ethical behaviour. There are values that people hold, whether 
classified as ethical or not, that are imperative in their demands upon the agent holding them, and potentially 
in conflict with each other. Declaring a value ethical is not a means of resolving such conflicts. 
Values are tied up with identity.16 What one values and who one is are not wholly distinct questions. One 
has some choice over who one decides to identify with, and exercise of this choice will be influenced by 
what one values. Although ascribed identity might operate independently of individual valuations assumed 
identity is tied to such valuation. 
What one values is not a matter of indifference. In his context to value something is not to be indifferent. 
Individuals who lose the capacity to value anything, to whom all choices seem indifferent, are unable to 
live full lives.17  It seems they are prone to risky behaviour, and find it very difficult to sustain plans or 
relationships. Practical rationality assumes that there is a goal or aim that means can be directed towards 
achieving. If there is no goal, if nothing is valued, then rationality has no traction. 
Bernard Williams wrote of ‘ground projects’:18 
‘A man may have, for a lot of his life or even just for some part of it, a ground project or set of 
projects which are closely related to his existence and which to a significant degree give meaning to 
his life.’ 
Ground projects for Williams were matters of such importance for an individual that their frustration might 
lead the person to contemplate suicide, although they might be saved from despair by other things or hopes. 
Ground projects could be selfish, or not:19 
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and binds us to ourselves. It is through caring that we provide ourselves with volitional continuity, in that way constitute and participate in our 
own agency.’ 
17 A. DAMASIO, Descartes’ Error, Vintage, London 2006. 
18 B. WILLIAMS, above n. 459, p. 12. Compare A. COLBY and W. DAMON, Some Do Care: Contemporary lives of moral commitment, 
Free Press, New York, NY 1994, p. 86: ‘We have discussed the steadfast dedication to moral principles that guides the exemplars’ choices – 
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19 B. WILLIAMS, above n. 459, p 13. There is some empirical evidence for this conceptual analysis, A. COLBY and W. DAMON, above n. 
474, p. 64: ‘In Suzie Valadez, as in the other exemplars, this implies a fundamental identification of the self with the values and beliefs that 
are at the heart of the work. She has become consumed by the work, fully and completely engaged. For Suzie, her work is her life. It makes 
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‘Ground projects do not need to be selfish, in the sense that they are just concerned with things for 
the agent … They may certainly be altruistic, and in a very evident sense moral, projects; thus he 
may be working for reform, or justice, or general improvement.’ 
However, they are important because they constitute the character of a person, not because they are moral. 
Harry Frankfurt wrote of first order desires and second order desires. It is second order desires that are 
characteristic of persons. Animals have first order desires, they want things. To have a second order desire 
involves having a reflective attitude to one’s first order desires. One may want to want something, or one 
may not want to want something. It is an act of volition, deciding to want one thing rather than another, 
that constitutes an agent. To merely respond to desires as they manifest is to be a wanton. To want to want 
something, and to seek to realise that desire, and to set about doing so, is to act wholeheartedly. What one 
wants to want is what one cares about:20 
‘It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the 
structure of a person’s will … Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, 
men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting 
to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are.’ 
At first Frankfurt wrote in terms of decisions and reasoning, but eventually he emphasised caring, in other 
words holding something to be important, as ultimately constitutive of people. It was what one loved that 
was the starting point for reflection on life, not reflection on life that led one to care.  
There were two fundamental problems with viewing the issue as one of decision making, of volition 
constrained by reason. The first problem was that the evaluative criteria to judge whether one thing to care 
about was better than another thing to care about were hopelessly circular. In order to know what is better 
one must first know what is important, and what is important is what one should care about.21 The second 
problem was that the reasoning process was impossible to set up without some view of what matters to the 
thinker:22 
‘This means that someone who is interested in making a reasonable decision concerning how to live 
cannot propose to start out by refusing to take any determination of the will for granted. If he insists 
upon being entirely impartial, and upon evaluating the available options unguided by any volitional 
predisposition, his inquiry is hopeless. The pan-rationalist demand for selfless objectivity is in this 
context not a reasonable one. It makes no sense to attempt an impersonal approach, from no 
evaluative point of view, to the problem of how one should live.’ 
The emphasis here is on the need to start from a settled or real volitional position: that is it cannot merely 
be some arbitrary position subject to change at will. If one merely asserts some opinion then there is still 
no traction for reasoning to start from; because one might as well start from some other place.23 For 
Frankfurt this makes a familiar quality of love important – one cannot just chose what or who to love. Love 
is not merely a matter of decision or will. 
Frankfurt needed a starting place and he sought it in the idea of confidence of belief.24 Frankfurt appealed 
to love as the source for such confident belief – love not founded upon reasons. We care about and value 
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what we love and it gives meaning to our lives. Self-love, the preference for life over death,25 and our love 
for our infant children were his paradigm cases:26 
‘Perhaps there are such arguments, but that is not to the point. The fact that people ordinarily do not 
hesitate in their commitments to the continuation of their lives, and to the well-being of their 
children, does not derive from any actual consideration by them of reasons; nor does it depend even 
upon an assumption that good reasons could be found. Those commitments are innate in us. They 
are not based upon deliberation. They are not responses to any commands of rationality.’ 
Thus, when one places an ethical concern over other values one may be deciding who one is, who one 
loves, and what is important in one’s life. Furthermore, these questions of values so important they 
constitute the self are not questions that can be resolved through reasoned demonstration.  
The objects of one’s love must be determined by each individual for herself. Indeed, they are not matters 
that an individual can determine in any straightforward manner. To ask someone to just ‘be different’ in 
this respect is as cruel as to ask someone to simply change who they are sexually attracted to. The matter 
is not one of mere will. Volition has its own necessities as reason has its necessities. In each case the 
necessity is not felt as an external act of power – one is not forced by another to accept the necessity; rather 
one adopts and internalises the necessity.27 
The necessities of reason are more familiar to us. Consider this passage from George Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four. The rebellious hero Winston Smith has been caught and is being questioned by a party official 
called O’Brien. The process is designed to break Smith, and render him willingly compliant to the demands 
of the party. He is being electrocuted during the dialogue that follows:28 
‘“Do you remember,” he went on. “writing in your diary, ‘Freedom is the freedom to say that two 
plus two make four’?” 
“Yes,” said Winston. 
O’Brien held up his left hand, its back towards Winston, with the thumb hidden and the four fingers 
extended. 
“How many fingers am I holding up, Winston?” 
“Four.” 
“And if the Party says that it is not four but five – then how many?” 
“Four.” 
The word ended in a gasp of pain. The needle of the dial had shot up to fifty-five. 
… 
The fingers stood up before his eyes like pillars, enormous, blurry and seeming to vibrate, but 
unmistakeably four. 
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“How many fingers, Winston?” 
“Four! Stop it, stop it! How can you go on? Four! Four!” 
“How many fingers, Winston?” 
“Five! Five! Five!” 
“No, Winston, that is no use. You are lying. You still think there are four. How many fingers, 
please?” 
“Four! Five! Four! Anything you like. Only stop it, stop the pain!”’ 
Orwell is demonstrating the violence inherent in trying to force someone to deny what they know, as a 
matter of reason, to be true. Two plus two makes four, whatever the head of the institution claims. It is a 
necessity of reason to acknowledge the fact. But it is not an alien will that forces acknowledgment – it is 
one’s own understanding. To deny the truth is to do violence to the self. 
For Frankfurt what one loves, what one cares about, is a necessity of volition. Although one can work 
towards not loving that which one loves it is a labour that must be undertaken by indirect routes. One cannot 
successfully will oneself not to love what one loves, no more than one can will to believe that two plus two 
makes five:29 
‘To the extent that a person is constrained by volitional necessities, there are certain things that he 
cannot help willing or that he cannot bring himself to do. These necessities substantially affect the 
actual course and character of his life. But they affect not only what he does: they limit the 
possibilities that are open to his will, that is, they determine what he cannot will and what he cannot 
help willing.’ 
Unlike the truths of arithmetic what one cares about is constitutive of who one is:30 
Now the character of a person’s will constitutes what he most centrally is. Accordingly, the 
volitional necessities that bind a person identify what he cannot help being … the essential nature 
of a person consists in what he must will. The boundaries of his will define his shape as a person.’ 
This analysis of how we construct ourselves from what we love is a way to understand the metaphor of 
internalisation. 
When we internalises a principle we make it a guide for feeling and action. We want to advance the 
principle; it is what we care about and how each one of us judges our self. It is likely the internalisation 
was associated with individuals we loved or cared about. However, that is not the central issue. It is our 
relationship with the internalised principle, not how it came to be internalised, that we need to focus upon. 
To betray the internalised principle is to betray ourselves:31 
‘Caring about his beloved is tantamount, then, to caring about himself. In being devoted to the well-
being of his beloved as an ideal goal, the lover is thereby devoted to an effort to realize a 
corresponding ideal in himself – namely, the ideal of living a life that is devoted to the interests and 
ends of his beloved. Someone who loves justice, for instance, necessarily wants to be a person who 
serves the interests of justice. He necessarily regards serving its interests not only as contributing to 
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the realization of a desirable social condition, but also as integral to the realization of his ideal for 
himself. His love defines for him, at least in part, the motives and preferences of his ideal self. 
A person who fails to act in the ways that caring about his beloved requires necessarily fails to live 
in accordance with his ideal for himself. In betraying the object of his love, he therefore betrays 
himself as well. Now the fact that a person betrays himself entails, of course, a rupture in his inner 
cohesion or unity; it means that there is a division in his will. There is, I believe, a quite primitive 
human need to establish and to maintain volitional unity. Any threat to this unity – that is, any threat 
to the cohesion of the self – tends to alarm a person and to mobilize him for an attempt at “self-
preservation.”’ 
It is clearly true that to pretend to have no ethical perspective in legal education is to teach unarticulated 
ethics by stealth. It produces an unsophisticated naturalistic defence of the status quo in curriculum terms. 
The attempt to do so may not be in bad faith. Fear of encroaching upon parts of the students’ selves that are 
not decently encroached upon may lie behind such attempts. 
It is here, in the field of moral motivation, that the fears of value informed teaching being oppressive and 
tending towards attempts at mind control are most alive. It is a sense of how intimately these questions 
relate to the self that makes people of good faith wary of exploring them. What is not justified by the 
academic role is the assumption of the rule of spiritual teacher or guru to the student.  In this field respect 
for the self-determination of the student is of primary and overwhelming importance. This means, inter 
alia, that summative assessment in this area – testing and grading for righteousness – is not justifiable on 
any grounds.32 
It is here that the voluntary nature of student choice is paramount. Paternalism is dangerous here. Critical 
thought is threatened by the imposition of any values here – even those justifiably taught on a law degree 
as constitutive of law as a discipline, or as a system, or as a profession. Hypocrisy and self-blindness on the 
part of academics are a particular danger here. What we care about is not a proper standard for what our 
students should care about. Even the moral has and should have its limits, morality that tries to determine 
all of our important acts:33 
‘is a genuine pathology of the moral life, the limitations of the moral is itself something morally 
important.’  
And it must be for individuals to determine those limits in the light of what they care about as individuals, 
not as abstract moral agents. 
Moral motivation is however a necessary subject to teach upon - although the better verb might be 
‘facilitate’ rather than ‘teach’ in this context. Self-reflection upon values is a vital aspect of the forming of 
identity. As noted above it is constitutive of the self. Supporting students in this enterprise is vital to 
effective ethical education and to supporting the student in their identity formation. What is not acceptable 
is correct moral character as an assessed learning outcome.  
 
4. TEACHING MORAL MOTIVATION IS VALUE-INFORMED LEGAL EDUCATION  
Moral motivation, it is argued above, is a matter that requires attention before a person is placed in a position 
of making a difficult choice. A predisposition for giving priority to ethical concerns needs to be established 
in advance. It may be already present in students: as a result of family background; or educational 
experiences prior to higher education; or from association with social groups that hold principles of ethical 
conduct dear. Legal education might endorse and maintain already existing values that could motivate 
ethical action in the future. Or it might actually dampen down and stifle principled reactions in students 
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who arrive with internalised principles of care. Or it might establish such principles where they are lacking, 
and maintain them in students who already have them. 
Oliner tries to inculcate altruistic principles by modelling them in his practice and talking about them in his 
teaching:34 
‘In my own teaching I try to share with students ample evidence that helping others and putting the 
welfare of others alongside their own is psychologically and physically healthy for them and that 
there are negative consequences of indifference to other people’s plights.’ 
He also asserts that our institutional practices need to reflect respect for altruistic principles if we wish to 
teach by example:35 
‘I can only hope that people who share my vision for a more caring world will take this research and 
move it forward by designing caring curriculums, workplace procedures, and ways to invest their 
daily lives with good works.’ 
In this he reminds us that what has already been argued for in this book is the starting point for teaching 
moral motivation. Oliner aligns his preferred values with the welfare of the student. He tells us that in his 
teaching he emphasises the advantages to the students personally of adopting the values he cherishes. One 
suspects, from reading him, that he also models his values through his teaching persona. He argues for a 
value sensitive curriculum, and awareness of the importance of values in procedures, and encourages his 
readers to make doing good part of their lives.  
A value-informed legal education is one that makes values, principles, caring, and student reflection upon 
who one wants to be, salient in the educational process. To some extent any and all of the proposals for 
teaching practice in this book are relevant to moral motivation. If moral motivation is something that is 
learnt from people who the learner cares about, then the quality of student relationships with staff and other 
students is important.36  
Moral motivation is learnt, but not necessarily in classrooms as a subject. The process is natural in the 
context of a community, internalisation of standards of conduct it is an essentially social activity: whether 
that community be a family, or a university, or a network of scholars, or a profession. The studies of Oliner 
have reaffirmed the essential insight of Aristotle on the importance of ‘character’ and its essentially social 
nature:37 
‘An Aristotelian approach considers human beings to be inherently social, and treats moral character 
as a social construct. To this extent it starts by acknowledging that we are members of a community 
with some common locus and culture. The idea of community emphasizes that our individual 
interests and mutual interests are situated or embedded within the institutions and social groups to 
which we belong. Both the law school and (as Durkheim noted long ago) the professions clearly 
constitute moral communities and serve as guardians and transmitters of cultural capital and values; 
the implications of this – both positive and negative – warrant consideration in the curriculum. At 
the same time, we cannot forget, either individually or collectively, that we are simultaneously 
members of wider communities (defined by cultural ties, ethnicity, and so on), so that we need to be 
sensitive to the priorities that might be assigned to our obligations to these different communities.’ 
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Thus, once again pluralism is a necessary pose because the communities we live in are diverse, because 
modern society is diverse, and ethical thought should seek areas of agreement that can bridge moral 
communities.  
The use of dilemmas, as advocated as a means for teaching moral reasoning above, can lead to the 
development of moral motivation. This is for three reasons. First, the appeal to intuitive responses as a 
starting point for discussion brings home moral diversity in the student group. It allows students to become 
aware of the possibility that people they like might disagree about matters of importance, and to view such 
disagreement as something for discursive reflection rather than conflict. Second, it allows students to take 
their values and their selves seriously.38 It makes reflection on values possible without embarrassment or 
threat of humiliation. Finally, it operates as an opportunity for imaginative rehearsal. Many of the teaching 
techniques that are used in this area rely upon forms of imaginative rehearsal. The metaphor of the spring 
trap helps us to see why. To be effective, moral motivation must be in place before the possibility of ethical 
action arises. Unless the situation is highly repetitive and has been institutionally reduced to routine then 
real life experience may well not be available. Therefore, the human capacity to imagine and plan for the 
future must be called upon, we do this through imaginative rehearsal: in other words we practice.  
Thus, it is important to recall that facilitating ethical conduct is not teaching a series of separate tasks to be 
mastered by the student. To deliver legal education it is necessary to focus upon some delimited knowledge, 
or process of reasoning, or skill, or exercise. One cannot teach everything at once. The modern jargon is to 
talk of learning outcomes from some teaching process. These are attempts to describe the immediate 
purpose of the session or module or programme. However, the aims of higher education generally and legal 
education specifically transcend the outcomes. We hope to enable people develop capacities that they will 
use and elaborate upon through their life. We hope to facilitate people acting ethically, rather than being 
too surprised, or too frightened, or too abashed to do so. These aims are supported by many learning 
outcomes, in different ways for different learners. The specific examples considered below are just that, 
examples. They make sense in the broader context of a value-informed educational practice, rather than as 
free-standing solutions. 
 
5. ALLOWING STUDENTS TO ENVISAGE THEMSELVES MORE OBJECTIVELY 
It is not always natural for students to ‘imaginatively rehearse’ possible futures. One problem is that the 
exercise only works if the imagined future is that of the student herself. The student needs to see herself as 
subject to forces and possibilities that are common to humanity rather than as the unique entity she surely 
is. Seeing the self ‘objectively’ – as others see one, in terms of characteristics one shares with others – is 
not straightforward.39 This difficulty is compounded by a narcissistic tint to our social life: there is reason 
to fear that concern with how others see us is becoming threatening to personal development.40 What we 
risk in attempting to encourage objectivity is inflaming pre-existing anxieties around appearance and peer 
perception. We need an impersonal and non-threatening method to allow personal imaginative rehearsal of 
the future.41  
In this endeavour the language and production of drama are potentially very useful. Dramatic productions 
are familiar to students and the language of drama has been assimilated by social scientists who were trying 
to obtain a similar objectifying effect. 
The metaphor of the theatre has been powerful in sociology. People have roles, such as mother, or Protestant 
Irish (Orangeman), or child, or barrister, or German, or school child, or blind person, or garage mechanic, 
or gang member, or city counsellor, or retired person, or sister, or bird watcher, or Conservative, or mental 
health nurse, or goth. Viewed from the perspective of the social institutions we inhabit our personal identify 
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is largely a function of our roles. Some roles are more important than others, and we occupy many roles at 
the same point in our lives and across different points in our lives.  
Different roles are played out before different audiences and in different physical locations. One problem 
with the concept of the role is that it is static. Life is lived over time and the person who lives it changes. 
Learning is probably continuous over life, and experiences shape perception and decisions.  The role is not 
endlessly repeated as in the real theatre, it is constantly under revision. One way to express this aspect of 
life is to talk of careers. Goffman coined the expression ‘moral career’ in connection with the role of the 
mental patient at an asylum,42 and used it again to refer to the stigmatised and those who manage characters 
(public perceptions) that are subject to being discredited.43 Goffman did not give any definitive definition 
of the moral career but Rom Harre gave the concept a definition that is adopted here:44 
‘It is the social history of a person with respect to the attitudes of respect and contempt that others 
have to them and of their understandings of these attitudes.’ 
We can return to Goffman for an explanation for why the idea of ‘the career’ is helpful in trying to construct 
and understand biographies and autobiographies:45 
‘One value of the concept of the career is its two-sidedness. One side is linked to internal matters 
held dearly and closely, such as image of self and felt identity; the other side concerns official 
position, jural relations, and style of life, and is part of publicly accessible institutional complex. 
The concept of career, then, allows one to move back and forth between the personal and the public, 
between the self and its significant society, without having to rely overly for data upon what the 
person says he thinks he imagines himself to be.’ 
For the educational project it is not the freedom from reliance on self-report that is significant: it is the 
ability to move back and forth between private and public; between identity and group membership and 
status.  The idea of the moral career is also useful because education is, of course, an institution that spends 
a lot of time on shame and honour formally through ‘assessment’ and informally in countless classroom 
interactions.46 Every student has experience of successful and unsuccessful ‘hazard’ – the taking of a risk 
to hopefully gain honour and prestige but which risks failure and humiliation. Engagement in social 
interaction always involves hazard, and intuitively one knows that fear of failure and humiliation is stronger 
than the hope of approval and success in many student groups. Although the official and instrumental 
activity is study and refinement of understanding, the seminar or tutorial is a social space easily used for 
expressive action – the bestowing of honour or contempt.47 
In developing the idea of the moral career in the context of teaching there is then a potentially painful self-
awareness on the part of the academic.48 One reason many institutions do not explore this area is that it 
might expose the institutionally powerful to moral hazard and reveal the tenuous link between overt aims 
and actual practices.  
The ideas of the role, and of the role through time as the career, and of the moral career as a particularly 
important and familiar career, are still not enough to deal with the task at hand. There remain two more 
complicating factors. One is life span. The other is multiple roles carried out in different theatres. At this 
point we can call upon the work of Donald Super who devised a diagrammatic means to express these ideas. 
He incorporates life span, and multiple roles, and the interaction between roles into a single image.49 
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Furthermore, he can incorporate decision making into the overall picture enabling a single life decision to 
be thought about as a part of the complex situation that it takes place within. 
Super’s diagram is a ‘rainbow’ – the arch shape tracks life span from vulnerability as a baby to vulnerability 
as an old person: the assumption is a process of birth, growth, exploration, establishment, maintenance, 
decline, and death. At first roles are limited in number (child – the mother-baby dyad; sibling); but they 
increase in number (one does not stop being a child or sibling when one goes to school – a new role as 
student is added); and then tend to decrease (as parents die, schooling comes to an end, retirement removes 
the professional career). At different times different roles are primary. The diagram manages to show the 
potential for conflict as the time available for different simultaneous roles generates zero-sum choices 
(whenever time spent on one activity or in one ‘theatre’ is lost to another). 
In practical terms one can start with the rainbow and the idea of multiple careers over a life-span. Students 
can be invited to sketch out the careers they feel will be desirable, or important, in the form of a career 
rainbow. Interesting variation or novelty can be looked at, and the idea of a career can be articulated. 
Elaboration of the diagram leads naturally to the setting out of the concepts. At this point the idea of career 
contingencies and decisions can be introduced (and noted on the diagram). These can then be fleshed out 
into decision problems drawn from real life or fiction or created for the educational setting.  
The rainbow has already proved to be useful with several categories of students:50 from A Level students 
to undergraduate students in social sciences. It encourages debate and the imagining of the self as an 
individual with multiple and potentially conflicting sources of identity from different theatres and roles 
played within them. Students are encouraged and enabled to view themselves as engaged in a life that is 
individual and contingent yet typical and predictable; that is constrained by necessity yet determined by 
personal decisions; that is lived and yet described by theory. The experience is apparently enjoyed and 
productive of insight rather than being dry and of no relevance. 
Participants in the Super’s rainbow exercise seem to enjoy the novelty of viewing their life from an unusual 
perspective. The theatres and roles are sometimes subjected to critical comment, but that can inform 
discussion and is not problematic. Multiplicity of roles and theatres brings into focus issues around 
conflicting demands on actors.51 Synchronous roles in different theatres invite reflection on whether some 
aspects of the actor should remain stable across roles, an issue of the proper place for integrity in the face 
of incompatible pressures for compliance.52 The waxing and waning of careers suggests the importance of 
time in decision making about life projects. The schematic manages to give an impersonal means to reflect 
upon what one thinks is important in a life.53  
 
6. DIVERSITY: AWARENESS OF DIFFERENCE 
Robert Putnam describes two types of social capital.54 There is social capital that has a bonding effect: it 
reinforces the ties of an exclusive community. There is social capital that is bridging: it operates across 
social groups, hence bridges gaps. If we are to advance the values of the political solution of difference then 
we require a system that is characterised by bridging social capital. It is through the recognition and valuing 
of diversity that political rule operates. However, totalitarian and authoritarian rule tends towards the rule 
of an exclusive sub-group: racial groups in Nazi Germany, and Apartheid South Africa, and the British Raj; 
class or party in the USSR; religious groups in early modern Europe. Bonding social capital is still valuable 
social capital, but it can encourage intolerance and petty mindedness. Bridging social capital is the source 
of tolerance and cosmopolitan views.55 
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When in using the dilemma to make students aware of difference of opinion amongst the students then one 
is facilitating the production of bridging social capital. People naturally seem to enjoy the types of 
interactions that generate social capital.56 Exercises that highlight how different groups experience social 
interactions can be powerful learning opportunities. However, care needs to be taken to avoid 
embarrassment and reinforcement of bonding social capital alone.  
Russell Pearce has reported on an exercise designed to open up discourse on how people feel they are 
perceived.57 In a group large enough to generate feasible sub-groups the class is asked to divide into four 
sub-groups on the basis of race and gender (women of colour, men of colour, white women and white men). 
This grouping is based on the assumption that these ascribed groups will have salience in social interactions. 
The sub-groups are invited to sub-divide: on any criteria the groups feel salient, e.g. class, English as a first 
language, sexuality. With a small group it is often better to allow the group to remain undivided, but seek 
a collective account reflecting the diversity within the group. The groups are, or the group is, asked to 
describe how their identity group (or the diverse members of a small group) experiences being a law student. 
The sub-group or group must give their account through a drawing. Imposing the need to draw and represent 
graphically might generate some dissent; however, it is an important element of the exercise. There seem 
to be several reasons for this.58 First, it tends to neutralise the too-ready language skills of law students. 
These skills can be used to distance the students from their feelings. Second, it encourages a freer expression 
because the participants struggle to express anything: the drawing tends to produce images that require 
interpretation, they tend towards the inchoate. This allows for some humour around the drawings which 
can diffuse tensions.59 Finally, it encourages cooperation within the group directed towards producing some 
sort of picture. 
When the groups (or group) have produced their pictures they are shared and discussed. 
Pearce takes aim at the assumption of normality that is English as a first language white male. As Goffman 
pointed out the norm (normal) is in fact abnormal.60 There is an unmistakable tendency to regard middle 
class white male as neutral, despite it obviously being a very specific set of social roles. In the words of 
Pearce:61 
‘To be a responsible and constructive member of legal organizations, a white lawyer must therefore 
acknowledge that whiteness is a racial identity and not a background norm.’ 
The aim here is not quite the same. 
The aim here is to raise awareness of both difference and commonality of experiences. The ideal of equality 
of opportunity is widespread. The assumption that the ideal is realised in practice in the UK is widespread, 
at least amongst my students.62 The belief in colour- and gender-neutral rule of law is strong, reflecting the 
universalising norm expressed and given social reality in the ideal of a rule of law, justice being depicted 
as blind as to status or power. The aim is not necessarily to attack this conception: rather the aim is the 
preliminary one of establishing the salience of identity for lived experience. This process of discovery of 
difference is at the root of bridging social capital. 
Bridging social capital is at the root of perceiving the other as a person deserving of care, or respect, or 
recognition. Awareness of experiences of others allows a universalism to develop from awareness of 
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diversity. This can generate academic benefits for all students.63 However, again the focus here is not on 
that aspect of diversity, but on the need to explore difference in order to understand what is common. In the 
words of Martha Nussbaum:64 
‘People from diverse backgrounds sometimes have difficulty recognizing one another as fellow 
citizens in the community of reason. This is so, frequently, because actions and motive require, and 
do not always receive, a patient effort of interpretation.’ 
In effect it is seeking to build from the specific to the universal by extending the range of the familiar. If 
most people do not apply universal principles to specific situations in ethical practice then we must seek to 
build outwards from specific and familiar groups to those less familiar.  
The power of the exercise described by Pearce is that it makes one’s own identity group unfamiliar through 
the drawing exercise. It then brings out the similarities and differences through the sharing of interpretations 
of the drawings. It enables articulation of the ordinary and commonplace realities of identity perspectives 
through a common awkwardness in graphic expression. It makes the giving of some explanations of actions 
and motives natural: because everybody has to explain, there is no normal group whose experience is taken 
as the common standard for each group. 
The power of the exercise is difficult to explain. The whole process requires careful administration, and 
significant time. This means it will need to be embedded in a relevant substantive subject matter. Obvious 
possibilities are: the relationship between the client and lawyer; equality in employment law; equality in 
sports law; reflections on employment careers; social justice; civil rights; social work and the law; medical 
law; research ethics; and legal theory. One benefit of incorporating the exercise into teaching practice is 
that it sensitises the academics involved to the issues of diversity in their own practice. 
Exercises developed in the field of diversity training are often adaptable for the purpose of developing 
appreciation of difference and common humanity. Test of unconscious bias are a fun way to introduce the 
idea that we incorporate stereotypes into our perceptions of the world.65 As always in this area of practice 
sensitivity needs to be shown and exclusion of any individuals or sub-groups should be assiduously avoided. 
A lightness of touch is usually better than earnest seriousness in terms of tone. 
 
7. PUBLIC ROLE MODELS 
Anne Colby and William Damn interviewed 23 people they identified as moral exemplars in American life. 
The aim was to identify what made and motivated people who were recognised as moral exemplars. The 
people interviewed were diverse in terms of ethnicity, gender, class, and religious identities. One reason to 
carry out the study was to use the results to inspire other people to be motivated towards a life of moral 
commitment:66 
‘In the course of human events, moral values have been most convincingly demonstrated and 
communicated through the personification of good in individual lives. Moral behaviour and moral 
influence of every kind rely heavily on such personification. This may be inevitable, because moral 
choices are constructed in relationships with real people, and moral ideas have behavioural meaning 
only as they are actively interpreted in human relationships. Moral personification is a ready-made 
means of creating such interpretations, since it brings with it direct illustrations of human action as 
well as an inspirational example of virtue embraced.’ 
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The other aim was to try to understand what led to people living remarkable and morally exemplary lives:67 
‘Human goodness, in fact, is both persistent and fragile. It appears when we least expect it, under 
condition that are little understood and difficult to create.’ 
In legal education one means to try and support students in developing moral motivations is to expose them 
to role models, and to reflect upon those people’s choices and lives. In doing this we must be aware of the 
linked dangers of hagiography and an unrealistic emphasis on individuals. The Oliners’ warning of the 
beguiling attraction of the hero narrative is apposite here.68 Colby and Damon are at pains to emphasise the 
importance of social support for their moral exemplars:69 
‘The relations between the exemplar and the group are reciprocal in their influence and are mutually 
transformative. Initially, there is a partial match of goals between the two. Then there is a 
communication of new information and concerns, followed by an engagement in new activities, 
followed finally by the adoption of broader moral goals.’ 
The life stories of the moral exemplars were not marked by isolated struggle but by an invigorating social 
dynamic. Although some exemplars faced periods of social ostracism as a result of their activities, it was 
one they shared with others who were significant others. Support, challenge, and creative discourse marked 
the developmental process of the exceptional individual far more than any isolated and tortured wrestling 
with conscience.70 
In educational terms the danger of presenting an unrealistic portrayal of the heroic individual is best 
countered by placing the individuals whose experiences are being considered into a social context that gives 
real emphasis to other people active at the time. The better vehicle is not the biography in isolation but the 
story of the times, or events, or groups, or movements, that the life story formed a part of. There are three 
challenges to adopting a contextual account. First, there is a risk that the story of the individual is lost, and 
the educational advantage of a close consideration of an individual’s formation and struggle and 
achievement becomes obscured by the clutter of contextual information. Second, that the contextual 
material makes the quantity of subject matter that has to be covered overwhelming in terms of curriculum 
space. Third, the difficulty of identifying adequate teaching resources to support the teaching and learning 
aims. Each of these problems can be dealt with.  
To use a single example of how the three problems can be dealt with I will briefly discuss the possible use 
of the life stories of Clifford and Virginia Durr as individuals whose moral commitments and active life 
can be presented as role models for law students to consider. Clifford and Virginia were married and lived 
a long life together. Clifford was a lawyer. Virginia was a mother, legal secretary, volunteer worker, and 
activist. Each was born to an upper class Alabama family and had a privileged upbringing. Their lives were 
caught up in the struggle against poll taxes in the Southern States, the impact of the Great Depression, the 
administration of New Deal reforms, the un-American activities witch hunts, and desegregation. 
Virginia spent three decades in political activity directed against poll taxes. Poll taxes were charged upon 
the casting of a vote. They were high enough to be a real economic disincentive to vote for poor white men, 
women of all classes without independent economic resources, and black people. In effect the poll tax made 
the grant of the vote to women in 1920 nugatory for most women in the Southern States of America. It was 
this injustice that moved Virginia to enter political work, together with a desire to mix with the politically 
active women of Washington DC where she was living. Her experiences with this group of politically active 
women sensitised her to the justice behind calls for union recognition and racial equality, and ultimately to 
the need to end segregation in the South. She refused to support attacks on communists or communist 
sympathisers, and was subpoenaed by the Senate Internal Security Committee to give evidence. She refused 
to answer any questions, and although she was threatened with imprisonment for contempt she suffered no 
formal sanction.  She was active in the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s.  
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Clifford Durr started out as a lawyer in a practice giving advice to the local business community in Alabama. 
However, during the Depression he suggested that the partners could take a drop in their pay rather than 
laying off vulnerable workers. This led him to become vulnerable to being laid off, and he sought work in 
Washington DC where he worked for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation – a New Deal body where 
he worked on a programme to re-capitalise the banks. In 1941 he was appointed head of the Federal 
Communications Commission. However, he was opposed to administering loyalty oaths, and refused to do 
so, and when his period in office came to an end in 1948 he resigned in order to avoid being involved in 
the mounting anti-communist persecutions. He stared a law firm in Washington, but an early client was a 
victim of the anti-communist persecutions, and he became associated with such clients. One characteristic 
of those facing persecution was they had no funds, and the firm was soon not viable due to its reputation of 
being willing to act for suspected or even actual communists. He obtained a post working for a corporation 
in Denver. However, before he had even started, the corporation insisted Virginia retract a political 
statement she had made, and as he refused to put pressure on her to do so he lost the position. The couple 
moved back to Alabama where he practiced law with a client base that included poor Afro-Americans. 
When Virginia became a notorious figure in conservative Southern circles by refusing to answer questions 
in the Senate, Clifford’s white client base almost entirely disappeared. He would later support civil rights 
activists through his legal practice. 
The couple make a valuable case history because they each supported the other. They changed from being 
principled but essentially privileged and conservative young people to becoming radicals who put principles 
before economic and career advantage. The interactions the couple had with each other, and that each of 
them had with those social groups she and he chose to associate with in Washington DC, were crucial to 
their developing awareness of injustice and devotion to opposing it. The geographical changes make it easy 
to keep the focus upon the couple sharp. Their arenas of struggle change as they move around the country 
for work reasons. Thus, the first challenge of keeping the individuals in focus whilst giving emphasis to the 
social influences upon them is simplified by them being a couple that had to move around and that did 
different things in different places. 
The second challenge (that the quantity of material is too much in terms of curriculum space) is more 
difficult. In the UK at least, the American Civil War, segregation, the impact of the Great Depression, the 
New Deal, the anti-communist persecution of the Cold War, and the civil rights movement are not very 
well understood. There is some background awareness of them in popular culture but it must be assumed 
that it will be necessary to teach the background history. In the UK even Brown v Board of Education of 
Topeka is an unfamiliar reference.71 Also, the constitutional role of the Supreme Court is unfamiliar to UK 
law students. However, these problems are not significantly aggravated by the American origin of Virginia 
and Clifford Durr. Students are more likely to have heard of Abraham Lincoln than William Gladstone; 
almost certain to have the most patchy knowledge of the Empire and decolonisation; to have very little 
understanding of the Irish Troubles as they are quaintly known; and little appreciation of the impact of the 
Great Depression in the UK. It may be useful to explain the differences between the jurisdiction and role 
of the Supreme Court in the UK and Supreme Court in the USA. 
The problem is how to incorporate the quite extensive contextual material into a curriculum context where 
it becomes independently worthwhile to teach it. If one is teaching a comparative law course that has the 
USA as a comparator jurisdiction then the material easily lends itself to such an enterprise. If teaching about 
democracy and the rule of law then the material lends itself to use as an excellent example of deficiencies 
in nominally democratic regimes, and the struggle for reform in the twentieth century. If teaching about the 
relationship between law and social change the material is seminal. If teaching comparative legal history 
the material is wonderfully engaging. However, all of these subjects are marginal in contemporary 
undergraduate legal education. If this couple are to be used as role models of a lifetime of moral engagement 
then it cannot be sufficient to rely upon any such vehicle being available. The issue becomes whether the 
development of the story of the couple is worth telling for its own sake. 
It is argued above that political rule - rule through sectional assertion of interest - is a value that legal 
education should try to advance. In part this reflects the truth expressed by Jhering when he wrote:72 
‘I now turn to the real subject of my essay – the struggle for law. This struggle is provoked by the 
violation or the withholding of legal rights. Since no legal right, be it the right of an individual or of 
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a nation, is guarded against this danger, it follows that this struggle may be repeated in every sphere 
of law – in the valleys of private law, as well as on the heights of public and international law.’ 
The life stories of Virginia and Clifford Durr are all about the struggle for rights, for concrete law: the 
struggle to make rights real and effective in practice, in the face of prejudice, tradition, and public fear 
whipped up by political actors for sectional advantage. Their stories show that it is possible to live a life 
devoted to this struggle and find it fulfilling. If not their story, then some other life story or life stories with 
this content deserve some space in the legal curriculum. 
The third difficulty (identifying adequate teaching resources) is not a problem. There is the work of Colby 
and Damon on Virginia, which also touches on Clifford.73 This work also places her life story into an 
analytical frame that helps to articulate those features of her story of general ethical importance. There is 
Virginia’s autobiography.74 There is a scholarly biography of Clifford.75 Once one expands the focus 
beyond the couple, the literature is vast. 
An alternative to using historical figures is to use people who have been involved in more recent principled 
action. Nick Johnson and I used the example of Susan Murray and Beth Robinson as exemplars of good 
legal practice.76 Their commitment to equal rights for gay and lesbian couples could equally be used in to 
inform instructional use of their practice as exemplars of ethical legal practice.77 David Luban has used the 
example of Yvonne Bradley as exemplary ethical legal practice.78 It is possible the more contemporary 
context that such people act within can reduce the strain of necessary supporting material. However, there 
is some loss of perspective, and the supporting literatures are less deep. 
 
8. FICTIONAL CHARACTERS 
Role models combine two means of influence: they have narrative interest – the biography is a form of 
narrative people find interesting; and they have an impact on what people view as feasible in a life – the 
biography informs readers of what is possible in the real world. It is the second feature that makes 
biographical accounts potentially uniquely powerful as an inspirational form. What has been lived must 
have been possible. Obviously, the honesty of the biographical narrative is crucial to this impact. If a reader 
feels the account is not true, that the narrative is more hagiography than biography, then the reader feels 
that it is not a realistic inspirational model.  
The fictional account of a life, or of a working life, or of an event in a life, can also influence in these two 
ways. The short story, the novel, the play, the film, the poem, and the essay can all capture interest and be 
‘true to life’ in literal or symbolic ways. Fiction is largely, although not entirely, judged by its ability to 
engage, to entertain, and to inform the audience. Literary or commercial success does not indicate a work 
will be useful in encouraging ethical self-reflection or the development of a moral character. However, it is 
a good indicator that the work can engage and form a way to focus ethical reflection for some students.  
There are fictional accounts of legal education and legal practice that can be used in legal education.79 
These often engage with ethical problems of law, the legal system, and legal practice. There seems no 
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reason not to make use of these resources in legal education, although they are actually little used in my 
experience. The problem is presumably once again the problem of space on the curriculum.  
There are fictional accounts of the importance of values in living a life worth living.80 Such accounts are 
likely to feature on courses concerned with law and literature, or law and the humanities, or law and media 
studies. If well chosen and well taught I have no doubt these can be extremely valuable in developing ethical 
awareness and sophistication in law students. 
Here I intend to focus on one example of a powerful short story that can be used to illuminate problems of 
ethical professional practice. It is about ethical conduct in the practice of the medicine. One advantage of 
taking a story from non-legal professional practice is that it raises issues of ethical professional practice 
rather than ethical legal professional practice. It makes the generalisation of the ethical issues easier because 
the issues are abstracted from medical practice and are abstract enough to apply to legal practice. The ethics 
are general not related to knowledge of any code or rule of practice, but clearly related to the duty to put 
the interests of the patient first. 
The story was written by William Carlos Williams and is called The Use of Force.81 Williams practiced as 
a doctor in first half of the twentieth century in New Jersey. The story tells of a house call by a doctor on a 
sick child. The story is not very long and can be read in about ten minutes. It is short enough, if desired, to 
be read within a seminar of one hour and still leave time for group analysis and discussion.  
Students need to be told that diphtheria used to be a dangerous disease in the USA and UK that was often 
fatal to children. Mortality rates in the absence of effective treatment were up to 20% of cases in children 
under five and 5-10% in older patients. President Cleveland’s daughter died of diphtheria, as did one of 
Queen Victoria’s adult daughters and her infant granddaughter. An effective treatment was developed in 
the early years of the twentieth century, but early treatment was important for success. The most telling 
diagnostic sign of diphtheria is a peculiar membrane on the tonsils which looks a bit like a patch of grey 
leather in the back of the mouth. In the UK diphtheria is controlled by vaccination, as indeed it is in most 
of the developed world.  
The story starts by giving a very brief account of the situation. The parents are both at home and clearly 
worried; implicitly this child is their first and only child. The doctor is aware of the business nature of the 
relationship as well as the medical relationship of care; the fee of three dollars is mentioned in establishing 
the scene. All of the adults are worried that the child, a young girl, might have diphtheria. The child is 
described as:82  
‘an unusually attractive little thing … She had magnificent blonde hair, in profusion. One of those 
picture children often reproduced in advertising leaflets …’ 
The child is attractive and seems strong constitutionally; however, she is feverish and uncooperative. She 
claims not to have a sore throat, but will not let her mother look. The doctor tries to coax her into opening 
her mouth. He uses her name ‘Mathilda’ in an attempt to establish her trust. All attempts are futile, and the 
parents’ attempts to help hinder his conciliatory approach. The parents irritate the doctor who speaks the 
dread word ‘diphtheria’ and frightens the parents, and no doubt thereby the little girl, by doing so. He will 
need to force the child’s mouth open. 
It is in the best interests of the child to have the diagnostic check. The child was clearly going to struggle, 
and the doctor had to enlist the aid of the parents, and the father in particular to help hold her still. Fear of 
diphtheria, and distress at the fight, and hesitance over hurting the child in restraining her, all take their toll 
on the father:83 
‘The father tried his best, and he was a big man … he himself was almost fainting, while the mother 
moved back and forth behind us raising and lowering her hands in an agony of apprehension.’ 
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Thus the characters in the drama have been sketched out with brilliant economy of description. The parents 
almost overcome by fear that their loved and cherished baby might die; at the same time swamped by 
embarrassment before the doctor, and feelings of helplessness in the face of their Mathilda’s refusal to 
cooperate, Mathilda who is stubborn, scared, and furious. The doctor who is spending a lot of time on a 
three dollar fee; who is irritated by the parents and their inability to control the child and thereby facilitate 
his task; and who is now engaged in a struggle against the child he likes but who he must distress in order 
to protect her. 
The doctor should look at the back of the child’s throat. There is no doubt about what should be done here. 
The problem is how it should be done. It is hard to hurt a child in order to examine it. It is hard to do so 
calmly. It might make sense to let everyone calm down and come back later. However, any delay might 
raise the risks to the child, and of course it would mean more time spent on this patient, and the dreadful 
thought of the unpleasant task put off through the rest of the doctor’s day. The doctor presses ahead:84 
‘Then I grasped the child’s head with my left hand and tried to get the wooden tongue depressor 
between her teeth. She fought, with clenched teeth, desperately! But now I also had grown furious 
– at a child. I tried to hold her down but I couldn’t. I know how to expose a throat for inspection. 
And I did my best. When finally I got the wooden spatula behind the last teeth and just the point of 
it into the mouth cavity, she opened up for an instant but before I could see anything she came down 
again and gripping the wooden blade between her molars she reduced it to splinters before I could 
get it out again.’ 
The doctor presses on, using a spoon in the place of his shattered medical implement:85 
‘Get me a smooth-handled spoon of some sort, I told the mother. We’re going through with this. 
The child’s mouth was already bleeding. Her tongue was cut and she was screaming in wild 
hysterical shrieks. Perhaps I should have desisted and come back in an hour or more. No doubt it 
would have been better. But I have seen at least two children lying dead in bed of neglect in such 
cases, and feeling that I must get a diagnosis now or never I went at it again. But the worst of it was 
that I too had got beyond reason. I could have torn the child apart in my own fury and enjoyed it. It 
was a pleasure to attack her. My face was burning with it.’ 
This is the dramatic highpoint of the story. The diagnosis is made: the child did have diphtheria, and 
presumably will receive treatment and recover. But the story does not end with this victory for medical 
care. It ends with a description of the little girl:86 
‘Now truly she was furious. She had been on the defensive before but now she attacked. Tried to get 
off her father’s lap and fly at me while tears of defeat blinded her eyes.’ 
The child has been humiliated. 
This story is about a professional who has to do something unpleasant but very important. It is about 
someone who is aware of the importance of money to himself and to his clients, and who is aware of the 
importance of his services to these parents.  It is about someone who in the embodied reality of the task 
struggles to cope. He does the right thing, but he does it in an emotional state that is wrong. He tends to the 
child but he also fights and defeats the child. He is irritated by the parents because they are clumsy and too 
aware of him as the doctor, but he is clumsy and too aware of them as people in the midst of distress that 
he is causing. He does his professional duty, but he does it by behaving unprofessionally. He has done his 
duty but comes away knowing he has failed in some way to be who he aspires to be. 
In terms of issues for discussion raised by the story it is useful to explore at least eight with law students. 
First, did the doctor do right? Second, could the situation have been resolved properly with less distress – 
and if so, how? Third, is the emotional state of the parents a proper matter for the doctor to consider? Fourth, 
is the emotional state of the child relevant to the duty of the doctor beyond issues of avoiding physical harm 
if possible? Fifth, what values are at play in this story? Such as: duty to give proper medical care to the 
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child; care for her feelings; care for the feelings of the parents; care for the feelings of the doctor, who is 
clearly upset; amount of the fee charged in light of the difficulty and time taken; self-control; 
professionalism. Sixth, is the description of raising tension and heightened emotions familiar from any prior 
experience of the students? If so, how did they cope? Seventh, how might such feelings arise in legal work? 
In this regard there is beating the witness in cross-examination; or the other side in negotiation; or informing 
the unpleasant client that the scheme is illegal, appeal is hopeless, or the tax cannot be avoided. Eighth, 
how might we prepare ourselves to deal with the emotions that can be associated with acting rightly?  
Hopefully, it is clear that the power of the writing makes it worth the time spent in reading and providing 
the contextual information required for classroom use of the story. Fiction can get the student as close to 
an imaginative embodiment of the situation as is possible. Honest fiction that concerns itself with the 
difficulties of professional practice can raise issues of conduct that would be difficult to raise in a clinical 
or work situation. 
Fiction can help students in reflecting upon their values and what they want them to be. In its ability to put 
the reader in the story it can approach simulation as a methodology for learning. Engaging fiction draws 
readers into the narrative and allows them to care about the characters and their difficulties. Fiction 
informed by an honest and thoughtful intelligence portrays situations and events in ways that illuminate 
issues that are difficult to bring into focus using other methods. 
 
9. CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 
There are several ways in which clinical legal education might be important for inculcating values or for 
leading to student reflection upon values. Real client clinics in particular encourage students to adopt client 
service as an aim, as discussed above in chapter 3. Furthermore, many law clinic clients are from social 
groups that face difficulties in accessing adequate legal services. Awareness of the difficulties faced by 
underprivileged groups or individuals can have transformative effects upon students. There is some fairly 
robust evidence that clinical experience in law school can lead to ethical development in practice: that clinic 
might in fact prepare some students to be ethically aware when they leave education and start practicing.87 
These possibilities for use of clinical methods in legal education have been explored above. 
Here concern will be focussed upon those clinics that adopt an expressly value-oriented perspective, clinics 
that are directed towards social justice, or community service, or service to some specific community.88 
These clinics direct students to have regard to certain values, such as: access to justice, or equality of 
treatment for different groups in law and elsewhere, or alleviation of poverty, or liberty, fraternity and 
equality as social values. Some social justice-orientated clinics have played an important role under 
oppressive regimes and might be considered a form of oppositional non-governmental organisation.89 In 
sponsoring a social justice law clinic, a law school might be pursuing what has been treated as an important, 
indeed definitive, characteristic of a university: ‘a role as critic and conscience of society’.90  
Some models of social justice clinic violate the imperative to align higher education with the interest of the 
student as set out in chapter 1.91 The primacy of alleviating deficiencies in access to justice is not an 
educational aim. It does fit into the broader role of the university, and especially as an extra-curricular 
activity it is an area of voluntary activity that might be encouraged as a form of community service. 
However, it is not appropriate to place community justice above the educational interests of the students, 
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and whilst a commitment to some form of social altruism might inform an academic in her life and practice 
this is not a legitimate reason to impose this value choice upon students.92 Such an academic might act as 
an inspirational role model for students. However, the commitments central to the identity of the academic 
are not commitments of the academy.  
Thus, the political commitment to serving underprivileged groups in society is not a value that can be 
allowed to supplant either the educational values of higher education, or the specific values of legal 
education. This does not mean there can be no place for them in legal education. Indeed, some of these 
personal commitments can be brought within the ambit of specifically legal values: restrictions on access 
to justice can distort the truth-finding function of legal process; denial of voice to underprivileged groups 
can undermine the practice of political government. Some others can be offered as inspirational goals that 
can be endorsed by students: an internalised ethic of altruistic action on behalf of the poor or weak can 
serve as a valuable model for students.93 Certainly those models that do not assess for compliance with the 
political aims of the social justice clinic avoid the danger of becoming oppressive.94 
There are various models of social justice clinic.95 Some are concerned with the delivery of legal services.96 
Some are concerned with policy.97 Similar, in being concerned with live clients and social justice concerns, 
are the innocence projects,98 and placements with legal advice providers such as the Citizens Advice 
Bureau.99 
Fran Quigley argues that clinical education should be used to teach about social justice. Quigley rejects the 
idea that not talking about social justice is neutral, and arguing that such neglect has an ethical content. 
Quigley argues that legal education should aim to inculcate values of opposition to social injustice in 
students:100 
‘[A] complete legal education and, in particular, a complete clinical educational experience, should 
include lessons of social justice. Clinical teachers should accept as part of their role the exposure of 
clinical students to experiences and reflective opportunities that will lead to social justice learning. 
To perform adequately this role, clinical teachers must understand the dynamic that causes the 
students' justice perspective to be transformed by their clinical experiences, and then design a 
methodology inspired by adult learning theory that will nurture the social justice learning 
opportunities a clinical course uniquely provides.’ 
Thus, Quigley argues for self-conscious efforts in the design and delivery of clinical legal education with 
the aim of facilitating students’ re-evaluation of their own values in the light of social injustice.  
The argument identifies clinical legal education as particularly powerful as a ‘transformative’ method of 
teaching and learning. The transformation in question is one of ethical beliefs, or moral motivation. The 
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power of clinical education rests upon its nature as experiential learning, and learning theories of 
experiential learning. 
Although there are various formulations of the dynamics of experiential learning they tend to agree that 
learning is a reflective process: something is noticed in the world that requires explanation; it is reflected 
upon; the reflection leads to the construction of a new view of the world.101 Fran Quigley uses such a model, 
taken from Jack Mezirow, of learning through reaction to a ‘disorienting moment’.102 The learner struggles 
to place a disorienting event or experience in existing schemes of meaning; this awareness of the 
unexplained results in either reflection and work on the problem posed, or in the dismissal of the 
incongruity; if the experience is reflected upon then learning can take place, as the learner re-orders prior 
understanding to make sense of the disorienting event. This learning, because it involves changes in the 
way the world is perceived and understood, can be transformative in effect.103 
Quigley identifies the social context of live client clinic providing legal services to disadvantaged 
individuals or groups as key, because this generates experiences that are likely to be disorienting moments 
for relatively privileged law students:104 
‘The experiential basis of live-client clinical settings is ideal for the provision of disorienting 
experiences for the learner. Most clinical courses involve the learners' direct representation of clients 
who, due to poverty, disability, discrimination or the like, are the victims of systemic injustice. Most 
law students come to the course without significant exposure to the victims of injustice and almost 
none come to the course with experience representing a person trying to wring a just result from an 
often unresponsive legal system. When the learners are confronted with their clients' very real 
suffering and frustration, the learners' necessarily abstract understanding of social justice often 
prevents assimilation of the experience. Hence, disorientation occurs.’ 
In support of this plausible claim paraphrases of student remarks are produced at the head of the article:105 
‘I couldn't believe what I saw in court yesterday. While we were waiting for our trial to start, dozens 
of people were getting evicted by the judge without even having a real chance to defend themselves. 
A lot of these tenants seemed to have good cases, but just because they were poor and didn't know 
the system the landlords' lawyers were getting anything they wanted from the judge. I just never 
realized how poor people get railroaded in what I thought was a fair system.’ 
The brute facts of the lived experiences of the clients undermined comfortable assumptions about the legal 
system.106 
In order to make best use of such disorientating moments a clinic needs to be structured so that: firstly, it 
facilitates the occurrence of disorientating moments for the students; secondly, that it facilitates the work 
on making sense of the experience, through reflection and discussion; and thirdly, that it allows the students 
to give effect to their value reorientation.107 The first necessity is embedded in clinical education with live 
                                                          
101 P. JARVIS, ‘Learning to be a Person in Society: Learning to be Me’ in P. JARVIS, Teaching Learning and Education in Late Modernity: 
The selected works of Peter Jarvis, Routledge, Abingdon 2012. An excellent selection of readings is: K. ILLERIS (ed.), Contemporary 
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102 J. MEZIROW, Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning, John Wiley & Sons, San Francisco CA 1991. 
103 Jarvis distinguishes between events (which seem to be equivalent to disorienting moments) and episodes. The episode is either an event that 
is prolonged over time or a series of events. This conceptual division helps to highlight the key role paid by the learner in defining the significant 
events (what is perceived as connected); and it allows the idea of the episode enables the analysis to span time, as learners do. In effect it is the 
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flow of time but learning occurs as joined up series of events upon which we concentrate.’ P. JARVIS, ‘Experience’ in P. JARVIS, Teaching 
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105 Ibid. p. 37. 
106 N. MARTIN, ‘Poverty, Culture and the Bankruptcy Code: Narratives from the money law clinic’ (2005) 12 Clinical Law Review 203, 239-
240 supplies evidence to this effect of disorienting moments, reflection, and re-evaluation for the academic as well as the students: ‘Practicing 
law in the clinic is hard work, much harder than I anticipated given that we were not dealing with domestic violence or other life-threatening 
situations. As we saw it, it was just money. We were simply using business law and business law students, to serve the needs of indigent clients. 
This, however, created a clash of two worlds. We were attempting to use legal tools to help clients that arise from a system that clients see as 
oppressive. At times, the clients felt that this was the very system that kept them oppressed and poor. Given the use of this system and its tools, 
it was natural for clients to mistrust the process. It would have been surprising, in retrospect, if this did not happen.’ 
107 F. QUIGLEY, above n. 552, pp. 52–56. 
clients. The second is typically already supported in clinical legal education by supervision, team working, 
group discussion, and reflective journals. Making sure the social justice reflection is productive requires 
attention. It is useful to provide an adequate terminology and structural analysis to be used in making sense 
of the moments. Finally, in providing legal services, in helping the clients, the student is able to give effect 
to the new understanding of the world and the place of social injustice in that world. 
Thus, the clinic can be viewed as a teaching methodology that is naturally well suited to encouraging the 
type of value reorientation that Quigley argues should be part of the teaching mission of the law school. 
This model, of using clinical education to facilitate the re-evaluation by the student of previous uninformed 
values positions is not objectionable. The learning model places agency in the student. The method is one 
that is fully open, and that relies for effectiveness upon the heightened consciousness and awareness of the 
student to the values being re-evaluated. This use of clinic must be considered a valid and appropriate one 
in trying to facilitate the development of salience for moral motivations in law students. 
Openness to reassessment of values has been identified as a characteristic of moral exemplars. The process 
was observed and described happening naturally by Colby and Damon:108 
‘As Brand became more aware of the reality of American poverty, he also became more sensitive to 
poverty abroad. He had enjoyed travel even before he joined the war on poverty. But after he 
established TAP [Total Action Against Poverty], he travelled with eyes newly opened to the extent 
and nature of global poverty. Thus, his travel time began to put the local conditions into a global 
perspective, to understand the relation between poverty and environmental issues, and to begin to 
act on the international as well as the local level. Thus, the changes in his goals changed his 
perception of the world, which in turn broadened his understanding and ultimately changed his goals 
again.’ 
Not all of us are open, and not all of us agree about how to make sense of disturbing experiences. The aim 
of legal education should be to support students in their own personal struggles with the world of experience 
and to help them find positive ways to make sense of the ugliness of that world. This is the task of teaching 
directed towards the moral motivations and personal identity of students. 
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